Prelude
I was wishing to write on this topic long ago, and I started writing on it since three weeks ago, but never got around to publish. Unfortunately for me, perhaps, the topic was debated (albeit in a limited way) and many did reach the conclusion that I was trying to argue for. Nevertheless, this article should be there for the sake of completeness.
A big taboo in Jordan is the critical discussion of the Hashemite Monarchy and the Institution of the Throne. Unfortunately, this makes for real intellectual debate on the institution of the Throne rare and weak, and result in having criticisms of the monarchy happen in concentrated outlets, with one-sided arguments, without real objective consideration.
The truth is, if anyone wishes to advocate for reform in Jordan, a position on the Hashemite Throne must be established, whether in private or in the argument. The reason for this is that, if whoever advocates for reform establishes that the institution of the throne is no good, then the matter of reform altogether should be dropped altogether and replaced with revolution. To establish the need for reform, one must first establish if the very core of the system is viable, and I think it is.
Again, to emphasize, this article is not a defense but rather a part of a series on reform, and it wishes to investigate the legitimacy of the monarchy as an institution, both historically and in the present context. I will establish that this institution does have legitimacy, or at least some legitimacy, and in the way shed light on the societal requirements from the Throne to secure stability (of the country) and legitimacy (of the establishment).
Part 1: On the Institution of the Throne and the Legitimacy of the Hashemite Monarchy
Before we can discuss the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy, we must establish how the legitimacy of an institution is measured. The legitimacy of an institution, I believe, is established by an answer of “yes” to two questions:
- Was it (or is it) in the will of the people to have the institution?
- Does this institution serve the greater good of the nation?
Both questions must hold at any period in time, though I will argue that the second question should hold slightly more weight than the first.
Historically, the two questions can be answered in a straightforward fashion. Challengers of the Hashemite monarchy often tell a story of an Emir from Hijaz, heading to Syria, stopping along the way in Transjordan and creating a country, or a story of a figure from Hijaz, installed by Western Powers for their own ambitions. Independent of these stories, however, is the establishment of allegiance to Emir Abdullah and the Hashemite Throne in 1920.
Establishment of allegiance, also known in Arabic as mubaya`a (مبايعة), is the traditional Islamic way in which Arab tribes negotiate and establish allegiance to a ruler. In all senses, the establishment of rule in the Arab world through mubaya`a is legitimate: it is a traditional, direct negotiation between monarch-to-be and the constituency, through “legitimate” social hierarchies of tribesmen and tribe-leaders. In 1920s Transjordan, the country was mainly tribalist, and even residents of cities were rooted into the known Jordanian tribes, and were often in close contact. Even minorities, like Christian and Circassian families at that time had already organized themselves into large families that are analogous to such tribes. That is to say: such negotiation of allegiance to Abdullah I did cover the entire constituency. Then and there, in 1920, the tribes decided that their interests are deeply rooted with that of the Hashemites, and they willed the creation of a Hashemite Kingdom in Transjordan.
Therefore, we established how it was the will of the people to have the institution of the throne, specifically, the Hashemite throne.
There is a little subtlety, however, which is the annexation of the West Bank in 1949, and thus the imposition of the establishment on the population of Palestinian origins. Was it the will of those people to have the establishment? The answer is complex, and highly debatable. The Husseini’s were clearly against a Hashemite rule of the West Bank, while the Nashashibi’s were in favor. And Jerusalem at the time (and with it, the West Bank as a whole), was divided in allegiance between the Husseini’s and Nashashibi’s, and through the effort of a Jerusalem Parliament (whose authenticity and legitimacy is to be questioned), it was decided that the West Bank is to go under the establishment. As such, one cannot say much about whether it was the will of some 50% of the today’s population’s ancestry to be under the Establishment—that I admit.
As for the second question: does the institution of the throne serve the greater good of the nation? To that, I would answer yes, and popular discourse in Jordan today seems to agree: unprecedented populist expressions of loyalty to the idea of the throne, and a Hashemite throne specifically, even if people are asking for limitations of the monarch’s powers. Jamal al-Sha`ir, a Ba`athist, had said in 1998:
I started understanding how much Jordan is attached—Jordan as a country and a people, especially Transjordanians—how much the future of these people and the whole country is connected with the Hashemite throne. If the Hashemite throne goes, Jordan goes. I started believing this only in the last ten years. But many people believed it before us. But we rejected it when we were young.
Source: Anderson, Betty S.. Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State. 2005. Austin, TX.
Thus, there is a consensus, it seems, that the Hashemite throne is somehow linked to the goodwill of Jordan, but again, with a few subtleties:
- The sentence “especially Transjordanians” appears, through al-Sha`ir assures that Jordanians of Palestinian origins are also covered when he adds “and the whole country”. Still, the distinction is of interest later on, and introduces some very interesting paradoxes.
- We don’t understand why the prosperity of the Hashemite throne is in the best interest of the country and vice versa.
A good answer to the second question is that the platform of the Hashemites (starting the Sons of Hussein of Mecca to an extent, but much more so since King Hussein I) consistently included a mix of Arab nationalism, secular governance, and foreign policies of moderation1 that is congruent with the needs and aspiration of the people. Another answer (or an additional benefit) may also be that the idea of a monarch is also necessary when certain social division, especially in religion, race, but more so in origin, exist, and a power is needed to “moderate” democracy and make sure that no minority will be abused by the tyranny of a majority. Does Jordan need something like the latter? This will be discussed later, but in short, current Transjordanian nationalist movements are alarming and show us that such might be necessary.
In Short: The Palestinian Paradox and the Transjordanian Establishment
The interesting story of the status of Jordanians of Palestinian origins today and the social complexities that surround it will be tackled in another upcoming post. However, the Palestinian Paradox is a more contemporary issue that (while completely rooted in the former) can be discussed independently. The Palestinian Paradox, basically, is this:
Given the two criteria, as well as the rhetoric of those like al-Sha`ir, the legitimacy of the Hashemite Throne from the perspective of the Palestinian-Jordanians is debatable, which also pauses a serious threat to the legitimacy of the throne in the country, considering those of Palestinian origins are a large part of the population. Also given the criteria, the Establishment is a Transjordanian Establishment, initially aimed at a Transjordanian constituency. The Paradox basically states that, if we are to assume these two facts, then there is a contradiction, and the only way to avoid the contradiction is to assert that the Establishment is also legitimate for Palestinians and extended to a pan-Jordanian (or, Jordanian) establishment. Namely:
If we attempt to make the assumption that that the Hashemite Throne is illegitimate from a Palestinian-Jordanian standpoint, then the end game will result in damage for those of Palestinian origins, making such an impossible option. Or, to paraphrase: trends of racist transjordanian nationalism show that the Establishment is actually making more ‘controversial’ decisions in the protection of those of Palestinian origins from the Tyranny of Transjordanian nationalism, than it is making controversial decisions in the marginalization of those citizens.
That is not to say that the marginalization of Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origins is to be permissible at any level, or that it is ethically or practically justifiable. And I will go at lengths in discussing this in future parts. What I am saying, however, is that while there is some marginalization of Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origins, recent events show that this does not translate into bias against Jordanians of Palestinian origins, as far as the Establishment is concerned.
Conclusion
In general, one can see both historical and contemporary justification of the Hashemite Throne as a legitimate entity, whose well-being is in the best interest of the nation, and vice-versa. With many ethnic tensions existing in Jordan, especially those between Transjordanian-Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origins, the buffer of an entity to moderate democracy and control the political system is necessary. The structure of the system, the limitations of powers on the king, and the institutions entailed by the establishment, however, are not free from flaw and need to be reformed.
Coming next in the series on the Jordanian Establishment: The Ethnic Affairs.
Notes:
- As an aside, Marwan Muasher criticizes the use of “moderate” to describe states that practice foreign policy moderation with Israel, not because he disagrees, but because he believes that such states don’t extend such moderation to their internal policies and thus cannot be called truly moderate in every sense — only so in foreign policy. I agree, actually.
