In Jordan, hard facts are not commonly used, unfortunately. As I described at an earlier post, Jordan has a big social problem of bigotry and over-confidence is politics.  Many statements are given about the deteriorating status of living, which is true and sad in many cases, but are often expanded and generalized to say that nothing good has come out of the establishment. This is not true. Jordan has real problems: We have political problems, from the external climate of the Middle East, to internal marginalization. We have social problems, and problems in education, and problems in corruption, and a poor economic situation, etc. But things are getting better, and to say that the establishment has not done anything would be an injustice.

This is not to say that all is well: we are a long way to go, and we should obviously demand more from the establishment. We should also demand less marginalization, and to be included in the process. But to fool ourselves and say that we are living in a system where the Establishment is trying to keep is weak and poor would be an unjust, unfounded, and disheartening act.

This is a look at the last ten years King Abdullah II’s reign as the Kingdom’s head of state.

Can some of these developments be associated to the potential positive sum nature of the world, technology, etc.? Yes. But take a look at the data, collected from a number of sources, and decide for yourself if it shows the possibility of a benign, well-intentioned establishment.

Information is taken from the CIA Factbook (referenced CIA for short), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Ministry of Finance of Jordan (MOF). Currencies are either in dollar ($ / USD), or in Jordanian Dinars (JD / JOD), and are indicated.

Nor all numbers are necessarily useful; GDP for instance is often criticized for not being a good metric of a country’s economic situation. Keep this in mind while viewing.

According to Abdullah II’s book, Jordan exports to the US shot up from “virually nothing to $18 million in 1998”. Under Abdullah’s negotiations, this number rose to $1 billion in 2009.

Debt as a percentage of the GDP continues to drop. After it reached below 60% of the GDP around 2008, a new policy was adopted that indicated that public debt shall never go above 60%. Initial reports indicate that we are about to hit that mark now, a very concerning sign. But people forget we are in a global recession; things are indeed very concerning, but some people assume that the establishment has worsened our situation. Looking back at 2002, where public debts’ percentage of the GDP was in the high 90s, it puts things in perspective.

Public and External debts in Jordan shown as an absolute number in JOD. These numbers are contemporary and not adjusted for inflation. As such, if adjusted for inflation, one would probably see a more level Public Debt graph up to 2011, and slowly declining external debts.

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Prelude

I was wishing to write on this topic long ago, and I started writing on it since three weeks ago, but never got around to publish. Unfortunately for me, perhaps, the topic was debated (albeit in a limited way) and many did reach the conclusion that I was trying to argue for. Nevertheless, this article should be there for the sake of completeness.

A big taboo in Jordan is the critical discussion of the Hashemite Monarchy and the Institution of the Throne. Unfortunately, this makes for real intellectual debate on the institution of the Throne rare and weak, and result in having criticisms of the monarchy happen in concentrated outlets, with one-sided arguments, without real objective consideration.

The truth is, if anyone wishes to advocate for reform in Jordan, a position on the Hashemite Throne must be established, whether in private or in the argument. The reason for this is that, if whoever advocates for reform establishes that the institution of the throne is no good, then the matter of reform altogether should be dropped altogether and replaced with revolution. To establish the need for reform, one must first establish if the very core of the system is viable, and I think it is.

Again, to emphasize, this article is not a defense but rather a part of a series on reform, and it wishes to investigate the legitimacy of the monarchy as an institution, both historically and in the present context. I will establish that this institution does have legitimacy, or at least some legitimacy, and in the way shed light on the societal requirements from the Throne to secure stability (of the country) and legitimacy (of the establishment).

Part 1: On the Institution of the Throne and the Legitimacy of the Hashemite Monarchy

Before we can discuss the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy, we must establish how the legitimacy of an institution is measured. The legitimacy of an institution, I believe, is established by an answer of “yes” to two questions:

1. Was it (or is it) in the will of the people to have the institution?
2. Does this institution serve the greater good of the nation?

Both questions must hold at any period in time, though I will argue that the second question should hold slightly more weight than the first.

Historically, the two questions can be answered in a straightforward fashion. Challengers of the Hashemite monarchy often  tell a story of an Emir from Hijaz, heading to Syria, stopping along the way in Transjordan and creating a country, or a story of a figure from Hijaz, installed by Western Powers for their own ambitions. Independent of these stories, however, is the establishment of allegiance to Emir Abdullah and the Hashemite Throne in 1920.

Establishment of allegiance, also known in Arabic as mubaya`a (مبايعة), is the traditional Islamic way in which Arab tribes negotiate and establish allegiance to a ruler. In all senses, the establishment of rule in the Arab world through mubaya`a is legitimate: it is a traditional, direct negotiation between monarch-to-be and the constituency, through “legitimate” social hierarchies of tribesmen and tribe-leaders. In 1920s Transjordan, the country was mainly tribalist, and even residents of cities were rooted into the known Jordanian tribes, and were often in close contact. Even minorities, like Christian and Circassian families at that time had already organized themselves into large families that are analogous to such tribes. That is to say: such negotiation of allegiance to Abdullah I did cover the entire constituency. Then and there, in 1920, the tribes decided that their interests are deeply rooted with that of the Hashemites, and they willed the creation of a Hashemite Kingdom in Transjordan.

Therefore, we established how it was the will of the people to have the institution of the throne, specifically, the Hashemite throne.

There is a little subtlety, however, which is the annexation of the West Bank in 1949, and thus the imposition of the establishment on the population of Palestinian origins. Was it the will of those people to have the establishment? The answer is complex, and highly debatable. The Husseini’s were clearly against a Hashemite rule of the West Bank, while the Nashashibi’s were in favor. And Jerusalem at the time (and with it, the West Bank as a whole), was divided in allegiance between the Husseini’s and Nashashibi’s, and through the effort of a Jerusalem Parliament (whose authenticity and legitimacy is to be questioned), it was decided that the West Bank is to go under the establishment. As such, one cannot say much about whether it was the will of some 50% of the today’s population’s ancestry to be under the Establishment—that I admit.

As for the second question: does the institution of the throne serve the greater good of the nation? To that, I would answer yes, and popular discourse in Jordan today seems to agree: unprecedented populist expressions of loyalty to the idea of the throne, and a Hashemite throne specifically, even if people are asking for limitations of the monarch’s powers. Jamal al-Sha`ir, a Ba`athist, had said in 1998:

I started understanding how much Jordan is attached—Jordan as a country and a people, especially Transjordanians—how much the future of these people and the whole country is connected with the Hashemite throne. If the Hashemite throne goes, Jordan goes. I started believing this only in the last ten years. But many people believed it before us. But we rejected it when we were young.

Source: Anderson, Betty S.. Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State. 2005. Austin, TX.

Thus, there is a consensus, it seems, that the Hashemite throne is somehow linked to the goodwill of Jordan, but again, with a few subtleties:

1. The sentence “especially Transjordanians” appears, through al-Sha`ir assures that Jordanians of Palestinian origins are also covered when he adds “and the whole country”. Still, the distinction is of interest later on, and introduces some very interesting paradoxes.
2. We don’t understand why the prosperity of the Hashemite throne is in the best interest of the country and vice versa.

A good answer to the second question is that the platform of the Hashemites (starting the Sons of Hussein of Mecca to an extent, but much more so since King Hussein I) consistently included a mix of Arab nationalism, secular governance, and foreign policies of moderation¹ that is congruent with the needs and aspiration of the people. Another answer (or an additional benefit) may also be that the idea of a monarch is also necessary when certain social division, especially in religion, race, but more so in origin, exist, and a power is needed to “moderate” democracy and make sure that no minority will be abused by the tyranny of a majority. Does Jordan need something like the latter? This will be discussed later, but in short, current Transjordanian nationalist movements are alarming and show us that such might be necessary.

In Short: The Palestinian Paradox and the Transjordanian Establishment

The interesting story of the status of Jordanians of Palestinian origins today and the social complexities that surround it will be tackled in another upcoming post. However, the Palestinian Paradox is a more contemporary issue that (while completely rooted in the former) can be discussed independently. The Palestinian Paradox, basically, is this:

Given the two criteria, as well as the rhetoric of those like al-Sha`ir, the legitimacy of the Hashemite Throne from the perspective of the Palestinian-Jordanians is debatable, which also pauses a serious threat to the legitimacy of the throne in the country, considering those of Palestinian origins are a large part of the population. Also given the criteria, the Establishment is a Transjordanian Establishment, initially aimed at a Transjordanian constituency. The Paradox basically states that, if we are to assume these two facts, then there is a contradiction, and the only way to avoid the contradiction is to assert that the Establishment is also legitimate for Palestinians and extended to a pan-Jordanian (or, Jordanian) establishment. Namely:

If we attempt to make the assumption that that the Hashemite Throne is illegitimate from a Palestinian-Jordanian standpoint, then the end game will result in damage for those of Palestinian origins, making such an impossible option. Or, to paraphrase: trends of racist transjordanian nationalism show that the Establishment is actually making more ‘controversial’ decisions in the protection of those of Palestinian origins from the Tyranny of Transjordanian nationalism, than it is making controversial decisions in the marginalization of those citizens.

That is not to say that the marginalization of Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origins is to be permissible at any level, or that it is ethically or practically justifiable. And I will go at lengths in discussing this in future parts. What I am saying, however, is that while there is some marginalization of Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origins, recent events show that this does not translate into bias against Jordanians of Palestinian origins, as far as the Establishment is concerned.

Conclusion

In general, one can see both historical and contemporary justification of the Hashemite Throne as a legitimate entity, whose well-being is in the best interest of the nation, and vice-versa. With many ethnic tensions existing in Jordan, especially those between Transjordanian-Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origins, the buffer of an entity to moderate democracy and control the political system is necessary. The structure of the system, the limitations of powers on the king, and the institutions entailed by the establishment, however, are not free from flaw and need to be reformed.

Coming next in the series on the Jordanian Establishment: The Ethnic Affairs.

Notes:

1. As an aside, Marwan Muasher criticizes the use of “moderate” to describe states that practice foreign policy moderation with Israel, not because he disagrees, but because he believes that such states don’t extend such moderation to their internal policies and thus cannot be called truly moderate in every sense — only so in foreign policy. I agree, actually.

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Jordan’s ICT Ministry published the text of the latest Cyberspace Crime Law recently, introducing some regulation, but also protection and possible restrictions to the largely unregulated IT sector in Jordan. The law is a major step forward for privacy and security, creating punishments for unauthorized access of all types, as well as unauthorized modification of data, etc. But the text of the law at certain articles is vague, providing multiple possibilities of interpretation and thus some concerns.

Note that I translated all relevant snippets from Arabic to English myself, and I am by no means qualified to give a proper legal translation or correct legal terminology. It is only done for the sole purpose of giving context to non-Arabic readers and not to be taken seriously as correct technical interpretations.

Concerns

Article 8 is probably the greatest possible concern, stating:

المادة8- كل من قام قصداً بإرسال أو نشر بيانات أو معلومات عن طريق الشبكة المعلوماتية أو أي نظام معلومات تنطوي على ذم أو قدح أو تحقير أي شخص يعاقب بغرامة لا تقل عن (100) مائة دينار ولا تزيد على (2000) ألفي دينار.

Translated:

Article 8- Any person who has, on purpose, sent or published figures or information via the Web or any other network to vilify or slander or insult any person is punished by a fine no less that one hundred Jordanian Dinars and no more than two thousand Jordanian Dinars.

In theoretical terms, the article is actually healthy, as it legitimizes the Internet as a normal continuation of a physical world, where accountability and responsibility still exists, and where the author or creator of information is still responsible for one’s words, just as one is in the physical world. The problem, however, is two-fold:

1. The first problem is the general nature of the offense. While the article appears to target libel, slander, and defamation, however, the final (أو تحقير = or insult) is concerning as it might generalize the article to include all insults/attacks, as opposed to defamation/libel. A common requirement for defamation is that the claim is non-factual and communicated to those other than the defamed individual. The vague and general final term to describe the offense, might be interpreted to render these requirements moot. For instance, if an individual blogs about a government figure and sharply criticizes him with correct information, making valid corruption allegations, it is an insult in general but not libel/defamation. The lack of a specific meaning to the term used makes this concerning.
2. The second problem, which is greater, is that it provides no context-requirement. For instance, the article doesn’t address articles only, or publications, or blogs, but “any communication”. I personally agree with subjecting online publications, articles, and even blogs to such article. I’d also agree with subjecting mass e-mails, or perhaps hall e-mails (i.e. person A sending e-mail to businessman B, slandering potential client/partner/employee C) (side not: provided no external monitoring by the government). However, when it comes to blog comments, online forums, chat websites, etc. I think such article becomes a violation of freedom of expression.

What do you think?

Article 9 also uses general terminology which I found open to much interpretation. Subsection (a) of Article 9 states:

المادة 9- أ- كل من أرسل أو نشر عن طريق نظام معلومات أو الشبكة المعلوماتية قصداً كل ما هو مسموع أو مقروء أو مرئي مناف للحياء موجه إلى أو يمس شخصا لم يبلغ الثامنة عشرة من العمر يعاقب بالحبس مدة لا تقل عن ثلاثة اشهر وبغرامة لا تقل عن (300) ثلاثمائة دينار ولا تزيد على (5000) خمسة ألاف دينار.

The article basically prohibits “indecent” materials that targets (or is accessible to) those below age of 18, as well as indecent material that affects those below age 18. The article supposedly refers to sexually indecent material, whether in writing, imagery, or video. The problem however is the social meaning for indecent may also be open to interpretation. Would it include an insult on religion? Would it include a religious debate? Someone claiming that Religion A is a fairy tale? Certainly by standards of our society these are considered indecent. Is that possible? I don’t think its a serious concern, but certainly more concise terminology (as achieved by sub-section B of the very same article) can help.

Article 13b+c are another concern, perhaps more valid than the previous one. 13b goes to state (truncated):

… يجوز لموظفي الضابطة العدلية ضبط الأجهزة والأدوات والبرامج والأنظمة والوسائل المستخدمة في ارتكاب أي من الجرائم المنصوص عليها أو يشملها هذا القانون والأموال المتحصلة منها والتحفظ على المعلومات والبيانات المتعلقة بارتكاب أي منها.

Basically stating that authorities have the right to possess or confiscate any equipment or tools or software or systems and “methods”  used to commit any of the mentioned offenses and retaining related information and data.

Sub-section c goes further:

ج- للمحكمة المختصة الحكم بمصادرة الأجهزة و الأدوات والوسائل وتوقيف أو تعطيل عمل أي نظام معلومات أو موقع الكتروني مستخدم في ارتكاب أي من الجرائم المنصوص عليها أو يشملها هذا القانون ومصادرة الأموال المتحصلة من تلك الجرائم والحكم بإزالة المخالفة على نفقة مرتكب الجريمة.

Translated:

c- Respective courts have the right to rule to confiscate equipment, tools, and methods, as well as terminate or disable any ICT system or Internet Website used to commit any of the crimes described and included in this Law, and the confiscation of funds obtained from these crimes, and ruling to remove the offense on the expense of those guilty.

Again, this is certainly important and valuable taking into consideration articles that refer to terrorism, national security, pornographic materials, etc. However, given the existence of Article 8, does any form of libel warrant the mere possibility of confiscation of servers or information. And given the concerns on the general nature of Articles 8 and 9, could such a procedure of confiscation of servers or retaining information be a restriction on internet freedom?

I am one who truly believes in the goodwill  of the government. As such, I am comfortable that the government will not take any extreme measures to make the worst of these concerns into truth, ever; however, I am still uncomfortable, and again the reason is two-fold:

1. The potential for abuse is there. While right now the probability of such abuse is zero for all intents and purposes, the potential that such abuse would arise one day, by a future government or under different circumstances in the future, is there. And this can be easily circumvented.
2. Some of these offenses, especially the ones mentioned above, will allow the general public to seek the judicial branch (article 17). Here, vagueness of some of the terms, as well as the possibility for interpretation, combined with the strong powers given to the court, creates greater potential for abuses by the public against owners of websites expressing themselves, facilitated by the courts.

Reassurances

The law finally provides protections to owners of websites and their users by restricting access to equipment, files, data, and information, addressing hacking, and providing a range of punishments depending on the nature of access violations. The term also refers to important cyber crimes, such as Article 11 which addresses those who attempt to use cyberspace to facilitate terrorist activities, subjecting these persons to hard labor.

Article 17 itself, while addressed in the concerns section, is a great step forward to make Jordan grow as a state of Law and Institutions, per the king’s vision. Article 17 reserves the general public’s right to seek justice for any violation personally through our legal institutions. With liberal and progressive interpretations of the laws, and care from the judicial branch, we will have a population that hold one another accountable, and a population that is responsible to one another on the internet, as it is in the “physical world”.

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This took a good portion of my energy for the past month, and discusses the history of political development, and its lack thereof, in Jordan. It is rather long, but nevertheless, if you have a comment or something to say, then at least more than the abstract. You can either view it here, or, for more comfortable viewing, check the PDF at Scribd.

Abstract

This paper discusses the development of a political system in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in an effort to understand the state of the current political system in the country. Different phases and defining moments in the history of Jordan will be studied, and will often directly correspond to phases of Jordanian national identity. Starting from the assassination of King Abdullah I and the short-lived reign of Talal, through the numerous coup d’état attempts in early reign of Hussein I, up to the 1994 Wadi Araba Treaty of Peace, the effect of ongoing events in shaping a political system in Jordan will be explored.

The development of a political system in Jordan will be discussed hand-in-hand along with contemporary regional politics and political movements, coupled with internal views regarding national identity. As such, the rise of Nasser and Nasserism is examined, illustrating the impact of the increasingly popular Nasserist movements in the 1950’s on the government, its policy, and the political system. Similarly, the Arab-Israeli Conflict as a whole, including the Six-Day war, the influence of the PLO, the rise of Fedayeen, and Black September will be reviewed, showing how these also shaped state policy. In addition, the rise of Islamic movements, particularly the Islamic Action Force (IAF), the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and its relation to and impact on the political system will be discussed throughout the course of history.

It will be argued that the period of the late 1950s in King Hussein’s reign, the Six-day war of 1967, the battle of Karameh of 1968, and most importantly, Black September of 1970, have been defining moments in the history of a Jordanian national identity and the formation of its current-day political system. The paper will reason that Black September represents the climax of an internal political crisis that lasted throughout the ‘70s and ‘80s.

The development of a Jordanian political system will be studied, beginning with King Talal and Prime Minister Tawfiq abul-Huda’s rewriting of the constitution and the establishment of some sort of a semi-democracy that is put to the test in the 1952 abdication of King Talal. The effect of Nasserist-inspired coup d’état attempts, as well as Black September on the Jordanian political system will be investigated, as well as the 23-year-long era of martial law, and the still-developing political system that emerged afterwards.

The essay aims to argue that the current political system – as well as its lack-thereof – in Jordan, is a result of a combination of organic development and non-development due to a century’s internal, as well as regional, political repercussions. It is my hope that this paper would illustrate the malleability of the political system and the possibility of continuous improvement. More so, it is my hope to illustrate that the existing political system (whether its current state is fortunate or unfortunate) is a result of internal, regional, and – seldom – external political repercussions, rather than a set static agenda by the ruling elite.

Background

Since Abdullah I’s reign, the newly-created kingdom of Jordan was particularly unstable; the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan (East Bank) has just merged with the West Bank, absorbing highly politicized Palestinian West Bankers, as well as refugees, giving them all Jordanian citizenship, and tripling the population of the country[1]. The entering population of Palestinians was more sophisticated, urbanized, and educated than the average Transjordanian population, which was predominantly Bedouin. Palestinians loyal to the Mufti also saw Jordan as an occupying power, and held a “high moral ground”, believing that Jordan’s Arab Legion, along with other Arab armies, have failed them, while others looked at King Abdullah as a “protector against Israeli aggression”. It is important to note that, until 1967, these Palestinians never demanded separation from the East Bank.[2]

Thus, with a tripled population, a Transjordanian-Palestinian divide, strong Palestinian nationalism, and a growing refugee problem, the newly-created Hashemite kingdom was in highly critical times…

Beginning of Change

With three fatal gunshots[3] the life of newly-created kingdom of Jordan’s first monarch ended, marking the beginning of decades of uncertainty and instability that continue to leave a distinctive mark on the country’s political system today. Abdullah’s successor, his son Talal, shaped by his father’s mistreatment during his upbringing, was resolved on becoming his father’s polar opposite, and as such initiated far-reaching reforms to the Jordanian political system.[4]

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Photo  by Ibrahim Oweis (edited). Source. License: CC Att-SA 2.0

As the end of my extended winter vacation approaches, the stay back home has come to a (temporary) end. I’ll be on a 15 hour trip to get me to my “third home” in Boston, Massachusetts (since we have always been taught “المدرسة بيتك الثاني”, meaning “school is your second home”) in anticipation of another lovely semester at MIT! Though it is probably juvenile to ‘say goodbye’ before spending a short time apart from home, I have garnered a few observations and articulated my timeless feelings and attitudes towards Jordan, and why such feelings and attitudes (positively) inhibit me to begin with. So here we go…

I live in a country whose borders were arbitrarily drawn by Gertrude Bell, so carelessly that a misalignment in transparent paper didn’t seem to bother her one bit. A country low on natural resources, that the late King Hussein’s quote “الإنسان أغلى ما نملك” (meaning “mankind is our greatest asset”) is used jokingly to reference the lack of oil, water, and arable land. A country with a nonexistent independent historic cultural identity, and a nascent national identity.

Yet, not an inch of Jordan exists that I cannot but absolutely adore. More importantly, however, are the people whose culture and identity astound me enough to understand this “haunting beauty” the late king refers to. This culture and identity whose presence I am in awe of, is the same one that began to formulate a mere 64 years ago. What I like about our magnificent ‘national identity’, that I’d rather call a cultural identity, is how it acknowledges and cherishes the fact that it is indeed nascent; an identity summed by the thought that we, “the Jordanian people”, whether Bedouins, old locals, Circassians, Chechens, Palestinian refugees, Iraqi refugees, and others have come together to build something good out of… well, not much. It is an identity of hospitality, generosity, but most importantly, fraternity and cooperation of people united by sharing a common vision of seeking improvement.

It is hard for many living in Jordan to appreciate or even realize the goodness I feel. Indeed, we have problems of our own; we are no beacon of human rights, social norms can be disappointing, and a real influential and internal political party is yet to be seen.

Criticizing the wrong we have in Jordan is the only way to improve; and writing about what is missing is the best way to inspire future leaders to step up and fix things, again, to do something good in an area that was previously lacking. My only message is that such criticism, however harsh it may be, remains to be done in a light where the criticizer realizes that things aren’t necessarily static, and change is very well possible.

It is the duty of a critical thinker to point what is wrong, but it gets to a point where criticism is done in an atmosphere of negativity, a negativity that might convince the thinker and the reader that an effort to improve isn’t worth it… and that’s when the thinker needs to stop and think things through.

I mean hey, we just fixed our tax laws! We’re working on great energy improvements. We’ve made great progress on economical reform. And human rights, like it or not, have improved drastically over the past 20 years. Change is being done, and that’s a positive thought one should keep in mind. Never mistake my sentences as trying to impose satisfaction on whatever we already have; I’d like to remind you that change has happened in the past, and it can happen in the present and future if we work for it. Some things are easier than others, but it’ll work.

/end emotional insights

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