The status of the Arab Revolt is complex, especially when considered by an Arab. While on the one hand, the Arab Revolt signifies a rebirth of the Arabs, in which attempts for independence re-emerge, and in which the yearning to greatness after years of dormancy is rekindled. In that respect, there is a big chance that Sherif Hussein’s correspondence with the British to secure an independent Arab future lead to the existence of the modern Arab states. One the other hand, however, while the Arab Revolt might signify the birth of Independent Arab entities, it also embodies some sort of death; a more serious Arab decline.

The deep involvement of the British with the Arab Revolt, as well as the Hashemite-British alliance have given leverage to Britain over the Arabs and allowed it to secure an autocratic role in handling the remains of the Ottoman Empire after its dissolution. The Arab Revolt, instead of resulting in the Birth of a unified and independent Arab state in the Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire, lead to the partitioning of the entire empire, the creation of artificial nation states, often with imported regents or rulers, the birth of the Palestine Question and the greater Arab-Israeli Conflict, the continued ‘colonization’ of the fragmented Arab states as a weak periphery ever supporting the west.

This complex two-sidedness of the Arab Revolt makes it particularly hard, especially for an Arab, to determine one’s views towards it. While an Arab might owe it to the revolt to still call oneself ‘an Arab’, its long term political failure means that an Arab also owes it to the revolt that he probably is, with an increased probability, regretful of being ‘an Arab’.

I do not think I am in a position to comment if the Arab Revolt was benign or not, worth it or not, positive or not. My point is not to comment on Sherif Hussein’s efforts in the revolt, nor the efforts of the Arabs as a people, because I think it is largely irrelevant. Regardless of the motivation, goals, and intentions of the revolt, the reason I view it with some sort of melancholy or regret is the end result of fragmentation and instability. And I do not think that Hussein or any of his peers had an impact on that. I look at the revolt with melancholy because of the British involvement, the broken promises, the double-alliances, and the way history unfolded. What a shame.

As the end of my extended winter vacation approaches, the stay back home has come to a (temporary) end. I’ll be on a 15 hour trip to get me to my “third home” in Boston, Massachusetts (since we have always been taught “المدرسة بيتك الثاني”, meaning “school is your second home”) in anticipation of another lovely semester at MIT! Though it is probably juvenile to ’say goodbye’ before spending a short time apart from home, I have garnered a few observations and articulated my timeless feelings and attitudes towards Jordan, and why such feelings and attitudes (positively) inhibit me to begin with. So here we go…

I live in a country whose borders were arbitrarily drawn by Gertrude Bell, so carelessly that a misalignment in transparent paper didn’t seem to bother her one bit. A country low on natural resources, that the late King Hussein’s quote “الإنسان أغلى ما نملك” (meaning “mankind is our greatest asset”) is used jokingly to reference the lack of oil, water, and arable land. A country with a nonexistent independent historic cultural identity, and a nascent national identity.

Yet, not an inch of Jordan exists that I cannot but absolutely adore. More importantly, however, are the people whose culture and identity astound me enough to understand this “haunting beauty” the late king refers to. This culture and identity whose presence I am in awe of, is the same one that began to formulate a mere 64 years ago. What I like about our magnificent ‘national identity’, that I’d rather call a cultural identity, is how it acknowledges and cherishes the fact that it is indeed nascent; an identity summed by the thought that we, “the Jordanian people”, whether Bedouins, old locals, Circassians, Chechens, Palestinian refugees, Iraqi refugees, and others have come together to build something good out of… well, not much. It is an identity of hospitality, generosity, but most importantly, fraternity and cooperation of people united by sharing a common vision of seeking improvement.

It is hard for many living in Jordan to appreciate or even realize the goodness I feel. Indeed, we have problems of our own; we are no beacon of human rights, social norms can be disappointing, and a real influential and internal political party is yet to be seen.

Criticizing the wrong we have in Jordan is the only way to improve; and writing about what is missing is the best way to inspire future leaders to step up and fix things, again, to do something good in an area that was previously lacking. My only message is that such criticism, however harsh it may be, remains to be done in a light where the criticizer realizes that things aren’t necessarily static, and change is very well possible.

It is the duty of a critical thinker to point what is wrong, but it gets to a point where criticism is done in an atmosphere of negativity, a negativity that might convince the thinker and the reader that an effort to improve isn’t worth it… and that’s when the thinker needs to stop and think things through.

I mean hey, we just fixed our tax laws! We’re working on great energy improvements. We’ve made great progress on economical reform. And human rights, like it or not, have improved drastically over the past 20 years. Change is being done, and that’s a positive thought one should keep in mind. Never mistake my sentences as trying to impose satisfaction on whatever we already have; I’d like to remind you that change has happened in the past, and it can happen in the present and future if we work for it. Some things are easier than others, but it’ll work.

/end emotional insights

There is no battle between the government and the electronic media, and the government welcomes constructive criticism and values differing opinions on the matter, and will not seek any form of the law without the consultation and approval with publishers of online journals, and welcomes the cooperation with all concerned parties to achieve the fitting formulation. We are committed too coordinate with those who disagree and no one-sided decision will be reached.

I happy. Now lets hope that the electronic press committee itself isn’t corrupt. I hope the Jordanian blogosphere also takes advantage of such statement and makes sure that the blogosphere itself will be engaged in a healthy dialogue with the government.

Source: http://ammonnews.net/article.aspx?ArticleNo=53067

There are a lot of things we don’t know yet, and unless there’s direct evidence that says that we should worry, we shouldn’t. That is not to say that we shouldn’t care about the issue, but we shouldn’t let it change our attitude towards whatever it is that we do.

First, there no clear evidence that the ruling applies only to media sites/news agencies (i.e. alghad.jo, ammonnews.net, ammannet.net, etc.) or blogs as well; so bloggers don’t need to worry from now.

Second, there is no indication of how things will work. As it has been mentioned earlier, there is a government committee trying to figure out how to apply the law to the web; requirements about identity vs. anonymity, trade unions, having an editor-in-chief, etc. most likely won’t apply to blogs. Similarly, some of the restrictions on information in news articles (who are there to portray facts), might not apply to blogs (who are there to portray opinion).

So go about your business for now and write freely; if a government spokesperson drops a bombshell, its another story. When fighting the decision, speak as honestly and freely as you always have. If you have a critical post in store, share it and educate us all. Criticize the government, and hope they’ll be open minded and strive to improve. Act as if its some sort of utopia, and if a decision or announcement tells us definitely that its not, you’ll have time to go back and self-sensor your past posts or something.

You can view the article in its original location here. Or, alternatively, continue to read it in this same post:

Websites and the Publication Law: The Hour’s Reality and What Should have Happened Instead

Perhaps the talk of the moment in the Jordanian blogosphere is the decision of the Court of Cassation of Jordan (also known as the Supreme Court) ^[1] to categorize Internet websites as a type of “publication” thus extending the controversial Press and Publication Law to govern websites as well. The decision was met with fierce opposition in the Jordanian Blogosphere; the Jordanian free and alternative media was now to be under the same governing legislation that many believe brought Jordan’s traditional media to its supposed demise. Indeed, it is a common view that the Press and Publication Law restricts journalists in exploring alternative news sources, as well as voicing their opinions freely in editorials.

The Court’s ruling, however, occurred in a different light. The ruling was a result of a court case by journalist Ahmad Salameh, currently an advisor for the crown prince of Bahrain, against Samir al-Hiari and Sakher Abu `Antara, who operate Internet news websites, over a case of public defamation. ^[3]

(See Ammon’s article on Salameh’s case against Omar Kallab, listing Salameh’s accusations against Mr. Kallab as well as the Ammon website: http://www.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=13047)

The ‘Press and Publication Law’ provides clear anti-defamation codes for journalists, and thus was used by Salameh to argue for his case. In that case, the writers as well as the editor-in-chief of the publication are accountable; and false information or personal attacks on individuals are prohibited. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and the verdict was appealed until reaching the Court of Cassation, which had to establish whether the basis of the case was lawful to begin with, and thus, establish whether the Press and Publication Law can be a governing document for articles on the internet.

Supporters of the ruling also view ramifications in the same light: writers on the internet are accountable to what they say, baseless attacks are prohibited, and information integrity is promoted.

While such view is well-founded, supporters are perhaps oblivious to the other ramifications of using the law as it stands to websites. For instance, the law prohibits writings offensive to religion, prophets, or other people, which might prove to hinder some of the healthy debate going on.

(View the Entire text of the Press and Publication Law in Arabic in its current form here: http://www.lob.gov.jo/ui/laws/search_no.jsp?no=8&year=1998 (Law initially passed in 1998, with major amendments in 2007))

Additionally, concerning questions come to mind; if a website is found to contain writings or expressions that are contrary to the Press and Publications Law, what happens? Are the writers held accountable? Or will the internet-equivalent of forcing a periodical to cease publication – website blocking – be implemented (which would be horrible, to say the least)?

Laws that limit personal attacks as well as offensive statements are not exclusive to Jordan, however. Anti-defamation jurisdictions are actually internationally accepted; Article 17 in the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for instance, explicitly refers to defamation:

1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.

2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm#art17

The problem in Jordan, however, is that defamation law is closely tied to the press, media, and publications, and the prohibition of defamation occurs primarily in the Press and Publication Law. Thus, when people like Ahmad Salameh took a defamation case to court, the case’s success was contingent on the characterization of internet websites as “publications” and recognizing them as falling under the controversial Press and Publication Law.

When viewed in that light, the ruling seems like a well-intentioned move to allow integrity to extend to the Internet, as well as the extending rights of citizens for protection from attacks on their image to apply on the Internet. The problem is, as mentioned before, other stipulations arise due to remaining portions of the law.

Personally, what I think would have been a better alternative, was to emphasize that defamation is a crime independently, irrelevant to the realm of media, the press, or publications. This is actually what most countries have in place; laws stress that if false claims producing a negative image are communicated to any person other than the defamed himself, the defamed has the right to seek retraction and/or compensation.

The reason I think a better alternative is to stress only on anti-defamation laws is because: their negative implications are narrower, yet they guarantee the personal right of protection against defamation on a broader scale. For instance, if one is to send several letters to CEOs claiming that individual XYZ is fraudulent, then it should be the right of individual XYZ to seek retraction and compensation, despite the fact that such defamation occurred in communications that are not categorized as “publications”. Similarly, a person’s own writings on the internet form a natural extension of his own communicated claims, and thus in the event of the defamation, a person can seek retraction naturally.

Extending anti-defamation laws to the internet is natural, and does happen in European countries and the United States (albeit with minor stipulations). It is based on the simple expectation that what you do in the “cyber world” is entailed by what you do in the “real world”.

Reserving individuals’ rights for protection against false claims and attacks on reputation in the internet is highly important. However, such protection of rights should not be done in the frame of media, press, and publication legislation, as that would hinder the openness of the web as we know it.

References

1. kinghussein.gov.jo/government4.html#The%20Judicial%20Branch
2. alghad.com/?speical_section=81&news=476677
3. alghad.com/?news=476359
4. alghad.com/?news=476631
5. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defamation

People are shocked that the suicide bomber responsible for the attack came into the base without the routine security measures. The attacker, currently identified by the CIA and western sources as Humam al-Balawi (though Jordanians call for more investigation), is responsible for the death of eight, among them Sharif Ali bin Zeid, a GID official.

U.S. sources say that al-Balawi was a Jordanian “double agent”, initially an extremist Islamist sympathetic to al-Qaeda, but ‘turned’ into a GID “agent” and informant. Taliban-related sources call him a “triple agent”, who was ultimately motivated to serve Taliban/al-Qaeda.

As such, public opinion of the of the GID, or, “the Jordanians”, as they are referred to, is becoming more negative. Many with little background on the history of GID-CIA anti-terrorism cooperation would call for less trust by the CIA/Americans towards the GID/Jordanians.

UPI states, however, that Jordanian officials stress that al-Balawi was not a Jordanian agent, but instead a trusted informant. Supposedly, al-Balawi has had a history of reporting reliable data. As such, the GID vouched for his integrity (information wise).

Nevertheless, should the GID be embarrassed? Sure. They do hold part of the responsibility; they probably didn’t watch al-Balawi as closely as they should’ve.

However, saying the CIA should be more questioning of GID contributions would do more harm than good.

David Ignatius, Washington Post journalist and author of “Body of Lies”, clarifies that the CIA probably should have been more weary of its own protocols. CBS News states that – in many ways – it was the CIA’s own problem that it let down its guard.

So why do I say that questioning GID contributions to the global operations against worldwide terrorism is harmful? Well, because the GID has, in the past, proved to be an invaluable source. Jordanian intelligence was responsible for thwarting the millennium attack plots, warning the CIA about the 9/11 attacks, etc.

The GID also are acclaimed worldwide for their intelligence abilities. David Ignatius mentions a CIA offer who said “He set the standard for how we do it”, of Sa`ad Kheir, a former GID official. Also referenced by Ignatius is George Tenet, former CIA director, saying the GID was the most helpful intelligence service against al-Qaeda.

Some Jordanians or Arabs might be discomforted by what I say, because they might view my apparent approval of “GID-CIA cooperation” as a sign of blind pro-Westernism, or going against ‘Arabism’, our culture, or political causes. As such, I’ll make it clear that the reason I approve of such ‘cooperation’ is because – as far as I understand, currently – the nature of such cooperation revolves around fighting worldwide terrorism. We Jordanians fell victim of the November 9th attacks in 2005, orchestrated by al-Qaeda-Middle East and al-Zarqawi. So, we should especially understand that, when it comes to networks such as al-Qaeda or Taliban, or attack plots that can endanger the lives of civilians, we have a human responsibility to cooperate with whoever capable to combat it.

And its a general PR mess that I’m talking about here, not actions.

I was in the process of writing an article about the recent attack in Camp Chapman that killed Shareef Ali Bin Zeid, a senior GID official, along with several CIA agents in the base. In the meantime, I noticed that Naseem Tarawnah, had already written up a post about the issue. Instead of writing a virtually duplicate post, I decided to follow the comments there, and a separate idea formed; Jordan is sometimes so sensitive about possibly appearing pro-Western that it chooses silence, denials, or bogus arguments that end up hurting their reputation among Arab states, not retain it.

It is indeed depressing that apparently, King Abdullah’s vision of transparency – while it applies to the government – doesn’t apply when the names “Israel” or the “U.S.” come to play. Which is a shame, really. Because I think if the government was in full disclosure of some of these facts (ones that do not play into issues of national security, of course), only few would contest the actions of the government.

As mentioned in the comments over at the blog, fighting terrorism, al-Qaeda, and Taliban is a legitimate cause that 90% (if not more) of the Arabs would agree to. If Jordanian spokespersons were as frank as Wikipedia, for instance,  was with me, telling me that Jordanian GID officials only went to the CIA base to deliver Humam Khalil al-Balawi, who claimed to have information about the location of Ayman al Zawahiri ,then most would be content! Instead, when the issue broke, no official source spoke of the CIA-GID connection, that many assumed the GID itself was somehow a ‘follower’ or a ‘subset’ of the CIA, and assumed also that the “connection” was somehow at a functional level (which would be scandalous), instead of an operational level (which is acceptable, especially in cases of combating global terrorism networks). Instead of receiving facts that would’ve made me examine things in an unbiased way, I only heard rumors, assumptions, and weasel words, and I was armed with no information to fight back with.

And if Humam al-Balawi is indeed the bomber, then don’t be ashamed because he’s a Jordanian. Did we forget al-Zarqawi is a Jordanian as well? Its fine to have one or two terrorists out of 6.5 million. And if the government is just ashamed because they vouched for al-Balawi, then how about just blame the CIA for not searching him or something?

But, here’s an interesting quote, pasted from Wikipedia:

Jordanian government officials, while acknowledging that al-Balawi was a Jordanian doctor, insisted that there was no proof that the suicide bomber was a Jordanian. They pointed to contradictory reports, including a statement from Afghan Taliban that claimed the attacker was an Afghan. A Jordanian official living abroad said that al-Balawi would not have been a double agent, and stated he was a sometime contact of the Jordanian intelligence who had no formal role as an intelligence officer. (source)

So I won’t jump into conclusions that it is indeed al-Balawi; it can be people from al-Qaeda or Taliban who tracked him and decided to stop him from leaking information or whatever. Still, the official story needs to shift from strict denial to something more informative.

This whole issue reminds me of Mohammad Hassanein Haikal’s saga, in which he bashed Jordan over and over, and it took weeks, if nor a month or so, for Zaid al-Rifa`i to come up with an answer. And that’s what kills me, we have the answers! 90% of the time, facts are on the Jordanians’ side. Our PR still messes up, comes up with little answers, and is reluctant to share the very information that will vindicate us!

Today, a spokesperson released some clarifications, and I think that’s satisfactory on some level, information-wise. But how far reaching is a late response?

This one has been on my mind for a while. The current political situation in the Middle East is one of the topics I’m truly interested in, and I’ve been writing numerous posts related to the issue. One thing that caught me attention was that I was addressing a lot of Arab concerns against Israel and its regime (which I firmly believe in), and in so forgot to address my personal concerns about Arabic politics when it comes to the conflict.

I also decided to write this after a long conversation I had with a friend (whose also Arab) who believes that Jordanian politics regarding the issue, especially the 1994 Wadi `Araba Treaty, indicates that Jordan (or the government/king) has – in a sense – betrayed The Cause and other Arab countries.

I think that’s a completely wrong approach, and I believe the truth is that Jordan is a pioneer in seeking peace, and a Just Solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Had other Arab countries followed Jordan’s footsteps in large, then Arabs would’ve done their part in promoting a just peace, and stability in the region would’ve been a much more probable reality.

Since I think such belief that Jordan went against the Palestinian Cause (and Pan-Arab Values, fraternity, and unity) is utterly misconceived on numerous levels, I find it hard to find where to start. This is why I’ll divide the post into separate arguments that will hopefully complement each other.

(The outline is basically as follows: 1: Jordan was not alone in pursuing peace in the 1990’s, 2: Jordan did not go against Palestine, 3: While Jordan has peace, Jordan is not a neutral nation, 4: Other Cases of Jordanian Commitment to the Pan-Arab Cause).

1) Jordan was not alone in pursuing peace in the 1990’s

King Hussein of Jordan had Middle East peace aspirations even before the war of 1967. That did not stop him, or the country, from being properly aligned with the Arabs in the war of 1967, where Jordan, lead by King Hussein, entered a full-force war against Israel, and lost a considerable amount of land from the West Bank, which, at the time, was part of the Kingdom of Jordan. (Many people have doubts about Hussein’s intentions in the 1967 war, these will be discussed in future articles). As a matter of fact, while King Hussein talked to Israelis (as did Egyptian, Lebanese, and Syrian officials), he only allowed such talks to translate into a treaty much later on.

While Anwar El-Sadat was alone in signing a peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, King Hussein’s 1994 treaty happened in a different light that Arabs of today forget:After Egypt’s 1979 treaty, Egypt’s membership in the Arab League was suspended, along with diplomatic relations between Egypt and many other Arab States. In 1989, however, the Arab League restored relations with Egypt, which was readmitted into the league. (Timeline: Arab League, BBC News.  2008)

Even more importantly, is the Madrid Conference of 1991 which involved official representations from Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine, to negotiate peace.

Even in the 1993 Oslo Accords, Syria was invited to participate, and only refused participation due to the PLO’s participation (per “Oslo Accords: Background” on Wikipedia). I.e. Syria refused pursuing further negotiations of peace with Israel not due to its reservations towards Israel, but rather, the PLO (due to tensions in the Gulf War).

In any case, post 1989, there was a new direction across all Arab countries that aimed to put an end to the conflict. The general direction of most Arab states was, indeed, peace negotiations.

Jordan did not go out of its way in signing the treaty, it is only different from other Arab countries in that it was successful in reaching a treaty.

2) Jordan did not go against Palestine

Then, in 1993, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat sign the Oslo Accords, which at the time was seen as the end for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Since the Oslo Accords announced an ‘end of hostility’ between PLO (the “sole representative of the Palestinian Peoples”) and the State of Israel, a ‘framework of solutions’ have been laid out.

King Hussein has said that any peace treaty he would sign with Israel would not go against the Palestinian Cause. Since, in 1993, “the Cause” appeared to have been solved (or begin to be solved), the king had no reason not to pursue his country’s own peace with Israel.

Indeed, Oslo is seen to have given the king the green light to pursue signing a treaty.

How could Jordan have gone against Palestine with its treaty of peace, if the Palestinian Authority itself signed its own treaty of peace first? Whatever grievances and grudges held by Arab States against Israel are there as a result of compassion and fraternity towards the Arab Palestinian population. Once the population’s representation (meaning, the PA) expresses its aspirations for settlement and compromise, it is the duty of sister Arab states to stand by the Palestinians in ending the conflict, just as it were their duty to stand by the Palestinians in defending their land in 1948 and 1967.

Some might comment that I refer to the Oslo Accords as if it were a successful treaty, when, in fact, its outcome indicates immense failure. However, I am describing the Oslo Accords as they were seen at the time, by King Hussein and other Arab leaders. Furthermore, the failure of the Oslo Accords, in my view, is not to be attributed to deception on either side, but rather, the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, and the consequent election of  fundamentalist ^{(disclaimer: personal opinion)}, right-wing Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, running the country in an opposite direction, against the principles agreed upon in Oslo.

3) While Jordan has peace, Jordan is not a neutral nation

I repeat: Jordan is not a neutral nation. Policies of Jordan since 1994 have been consistently pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian.

It is frustrating to see that many thing Jordan has deserted the Palestinian Cause, because as I open my Jordanian newspaper every day, and see developments in Jordanian foreign politics, out efforts regarding Palestine are all I read about.

“Jordan will continue to fight for Palestinian rights — King” says one front-page headline in December, 2009[1]. “Time running out on Mideast” says another, clarifying: “In comments published Monday, His Majesty King Abdullah warned that the window of opportunity for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is very limited”[2].

In checking the front page of The Jordan Times between December 22nd, 2009 and January 1st, 2010, I have not found a single case where the Palestine did not occupy front-page headline news. More often than not, headline news regarding Palestine is not detached, and often covers government initiatives, speeches by the King, diplomatic visits by the king and government, talks with Abbas, the Israeli government, etc., regarding reaching a solution to the conflict.

When did the last time any non-Jordanian, non-Egyptian Arab diplomat take the time to speak of Palestine instead of his own country on official state visits and speeches? The are a few exceptions, but at large, Jordan is one of the very few countries that is genuinely deeply interested in a Just Solution for the Palestinians.

Or how about this one? In King Abdullah’s Speech to the Congress in 2007, the words “Jordan”, “Jordanian”, etc. were uttered a total of 7 times, compared to the 15 times Palestine was mentioned! And I’m not being silly and just counting words, go ahead, click the link above, and read the speech. This is our king’s speech on a state visit to the U.S. You would think it’d be in Jordan’s best interest to talk about foreign aid, economical reform, cooperation (as do the leaders of the rest of the Middle Eastern countries), but he – representing the position of Jordan in the conflict – chose, and continues to choose the issue of Palestine, making it Jordan’s main mission, in terms of foreign policy. Go ahead, give it a read, this is what Jordan stands for, advocating peace in the Middle East, and a Just Solution for Palestine.

In official state visits to Japan, the EU, and the U.S., the general attitude of news items is along the lines of: “the King stressed the importance of a viable Palestinian state… oh, and by the way, they agreed on economical cooperation”, or something.

Also, Jordan openly denounces and condemns Israeli settlement expansion, as well as Israeli military moves against other Arab nations. In the 2006 Lebanon war, a statement from the Jordanian government denounced Israel’s actions (yes, even though we signed a peace treaty with them):

“Jordan stands against whoever exposes the Palestinian people and their cause, Lebanon and its sovereignty to unexpected dangers. Israel’s use of force against unarmed civilians and the outcome in terms of the human loss and destruction of civil institutions.”

BBC NEWS

As for the Gaza War:

SALAH BASHIR, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Jordan, said his country felt deep pain and grave concern at the escalation of violence and deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, […]  The military operations were a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and the Fourth Geneva Convention.

un.org/News/Press/docs//2009/sc9563.doc.htm

I’m not asking anyone to commend Jordan on such quotes, because that’s Jordan’s duty. The point of showing such quotes is to emphasize that Jordan continues to criticize Israel – and harshly – whenever it feels compelled by Arab duty to do so. While Jordan engages in full normalization with Israel, it does not engage in neutralization. Please, do not confuse the two; the feelings, emotions, views, and motivations of the Jordanian people and their leadership remain the same: in full support of the Palestinians, we discovered, however, that our pro-Palestinian message and efforts are best conveyed in an atmosphere of peace and dialogue.

Point is, foreign politics of Jordan is centered around the Palestinian Cause. Saying Jordan deserted Palestine or other Arab States because of its peace with Israel insults the very foundation of Jordanian policy.

4) Other Cases of Jordanian Commitment to the Pan-Arab Cause

Also among Jordanian Efforts, are King Hussein’s interference in the Wye River Memorandum of 1998 (will be discussed in a future article), and his facilitation of the Hebron Agreement that lead to the pulling back of the “IDF”, out of Hebron. Jordan’s aid to the Gaza strip, and continuous donations to Palestine are also among these.

In the Lebanon war in 2006, Jordan’s Queen Alia International Airport was the first and only airport to be used to send aid/relief aircrafts to Lebanon during the war. Countries like the UAE used Jordan as a medium to send its own relief planes soonafter,  taking advantage of the safe air passage opened by Jordan to Lebanon, based on negotiations with Israel. Also, In the Gaza War in 2008-09, relief as usual, and a huge blood donation campaign, in which the king was one of thousands to donate blood.

An important example, that shows Jordan’s commitment to the Arab cause, and its proper prioritization of Arab interests above Jordanian interests is the following story:

On 25/09/97, Khaled Mashal, a prominent Hamas leader, suffered an assassination attempt by Israeli Mossad agents, while presiding in Jordan (where he lived between ‘91-‘99).  King Hussein threatened to cut diplomatic relations with Israel, and nulling the 1994 treaty of peace if an antidote is not given to Mashal, and indeed, an antidote was supplied. Jordanian authorities also captured the Mossad agents, and released them in exchange of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, founder of Hamas.

Over and out.

A limited preview can be seen on Google books here:

http://books.google.com/books?id=3-JWbAkLVbEC&pg=PA42&dq=King+Talal&cd=8#v=onepage&q=King%20Talal&f=false

I would disagree with the cynicism surrounding the constitution; though its technically right. The book highlights that Jordan did not become a democracy, but rather a pseudodemocracy. However, given current context, it seems that people on the outside (and sometimes the inside as well) mistake Jordan for a dictatorship or an authoritarian-ship; pseudodemocracy as a description shows: an element of democracy does at least exist. My view of Jordanian democracy is closer to “democracy-in-transit”, a system that is largely flawed technically, but practically – and for the time being only – generates freedoms.