This is not to say that all is well: we are a long way to go, and we should obviously demand more from the establishment. We should also demand less marginalization, and to be included in the process. But to fool ourselves and say that we are living in a system where the Establishment is trying to keep is weak and poor would be an unjust, unfounded, and disheartening act.

This is a look at the last ten years King Abdullah II’s reign as the Kingdom’s head of state.

Can some of these developments be associated to the potential positive sum nature of the world, technology, etc.? Yes. But take a look at the data, collected from a number of sources, and decide for yourself if it shows the possibility of a benign, well-intentioned establishment.

Information is taken from the CIA Factbook (referenced CIA for short), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Ministry of Finance of Jordan (MOF). Currencies are either in dollar ($ / USD), or in Jordanian Dinars (JD / JOD), and are indicated.

Nor all numbers are necessarily useful; GDP for instance is often criticized for not being a good metric of a country’s economic situation. Keep this in mind while viewing.

According to Abdullah II’s book, Jordan exports to the US shot up from “virually nothing to $18 million in 1998”. Under Abdullah’s negotiations, this number rose to $1 billion in 2009.

Debt as a percentage of the GDP continues to drop. After it reached below 60% of the GDP around 2008, a new policy was adopted that indicated that public debt shall never go above 60%. Initial reports indicate that we are about to hit that mark now, a very concerning sign. But people forget we are in a global recession; things are indeed very concerning, but some people assume that the establishment has worsened our situation. Looking back at 2002, where public debts’ percentage of the GDP was in the high 90s, it puts things in perspective.

Public and External debts in Jordan shown as an absolute number in JOD. These numbers are contemporary and not adjusted for inflation. As such, if adjusted for inflation, one would probably see a more level Public Debt graph up to 2011, and slowly declining external debts.

The image above is important, as it shows the upward progress of the Jordanian economy up until the global economic crisis. While economic growth is expected, the increasing economic growth from 2000 until 2007 was significant. Things took a downwards turn when the crisis hit, but were only fully realized by 2010, at the height of anti-Rifai protests. As Prime Minister Samir Rifa`i struggled to restore the financial situation in Jordan, by removing subsidies and enacting tough measures, his policies proved to be unpopular and lead to his downfall. People in Jordan believed Rifai’s government was embezzling the people from money by increasing oil prices, etc. Meanwhile, every person with access to a computer could verify that global oil prices were up; it was not the government playing make believe. But sometimes bad things happen to promising men, that is the cycle of life. Jordanians got Marouf al-Bakhit to replace him. I hope the anti-Rifai protesters are happy.

GDP Per Capita numbers from 2000-2011. The Jordanian press however is not a fan of these numbers, as it says that the Ministry of Finance has been cooking some of the numbers, and at some point appended JOD 1.5 billion to a GDP figure for no reason.

The image above is a curious one, as it seems to be lacking in data. But that’s what the CIA Factbook seems to say.

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I am a firm believer that reform must begin in the law (and in case, the constitution). Though I think social reform is very important, any country of laws and institution is only as good as these laws and institutions. Our most supreme document is the constitution, and reform in the constitution can certainly have far reaching effects.

The first Constitution was introduces in 1952 by King Talal and Prime Minister Tawfiq Abul Huda, as a response from King Talal to his father’s conservative constitution, and an attempt from Abul Huda to stabalize the country. The constitution of 1952 is an impressive document, and was certainly meant to revolutionalize many things in Jordan. And in many cases it did.

But the constitution of 1952 was flawed in three main ways:

1. Many statements that safeguarded rights to the citizens were concluded by “unless it conflicts with the law”, leaving much room for debate.
2. Vague terminology was used, especially saying that “the Nation” is the source of powers instead of the “People”, etc.
3. But the most popular flaw (albiet the least significant) is the number of amendments that took place between the 50s and 80s during King Hussein’s time, where the parliament was slightly weakened.

The Point

The new constitution draft attempts to solve many of these problems.

In a nutshell, the main foci of the new constitution amendments are:

1. Specificity
1. Statements that safeguart rights now have very specific exclusions, as opposed to using broad terms like “unless it conflicts with the law”.
2. Certain terms like “Nation” were replaced by “People” where appropriate.
2. Human Rights
1. Jordan was described as a state that is democratic and seeks social equality; this can be a game changer
2. Emphasis on gender equality
3. Emphasis on committment to international human rights treaties
4. Emphasis on rights to opinion, peaceful assembly, and protest
5. Emphasis against torture of citizens
6. Emphasis on privacy of information, and including electronic information as a form of private communication
7. Strong limitation on capital punishment, and an additional proposal to prohibit capital punishment altogether
3. Revamped Judicial System
1. A new Supreme Constitutional Court is suggested, to deal with the interpretation of laws and the constitution, as well anything which may violete these interpretations
2. A new proposal to decrease the influence of religious courts and other special courts
4. Removed Amendments
1. One notable amendment was removed, which granted the king the right to keep the Parliament dissolved for longer than the prescribed time. With the new proposal, a dissolved parliament must reconvene in 4 months if a new parliament is not produced.

Favorite snippets:

Addition of II.n. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a state seeking to fulfill social justice, sustainable development, security, and equality, and achieving a good quality of life for the citizen, and reinforcing respect for Human Rights through citizenship, intellectual pluralism, and the sovereignity of the constitution and the law.

Addition of II.n. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a state seeking to build Relationship with Arab and International States based on common national and humanitarian goals.

Amendment of II.5. Jordanian citizenship is defined through a law that achieves equality, and may not be rescinded unless as a personal punishment through a final court ruling from the respective court.

Addition: The Nation assumes the responsibility of protecting the Environment

Change: “Citizen is free to express opinion through (…) within bounds of the law” -> “Citizen isf ree to express opinion through (…) insofar as it does not violate the rights of other citizens and society”.

Addition: Citizens are guaranteed the right of peaceful protest. (No “but” or conditions)

Addition: The State supports the freedom of intellectual, artistic, and literary creativity, scientific research, and academia.

Change: The Nation is the Source of All Powers -> The People is the Source of All Powers

Change: King can appoint a Female in a Regency council.

Change: “Capital punishment must not be carried out except in the tightest of circumstances, after an approval from the King. Every sentence of this type is presented by the Cabinet with a statement explaining its opinion. No minor, pregnant woman, recent mother, men over 70, or disabled individual can be executed.

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I have not written anything in this blog in a long time. I have tried to start writing many times, but I never could finish. I have been, for the past few months, increasingly frustrated with the stiuation in Jordan; while the government is doing some right moves, politically, I became largely frustrated with the wave of bigotry that has swept our society off its feet. Bigotry in politics is almost deeply enthralled in the hearts and minds of many Jordanians, across classes, political views, roles, and perspectives.

Pro-Government protesters are bigoted against Pro-Reform protesters, considering them unthankful, unpatriotic “scum”.

Pro-Reform protesters are themselves bigoted against Pro-Government protesters, thinking they are government-funded thugs who want ot beat them.

Pro-Government media is bigoted agaisnt many political movements, consdiering them outside-fundedp lots against our security.

Anti-Government media is even more bigoted: against the government, police, and their supporters. Every policy is an evil plot, every anti-Government journalist is a hero, every incident is an attack, every violence is targetting thme, and every politician is corrupt.

Events are blown out of proportion at times, and are silenced at others. Every Jordanian reads the news they agree with, and stop: never the opposite perspectives. Our opponents’ political view does not exist. Our opponents’ perspectives are always unfounded. Our rivals are always bigoted, nonsensical, idiots, and fools–never us.

We need a national dialogue, yet all we do is push each other around. Videos of our protests are sad scenes of people yelling at people, fighting with others, and never listening. Never mind that some are reporters and other are policemen, neverm ind that some are politicians and others are activists, all act the same: Like the stereotypical impulsive man, violent, angry, bigoted, and never listens.

I try to go both ways, sometimes criticize the government, and at others support it, depending on what I think (though recently I admit I am doing more support than criticize, but I’m convinced I’m still rational about it). Yet, whenever I criticize, or express the need for a reform, I am called naive by some, and anti-Jordanian by others. And when I express that I don’t think the government was wrong in X, or that the government is doing the right thing in Y, I am either uneducated or have some sort of interest.

After debates with some, I often hear that people are surprised how there is someone smart who thinks differently. So let me be very clear:

People subscribe to all sorts of thoughts, beliefs, and views. Some views might be better than others, but all are debatable. Nothing is obviously true, and very little is obviously false. Most of those who subscribe to views possess a well-thought, legitimate reason, and many philosophical arguments, that lead them to possess a view. No view, belief, or side is exclusively more intelligent or just. My view can still be better than yours, and I will continue to defend it with confidence, but never condescension.

Political reform is essential, but the society must also rise up. We need a new atmosphere where one is not ridiculed for speaking his mind.

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I was wishing to write on this topic long ago, and I started writing on it since three weeks ago, but never got around to publish. Unfortunately for me, perhaps, the topic was debated (albeit in a limited way) and many did reach the conclusion that I was trying to argue for. Nevertheless, this article should be there for the sake of completeness.

A big taboo in Jordan is the critical discussion of the Hashemite Monarchy and the Institution of the Throne. Unfortunately, this makes for real intellectual debate on the institution of the Throne rare and weak, and result in having criticisms of the monarchy happen in concentrated outlets, with one-sided arguments, without real objective consideration.

The truth is, if anyone wishes to advocate for reform in Jordan, a position on the Hashemite Throne must be established, whether in private or in the argument. The reason for this is that, if whoever advocates for reform establishes that the institution of the throne is no good, then the matter of reform altogether should be dropped altogether and replaced with revolution. To establish the need for reform, one must first establish if the very core of the system is viable, and I think it is.

Again, to emphasize, this article is not a defense but rather a part of a series on reform, and it wishes to investigate the legitimacy of the monarchy as an institution, both historically and in the present context. I will establish that this institution does have legitimacy, or at least some legitimacy, and in the way shed light on the societal requirements from the Throne to secure stability (of the country) and legitimacy (of the establishment).

Part 1: On the Institution of the Throne and the Legitimacy of the Hashemite Monarchy

Before we can discuss the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy, we must establish how the legitimacy of an institution is measured. The legitimacy of an institution, I believe, is established by an answer of “yes” to two questions:

1. Was it (or is it) in the will of the people to have the institution?
2. Does this institution serve the greater good of the nation?

Both questions must hold at any period in time, though I will argue that the second question should hold slightly more weight than the first.

Historically, the two questions can be answered in a straightforward fashion. Challengers of the Hashemite monarchy often  tell a story of an Emir from Hijaz, heading to Syria, stopping along the way in Transjordan and creating a country, or a story of a figure from Hijaz, installed by Western Powers for their own ambitions. Independent of these stories, however, is the establishment of allegiance to Emir Abdullah and the Hashemite Throne in 1920.

Establishment of allegiance, also known in Arabic as mubaya`a (مبايعة), is the traditional Islamic way in which Arab tribes negotiate and establish allegiance to a ruler. In all senses, the establishment of rule in the Arab world through mubaya`a is legitimate: it is a traditional, direct negotiation between monarch-to-be and the constituency, through “legitimate” social hierarchies of tribesmen and tribe-leaders. In 1920s Transjordan, the country was mainly tribalist, and even residents of cities were rooted into the known Jordanian tribes, and were often in close contact. Even minorities, like Christian and Circassian families at that time had already organized themselves into large families that are analogous to such tribes. That is to say: such negotiation of allegiance to Abdullah I did cover the entire constituency. Then and there, in 1920, the tribes decided that their interests are deeply rooted with that of the Hashemites, and they willed the creation of a Hashemite Kingdom in Transjordan.

Therefore, we established how it was the will of the people to have the institution of the throne, specifically, the Hashemite throne.

There is a little subtlety, however, which is the annexation of the West Bank in 1949, and thus the imposition of the establishment on the population of Palestinian origins. Was it the will of those people to have the establishment? The answer is complex, and highly debatable. The Husseini’s were clearly against a Hashemite rule of the West Bank, while the Nashashibi’s were in favor. And Jerusalem at the time (and with it, the West Bank as a whole), was divided in allegiance between the Husseini’s and Nashashibi’s, and through the effort of a Jerusalem Parliament (whose authenticity and legitimacy is to be questioned), it was decided that the West Bank is to go under the establishment. As such, one cannot say much about whether it was the will of some 50% of the today’s population’s ancestry to be under the Establishment—that I admit.

As for the second question: does the institution of the throne serve the greater good of the nation? To that, I would answer yes, and popular discourse in Jordan today seems to agree: unprecedented populist expressions of loyalty to the idea of the throne, and a Hashemite throne specifically, even if people are asking for limitations of the monarch’s powers. Jamal al-Sha`ir, a Ba`athist, had said in 1998:

I started understanding how much Jordan is attached—Jordan as a country and a people, especially Transjordanians—how much the future of these people and the whole country is connected with the Hashemite throne. If the Hashemite throne goes, Jordan goes. I started believing this only in the last ten years. But many people believed it before us. But we rejected it when we were young.

Source: Anderson, Betty S.. Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State. 2005. Austin, TX.

Thus, there is a consensus, it seems, that the Hashemite throne is somehow linked to the goodwill of Jordan, but again, with a few subtleties:

1. The sentence “especially Transjordanians” appears, through al-Sha`ir assures that Jordanians of Palestinian origins are also covered when he adds “and the whole country”. Still, the distinction is of interest later on, and introduces some very interesting paradoxes.
2. We don’t understand why the prosperity of the Hashemite throne is in the best interest of the country and vice versa.

A good answer to the second question is that the platform of the Hashemites (starting the Sons of Hussein of Mecca to an extent, but much more so since King Hussein I) consistently included a mix of Arab nationalism, secular governance, and foreign policies of moderation¹ that is congruent with the needs and aspiration of the people. Another answer (or an additional benefit) may also be that the idea of a monarch is also necessary when certain social division, especially in religion, race, but more so in origin, exist, and a power is needed to “moderate” democracy and make sure that no minority will be abused by the tyranny of a majority. Does Jordan need something like the latter? This will be discussed later, but in short, current Transjordanian nationalist movements are alarming and show us that such might be necessary.

In Short: The Palestinian Paradox and the Transjordanian Establishment

The interesting story of the status of Jordanians of Palestinian origins today and the social complexities that surround it will be tackled in another upcoming post. However, the Palestinian Paradox is a more contemporary issue that (while completely rooted in the former) can be discussed independently. The Palestinian Paradox, basically, is this:

Given the two criteria, as well as the rhetoric of those like al-Sha`ir, the legitimacy of the Hashemite Throne from the perspective of the Palestinian-Jordanians is debatable, which also pauses a serious threat to the legitimacy of the throne in the country, considering those of Palestinian origins are a large part of the population. Also given the criteria, the Establishment is a Transjordanian Establishment, initially aimed at a Transjordanian constituency. The Paradox basically states that, if we are to assume these two facts, then there is a contradiction, and the only way to avoid the contradiction is to assert that the Establishment is also legitimate for Palestinians and extended to a pan-Jordanian (or, Jordanian) establishment. Namely:

If we attempt to make the assumption that that the Hashemite Throne is illegitimate from a Palestinian-Jordanian standpoint, then the end game will result in damage for those of Palestinian origins, making such an impossible option. Or, to paraphrase: trends of racist transjordanian nationalism show that the Establishment is actually making more ‘controversial’ decisions in the protection of those of Palestinian origins from the Tyranny of Transjordanian nationalism, than it is making controversial decisions in the marginalization of those citizens.

That is not to say that the marginalization of Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origins is to be permissible at any level, or that it is ethically or practically justifiable. And I will go at lengths in discussing this in future parts. What I am saying, however, is that while there is some marginalization of Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origins, recent events show that this does not translate into bias against Jordanians of Palestinian origins, as far as the Establishment is concerned.

Conclusion

In general, one can see both historical and contemporary justification of the Hashemite Throne as a legitimate entity, whose well-being is in the best interest of the nation, and vice-versa. With many ethnic tensions existing in Jordan, especially those between Transjordanian-Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origins, the buffer of an entity to moderate democracy and control the political system is necessary. The structure of the system, the limitations of powers on the king, and the institutions entailed by the establishment, however, are not free from flaw and need to be reformed.

Coming next in the series on the Jordanian Establishment: The Ethnic Affairs.

Notes:

1. As an aside, Marwan Muasher criticizes the use of “moderate” to describe states that practice foreign policy moderation with Israel, not because he disagrees, but because he believes that such states don’t extend such moderation to their internal policies and thus cannot be called truly moderate in every sense — only so in foreign policy. I agree, actually.

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But as a Jordanian, this time is both a threat and an opportunity to a country like Jordan. Recent events both showed the potential for hope and prosperity, and great regression.

One uncontested fact, however, is that the Jordanian Establishment is in dire need of reform. I have had my own long list of criticisms to the Jordanian Establishment, but I have never really addressed it on this blog because I was too busy countering the criticisms of the Establishment that I feel are false, and even dangerous. I still see such criticisms, but I decided the best way to advocate for real reform is to articulate my own view on what is wrong with the Establishment. This cannot be done without establishing also what is right, and what should remain the same.

Starting today, I will be introducing a multi-part series of articles on my blog. The series is titled “The Jordanian Establishment: Perks, Flaws, and the Call for Reform“, and will look at multiple aspects of the Jordanian establishment, from the monarchy, to the constitution, and from society to institutions. Questions of legitimacy will be raised and answered, questions on nationalism will be discussed, the plague of societal racism that we witness will be discussed, and throughout the articles I will try voice my opinion on how to improve.

The purpose for the series is neither to criticize, nor to defend. The purpose of the series is to advocate for my view on reform, why it is necessary, and why is it good. However, in the process, I will be engaging in both criticism and defense to satisfy the real purpose.

Not all parts advocate for reform independently, some will shed background and establish facts, while others voice opinion.

In this post, I will be maintaining links to the published articles in the series:

1. The Jordanian Establishment: Part 1 — The Hashemite Throne
2. The Jordanian Establishment: Part 2 — The Ethnic Affairs
3. The Jordanian Establishment: Part 3 — TBA

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مقالة ركيكة بعيدة عن المنطق، مع الأسف.

لا نستطيع أن نوصف الموقف بالمثير للشبهة إذا قال ناطق “ما حدث” بدل “زعرنة”، فعلى الناطق الرسمي للأمن العام أن يتكلم بحيادية وقد قام بذلك. لا يجب علينا أن نطالب ناطق باسم الأمن العام بأن يستخدم مصطلحات منحازة كمصطلحاتنا.

وعلى كل حال، توجد صور، ولكن الصور غير كافية. المرتكبون “مجهولين” حتى تعرف اسماؤهم ومواقعهم ويتم القبض عليهم.

أرجو أن يقوم رئيس التحرير بتدقيق أكثر جودة في المرات القادمة.

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By government calculations, the cost of each employee spending 15 minutes in the bathroom would reach JD 17.5 million per year.

The idea, of course, alluding to the government’s calculations of 1 hour spent by government employees browsing the Internet costs the government JD 70 million per year, leading Prime Minister Samir Rifai’s government to block access to over 48 websites from the internal network at all ministries and public agencies.

The logic is purely flawed. Browsing the computer while working is a non-essential activity and a waste of time. It is a distraction. Going to the bathroom is an essential need for an employee and helps them be in a better condition to do their task.

I hope AmmonNews engages in more responsible editorialism in the future, pointing out issues that actually matter, instead of attacking the government for good moves.

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قبل المضي قدماً، أود التأكيد على احترامي لمهنة الصحافة بشكل عام، والصحافة الأردنية بشكل خاص، وأن تهجمي على بعض الممارسات غير موجهة للصافة الأردنية بأكملها.

والأمر العجيب أن الاتهامات والـ”إهانات” الموجهة لجمعة ليست بالإهانات الحقيقية، وهي في الواقع ليست أمور سلبية، إلا أنها وجّهت بضوء سلبي ووراء عدسة ساخرة لتبدو كأنها انتقادات حقيقية…

اتهم جمعة بأنه وزير “مدلل” لأن منهاجيته وطريقه عمله في العمل العام تشبه طريقة العمل في القضاء الخاص، واتهم بأن لديه “عقلية البزنس” ولذلك فهو “بالطبع” غير ملائم ليكن وزير فعال في القطاع العام.

العجب هنا أن المتخصصين يتفقون بأن الكثير من عادات إدارة القطاع الخاص يجب تطبيقها في القطاع العام لتحسين جودة الخدمات. مثال عليها هو استخدام مبدأ “الهيكل التنظيمي” في القطاع العام بعد أن ثبتت ميزته في القطاء الخاص، وطرق الدفع بالساعات، واستخدام الدعاية والاعلانات لنشر وعي “المستهلك” (هنا، المواطن)، الخ…

الإنتاجية هو الأهم في القطاع العام، والإناجية أيضاً في بالغ الأهمية في القطاع الخاص، وبحسب دراسات وأرقام وحقائق، نعلم بأن الحاسوب قد يضر الانتاجية عندما يستخدم كأداة “استجمام” أو “لعب” يستخدمها الموظف الحكومي وموظف الشركة للفت انتباههم عن العمل.

وإذا فأمر جمعة بحجب بعض المواقع الاخبارية والشخصية ذات الشعبية في الدوائر، وغير المتعلقة بالعمل، وهي — كما أكد جمعة ذاته — ممارسة شائعة في العديد من الشركات وفعاليتها مثبتة.

الصحافة تتذمر بطول “الطوابير” في الدوائر الحكومية، وكثرة الانتظار، وعدم التركيز فيها، وكثرة الاخطاء الممكن تجنبها (ومعها حق هنا) — ولكن لا تحسبوا أن في هذا التذمر رغبة للتغيير والتحسين (فالتذمر موضة وفن)، بل اعلم أن في هذا التذمر رغبة للتذمر فقط لا غير، وإذا أعربت الحكومة أو دائرة حكومية عن رغبتها في معالجة الوضع الراهن، والتغيير والتحسين، فتعود الاسطوانة المكسورة بالدوران، والتذمر، والتذمر، إلا أن التذمر الآن… من غير حق.

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Note that I translated all relevant snippets from Arabic to English myself, and I am by no means qualified to give a proper legal translation or correct legal terminology. It is only done for the sole purpose of giving context to non-Arabic readers and not to be taken seriously as correct technical interpretations.

Concerns

Article 8 is probably the greatest possible concern, stating:

المادة8- كل من قام قصداً بإرسال أو نشر بيانات أو معلومات عن طريق الشبكة المعلوماتية أو أي نظام معلومات تنطوي على ذم أو قدح أو تحقير أي شخص يعاقب بغرامة لا تقل عن (100) مائة دينار ولا تزيد على (2000) ألفي دينار.

Translated:

Article 8- Any person who has, on purpose, sent or published figures or information via the Web or any other network to vilify or slander or insult any person is punished by a fine no less that one hundred Jordanian Dinars and no more than two thousand Jordanian Dinars.

In theoretical terms, the article is actually healthy, as it legitimizes the Internet as a normal continuation of a physical world, where accountability and responsibility still exists, and where the author or creator of information is still responsible for one’s words, just as one is in the physical world. The problem, however, is two-fold:

1. The first problem is the general nature of the offense. While the article appears to target libel, slander, and defamation, however, the final (أو تحقير = or insult) is concerning as it might generalize the article to include all insults/attacks, as opposed to defamation/libel. A common requirement for defamation is that the claim is non-factual and communicated to those other than the defamed individual. The vague and general final term to describe the offense, might be interpreted to render these requirements moot. For instance, if an individual blogs about a government figure and sharply criticizes him with correct information, making valid corruption allegations, it is an insult in general but not libel/defamation. The lack of a specific meaning to the term used makes this concerning.
2. The second problem, which is greater, is that it provides no context-requirement. For instance, the article doesn’t address articles only, or publications, or blogs, but “any communication”. I personally agree with subjecting online publications, articles, and even blogs to such article. I’d also agree with subjecting mass e-mails, or perhaps hall e-mails (i.e. person A sending e-mail to businessman B, slandering potential client/partner/employee C) (side not: provided no external monitoring by the government). However, when it comes to blog comments, online forums, chat websites, etc. I think such article becomes a violation of freedom of expression.

What do you think?

Article 9 also uses general terminology which I found open to much interpretation. Subsection (a) of Article 9 states:

المادة 9- أ- كل من أرسل أو نشر عن طريق نظام معلومات أو الشبكة المعلوماتية قصداً كل ما هو مسموع أو مقروء أو مرئي مناف للحياء موجه إلى أو يمس شخصا لم يبلغ الثامنة عشرة من العمر يعاقب بالحبس مدة لا تقل عن ثلاثة اشهر وبغرامة لا تقل عن (300) ثلاثمائة دينار ولا تزيد على (5000) خمسة ألاف دينار.

The article basically prohibits “indecent” materials that targets (or is accessible to) those below age of 18, as well as indecent material that affects those below age 18. The article supposedly refers to sexually indecent material, whether in writing, imagery, or video. The problem however is the social meaning for indecent may also be open to interpretation. Would it include an insult on religion? Would it include a religious debate? Someone claiming that Religion A is a fairy tale? Certainly by standards of our society these are considered indecent. Is that possible? I don’t think its a serious concern, but certainly more concise terminology (as achieved by sub-section B of the very same article) can help.

Article 13b+c are another concern, perhaps more valid than the previous one. 13b goes to state (truncated):

… يجوز لموظفي الضابطة العدلية ضبط الأجهزة والأدوات والبرامج والأنظمة والوسائل المستخدمة في ارتكاب أي من الجرائم المنصوص عليها أو يشملها هذا القانون والأموال المتحصلة منها والتحفظ على المعلومات والبيانات المتعلقة بارتكاب أي منها.

Basically stating that authorities have the right to possess or confiscate any equipment or tools or software or systems and “methods”  used to commit any of the mentioned offenses and retaining related information and data.

Sub-section c goes further:

ج- للمحكمة المختصة الحكم بمصادرة الأجهزة و الأدوات والوسائل وتوقيف أو تعطيل عمل أي نظام معلومات أو موقع الكتروني مستخدم في ارتكاب أي من الجرائم المنصوص عليها أو يشملها هذا القانون ومصادرة الأموال المتحصلة من تلك الجرائم والحكم بإزالة المخالفة على نفقة مرتكب الجريمة.

Translated:

c- Respective courts have the right to rule to confiscate equipment, tools, and methods, as well as terminate or disable any ICT system or Internet Website used to commit any of the crimes described and included in this Law, and the confiscation of funds obtained from these crimes, and ruling to remove the offense on the expense of those guilty.

Again, this is certainly important and valuable taking into consideration articles that refer to terrorism, national security, pornographic materials, etc. However, given the existence of Article 8, does any form of libel warrant the mere possibility of confiscation of servers or information. And given the concerns on the general nature of Articles 8 and 9, could such a procedure of confiscation of servers or retaining information be a restriction on internet freedom?

I am one who truly believes in the goodwill  of the government. As such, I am comfortable that the government will not take any extreme measures to make the worst of these concerns into truth, ever; however, I am still uncomfortable, and again the reason is two-fold:

1. The potential for abuse is there. While right now the probability of such abuse is zero for all intents and purposes, the potential that such abuse would arise one day, by a future government or under different circumstances in the future, is there. And this can be easily circumvented.
2. Some of these offenses, especially the ones mentioned above, will allow the general public to seek the judicial branch (article 17). Here, vagueness of some of the terms, as well as the possibility for interpretation, combined with the strong powers given to the court, creates greater potential for abuses by the public against owners of websites expressing themselves, facilitated by the courts.

Reassurances

The law finally provides protections to owners of websites and their users by restricting access to equipment, files, data, and information, addressing hacking, and providing a range of punishments depending on the nature of access violations. The term also refers to important cyber crimes, such as Article 11 which addresses those who attempt to use cyberspace to facilitate terrorist activities, subjecting these persons to hard labor.

Article 17 itself, while addressed in the concerns section, is a great step forward to make Jordan grow as a state of Law and Institutions, per the king’s vision. Article 17 reserves the general public’s right to seek justice for any violation personally through our legal institutions. With liberal and progressive interpretations of the laws, and care from the judicial branch, we will have a population that hold one another accountable, and a population that is responsible to one another on the internet, as it is in the “physical world”.

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I have been thinking about this one for a while. You see, I am very interested in regional politics (“region” here comes from the Latin “to Middle East“…), and I like to read about it in as many places I could, including blog posts of course, and I often comment when I feel compelled to share or add.

But I dislike exaggerated points and wrong facts, logical fallacies, an unfounded appeal for emotion, loaded non-arguments, etc. In normal conversations, these might not be that common, but when conversation shifts to politics or religion, where people are passionate about their arguments, often extremely committed to one side — blind to all the rest, these logical “mishaps” become more and more imminent.

When reading such points, I am often compelled to write back, with a counterargument.

The reason I share this now is because, in the Jordanian blogosphere, most points that bother me just so happen to be concentrated on one side, and as a result, most counterarguments I make happen to be concentrated on the inverse side. And I’m not a hard-liner-loyalist, but increasingly I feel that this is what it seems. And its something I’m used to, anti-religious friends, upon conversation, often deem me as extremely religious, while religious friends often deem me as extremely anti-religious. That is because, by my very nature, I like to respond to one-sided arguments (arguably, all passionate arguments are one-sided, but I disagree) with a one-sided counter-argument.

But to cut the crap, and go directly to the real unambiguous point:

Jordan, is a state with its own strengths and weaknesses, achievements and counter-achievements, perks and downsides, and ultimately, the government, is both right and wrong, depending on the issue. I am all for the continuous improvement of the country, society, and the establishment, and I understand and support that this entails criticism of the wrong.

As such, the arguments I try to fight are those that say its all good and dandy, and those that entail its all bad and horrible. But can’t we engage in more balanced critique where we can actually know where Jordan really stands — what are the upsides and downsides of establishment, where to improve, where to reform, where to revolutionize, and where to simply support?

Just because one might be dissatisfied by Jordan’s attitudes towards certain aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, doesn’t mean that we should criticize the Abdali Regeneration project as a plan to suppress Ammanis, or even criticize all aspects of the attitudes towards the conflict to begin with. And when one is dissatisfied by internal policies, linking them to a national plan of intellectual suppression isn’t helpful either; it ignores real growth and real improvement in some places. All I say is, know where you stand, know where Jordan stands, and then engage in activism accordingly.

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