I have been thinking about this one for a while. You see, I am very interested in regional politics (“region” here comes from the Latin “to Middle East“…), and I like to read about it in as many places I could, including blog posts of course, and I often comment when I feel compelled to share or add.

But I dislike exaggerated points and wrong facts, logical fallacies, an unfounded appeal for emotion, loaded non-arguments, etc. In normal conversations, these might not be that common, but when conversation shifts to politics or religion, where people are passionate about their arguments, often extremely committed to one side — blind to all the rest, these logical “mishaps” become more and more imminent.

When reading such points, I am often compelled to write back, with a counterargument.

The reason I share this now is because, in the Jordanian blogosphere, most points that bother me just so happen to be concentrated on one side, and as a result, most counterarguments I make happen to be concentrated on the inverse side. And I’m not a hard-liner-loyalist, but increasingly I feel that this is what it seems. And its something I’m used to, anti-religious friends, upon conversation, often deem me as extremely religious, while religious friends often deem me as extremely anti-religious. That is because, by my very nature, I like to respond to one-sided arguments (arguably, all passionate arguments are one-sided, but I disagree) with a one-sided counter-argument.

But to cut the crap, and go directly to the real unambiguous point:

Jordan, is a state with its own strengths and weaknesses, achievements and counter-achievements, perks and downsides, and ultimately, the government, is both right and wrong, depending on the issue. I am all for the continuous improvement of the country, society, and the establishment, and I understand and support that this entails criticism of the wrong.

As such, the arguments I try to fight are those that say its all good and dandy, and those that entail its all bad and horrible. But can’t we engage in more balanced critique where we can actually know where Jordan really stands — what are the upsides and downsides of establishment, where to improve, where to reform, where to revolutionize, and where to simply support?

Just because one might be dissatisfied by Jordan’s attitudes towards certain aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, doesn’t mean that we should criticize the Abdali Regeneration project as a plan to suppress Ammanis, or even criticize all aspects of the attitudes towards the conflict to begin with. And when one is dissatisfied by internal policies, linking them to a national plan of intellectual suppression isn’t helpful either; it ignores real growth and real improvement in some places. All I say is, know where you stand, know where Jordan stands, and then engage in activism accordingly.

Share

Abstract

This paper discusses the development of a political system in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in an effort to understand the state of the current political system in the country. Different phases and defining moments in the history of Jordan will be studied, and will often directly correspond to phases of Jordanian national identity. Starting from the assassination of King Abdullah I and the short-lived reign of Talal, through the numerous coup d’état attempts in early reign of Hussein I, up to the 1994 Wadi Araba Treaty of Peace, the effect of ongoing events in shaping a political system in Jordan will be explored.

The development of a political system in Jordan will be discussed hand-in-hand along with contemporary regional politics and political movements, coupled with internal views regarding national identity. As such, the rise of Nasser and Nasserism is examined, illustrating the impact of the increasingly popular Nasserist movements in the 1950’s on the government, its policy, and the political system. Similarly, the Arab-Israeli Conflict as a whole, including the Six-Day war, the influence of the PLO, the rise of Fedayeen, and Black September will be reviewed, showing how these also shaped state policy. In addition, the rise of Islamic movements, particularly the Islamic Action Force (IAF), the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and its relation to and impact on the political system will be discussed throughout the course of history.

It will be argued that the period of the late 1950s in King Hussein’s reign, the Six-day war of 1967, the battle of Karameh of 1968, and most importantly, Black September of 1970, have been defining moments in the history of a Jordanian national identity and the formation of its current-day political system. The paper will reason that Black September represents the climax of an internal political crisis that lasted throughout the ‘70s and ‘80s.

The development of a Jordanian political system will be studied, beginning with King Talal and Prime Minister Tawfiq abul-Huda’s rewriting of the constitution and the establishment of some sort of a semi-democracy that is put to the test in the 1952 abdication of King Talal. The effect of Nasserist-inspired coup d’état attempts, as well as Black September on the Jordanian political system will be investigated, as well as the 23-year-long era of martial law, and the still-developing political system that emerged afterwards.

The essay aims to argue that the current political system – as well as its lack-thereof – in Jordan, is a result of a combination of organic development and non-development due to a century’s internal, as well as regional, political repercussions. It is my hope that this paper would illustrate the malleability of the political system and the possibility of continuous improvement. More so, it is my hope to illustrate that the existing political system (whether its current state is fortunate or unfortunate) is a result of internal, regional, and – seldom – external political repercussions, rather than a set static agenda by the ruling elite.

Background

Since Abdullah I’s reign, the newly-created kingdom of Jordan was particularly unstable; the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan (East Bank) has just merged with the West Bank, absorbing highly politicized Palestinian West Bankers, as well as refugees, giving them all Jordanian citizenship, and tripling the population of the country[1]. The entering population of Palestinians was more sophisticated, urbanized, and educated than the average Transjordanian population, which was predominantly Bedouin. Palestinians loyal to the Mufti also saw Jordan as an occupying power, and held a “high moral ground”, believing that Jordan’s Arab Legion, along with other Arab armies, have failed them, while others looked at King Abdullah as a “protector against Israeli aggression”. It is important to note that, until 1967, these Palestinians never demanded separation from the East Bank.[2]

Thus, with a tripled population, a Transjordanian-Palestinian divide, strong Palestinian nationalism, and a growing refugee problem, the newly-created Hashemite kingdom was in highly critical times…

Beginning of Change

With three fatal gunshots[3] the life of newly-created kingdom of Jordan’s first monarch ended, marking the beginning of decades of uncertainty and instability that continue to leave a distinctive mark on the country’s political system today. Abdullah’s successor, his son Talal, shaped by his father’s mistreatment during his upbringing, was resolved on becoming his father’s polar opposite, and as such initiated far-reaching reforms to the Jordanian political system.[4]

While initiatives such as acknowledging the opposition, integrating it into the political system and cabinet, selecting more representative Senators in the upper house of the parliament, and liberalizing the state as a whole were important and highly welcomed by the people, Talal and Prime Minister Tawfiq abul-Huda’s biggest and most far reaching achievement is Jordan’s re-written constitution.[5]

Talal’s 1952 constitution translated Jordan’s monarchy from an absolutist authoritarian regime into a constitutional one, with a basic framework of checks and balances. Indeed, the 1952 constitution proclaims “the Nation is the source of all powers”[6], replacing previous proclamation that, in the King is vested executive[7] and legislative[8] power. The constitution also attempts to safeguard some basic human rights, as Satloff puts it, “banning discrimination on race, language, or religion (Article 6i); ensuring work, education, and equal opportunity (Article 6ii); guaranteeing freedom of opinion in speech, writing, ‘photographic representation,’ and the press (Article 15i/ii)”.[9]

The constitution also created a bicameral parliamentary system; the upper house, the Senate, constitutes of notables appointed by the king and makes no more than one-third of the parliament, while the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, constitutes elected representatives.

Looking from the outside, the system of government created by Talal and Abul Huda was a basic democratic constitutional monarchy, with the king as the Head of State, a Prime Minister, appointed by the head of state, acting as the head of government, both heading the executive branch, where the king rules by royal decree (analogous to U.S. President’s Executive Order). These two entities can propose legislation, but ultimate authority is vested in the separate legislative branch, the Parliament, which is bicameral and includes an elected body, and can also interfere with the executive branch (checks and balances), especially with votes of no-confidence, in which two-thirds of the elected chamber of deputies could revoke government actions or call for its dissolution. The head of state can still veto parliament decisions, as is typical in many political systems.

However, the political system was still flawed by giving the King and Prime Minister the absolute advantage; almost all articles in the constitution secure rights to the people and parliament conditional upon the “limits of the law”, giving the ruling elite – specifically the king and prime minister – unprecedented leverage, tipping over the balance of the system in their favor. Such “loopholes”, indeed, were ‘exploited’ several times through the course of history, both positively and negatively, in shaping future election law, enabling absolutist martial law with a dissolved parliament, and even enabling the 1994 Wadi Araba Israel-Jordan treaty of peace.

On August 11, 1952, the new constitution was put through the ultimate test, when King Talal’s worsening schizophrenia prompted Abul Huda to appeal to the parliament to depose the king. By Article 28v, the king was required to be mentally sound; accordingly, the parliament deposed him.[10]

The Young King and the Nasserist Wave

Nineteen days before Talal’s deposition, on July 23, 1952, was the beginning of Egypt’s 1952 revolution, led by the Free Officer Movement, which ended with the abdication of King Farouk of Egypt. The revolution also marked the beginning of Gamal Abdul Nasser’s rise to power and influence, and the spread of a distinct pan-Arab, Arab Nationalistic school of thought: Nasserism.

Meanwhile, Hussein was proclaimed king on August 11, 1952, but was under the legal age of 18 years of the lunar Islamic (Hijri) calendar, and as such, Tawfiq abul-Huda continued to rule as Prime Minister, until 2 May, 1953. Dissatisfaction of abul-Huda’s “reign” culminated opposition, with growing “conservative opposition” in Amman, and “semi-liberal opposition” in the West Bank[11]. Thus, by the time King Hussein was to be enthroned and assume full power, there was already a well-established opposition force within the public sphere, the royal palace, and the government. These opposition groups included Arab Nationalists, mainly constituting of Nasserists, national socialists, mainly constitution of communists and Ba’athists, Islamists, mainly constituting of the Muslim Brotherhood[12], as well as Palestinian nationalists. This section focuses on the Nasserist wave, but the influence of political movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the PLO (or more formally the Fedayeen) will be studied in future sections.

The first culmination of tension occurred in 1955, when Britain tried, eventually in vain, to get Jordan to sign the Baghdad Pact. While initial Prime Minister Said al-Mufti of the Old Guard harshly opposed joining the pact, other forces disagreed, and he finally resigned his government. The new Prime Minister, Hazza’ al-Majali, announced Jordan’s readiness to enter negotiations with the British on the pact. Meanwhile, radios from Cairo (such as “Sawt al Arab” meaning The Arab Voice) prompted Jordanians to refuse. As popular opposition turned to protest, the government complied and rejected the pact[13]. With that, another major step had to be taken, to further align Jordan for the ever-more-powerful pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism trends, and it occurred on March 1, 1956. On March 1, the king dismissed General Glubb, also known as “Glubb Pasha”, from his post as the commander-in-chief of the Arab Legion, Jordan’s army. The people, and the Arab world, reacted very positively, considering it a (re)declaration of independence[14], to the point that the king and the monarchy were hailed even by the most liberal and anti-monarchy opposition[15].

But as Hussein was moving closer and closer towards Nasserist Arab Nationalism, Nasser’s pressure began to be felt. Especially because, by then, the July 26, 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal already took place, transforming Nasser and Nasserism into idolized figures and ideologies, respectively. Free elections occurred in October 1956 that resulted in a parliament dominated by the opposition, mainly West Banker Nasserists and Communists, unsurprisingly, given recent events. Thus, with parliament pressure, King Hussein asked Suleiman Nabulsi, a pro-Nasserist and founder and leader of the National Socialist Party, to head the government. A mere two days after entering office, the tripartite alliance of Britain, France, and Israel, entered Egypt in what is now known as the Suez Crisis of 1956, after which Nasser was defeated, yet nevertheless managed to emerge as a hero in the Arab world.

The parliament, and the newly appointed government, as well as sizable portions of the public sphere, especially amongst liberals, began advocating a union with Egypt. As an article in TIME states, in the West Bank “there were more pictures of Nasser to be seen on the shop walls than of Hussein. […] The country’s new [Prime Minister], Suleiman Nabulsi […] proclaimed flatly: “Jordan’s destiny is to disappear.” ”[16]. Nabulsi’s government also reduced diplomatic relations with the West, targeted pro-Western officials in civil service, and entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union (as a response to Hussein’s request to dismiss a number of communist elements from the cabinet), thus strengthening the position of leftists, specifically socialists and communists within the country. The position of Hussein seemed weakening with time.

Worse yet for the 21-year old Hussein, was that the dismissal of Glubb from the army resulted in “senior vacancies […] occupied by nationalist and Ba’athist officers, who were to challenge the monarchy […]”[17], among these was Ali Abu Nuwwar. Indeed, the Arab Legion continuously became more and more politicized, with Ba’athist, Nationalist, and Socialist political parties attempting to recruit members of the army; after all, the Free Officers Movement has shown that the shortest and most effective path to power was through the army.

As the relationship between the Palace and the Cabinet sunk to an all-time low, with Hussein acting ‘behind the cabinet’s back’, and the cabinet calling for a federation with Egypt and Syria, Nabulsi’s government retaliated, threatening resignation if a list of demands is not met. Hussein ultimately responded, on April 10, 1957, by requesting the resignation of the cabinet.

Opposition rallies expressing support for al-Nabulsi’s outgoing government broke loose, putting more pressure on Jordan and the monarchy. Hussein tried to appease the public by appointing Hussein Fakhri al-Khaldi, a Palestinian, as PM, who resigned 24 hours after appointment. Opposition became stronger[18]. The king tried to commission others to form a government, but they also failed. The country seemed “on a verge of chaos” and on April 13, 1957, units of the army loyal to nationalist Abu Nuwwar clashed with those loyal to the king. It was, to say the least, a coup attempt[19]. The king himself, in a surprising turn of events, went to the said army camp in Zarqa on that same day, after having secretly gained the Bedouins allegiance against Abu Nuwwar (and “his Palestinians”). Then, as described in an article in TIME:

[…] taking the untrustworthy Abu [Nuwwar] with him, he rushed out to confront the rampaging Bedouins, narrowly saved his quaking general from being shot, and won wild cheers from the tribesmen by leaping atop an armored car and shouting: “If you do not want me as your King, I will go!” […] As his Bedouins swarmed over Amman, with faces blackened by charcoal as a sign they meant business, Hussein began warily to consolidate his opening triumph. There were, after all, other armies in Jordan. (TIME, 1957)

Two days later, on April 15, a government by al-Khaldi was successfully formed, with al-Nabulsi still in the cabinet as minister of Foreign Affairs, despite disapproval from the king. On April 16, it was announced that Jordan would receive financial assistance under the Eisenhower Doctrine, had it become victim of aggression[20]. Cairo’s radio, “The Arab Voice” talked about a plot in the palace against the Jordanian people. The street roared; people shouted “long live Nasser” and “down with the Eisenhower Plan”[21], and another unsuccessful coup against Hussein took place, this time linked indirectly to al-Nabulsi. Hussein shifted again to a conservative government from the Old Guard, by appointing Ibrahim Hashem, banning all political parties, and declaring a state of emergency and along with it martial law.

Political parties were dismantled, dissolved, and banned officially, but in reality ‘went underground’, and remained illegal until 1992. The Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to continue as a “charitable organization”. The “democratization” of Jordan that had occurred since 1953 was reversed in two weeks in April[22]. The post-1957 political setup of Jordan was changed:

[…] the Jordanian polity was divided into two parts: the majority that supported the king […], and the minority, comprising the political opposition. Unlike the latter, the majority were inactive, counting on the government to be their spokesperson; this created the “silent majority” in Jordan. (Abu-Odeh, p. 82)

It was then, as a result these events that some form of political “Trans-Jordanization” of the then-two-Banked Jordan started to unfold, with the East Bank generally more favored. The 1957 riots and coup attempts had proven that the huge Nasserist influence on the West Bankers was a threat to the kingdom and monarchy.

Such events could very well be understood through the concept of National Identity. First, the concept of an independent Jordanian state, especially at that time, where no cultural or national distinctiveness has yet developed, was thus mostly intertwined with ‘loyalty’ or support of the Hashemite throne. Transjordanians were generally loyal to the monarchy, but for Palestinian-Jordanians, it was more complicated; a more powerful Palestinian national identity had already developed as a result of political events since the beginning of the century. Nasser’s Arab Nationalist rhetoric was more effective on Palestinian-Jordanians than Transjordanians, since was often coupled with commitment to “liberate Palestine” and solve the Palestine Question, but also since they had less commitment to a separate, independent “Jordan”, compared to Transjordanians.

The Six-Day War

Since 1964, while Jordan remained pro-Western, it also aligned itself more with Arab Nationalism as well, signing a mutual defense treaty with Egypt, agreeing to the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, becoming a founding member of the United Arab Command, etc. The state of emergency had almost seized, and martial law had been relaxed. However, the post-1957 opposition shifted to “external opposition” as numerous opposition leaders fled to other countries, and as such radios of Damascus and Cairo, now joined by Baghdad, intermittently campaigned against the Hashemite Kingdom nevertheless. Regardless, the monarchy’s political relationship with Nasser was in good shape.

Following activities by Fedayeen elements against Israel prompted it to launch military operations against the West Bank, these quickly escalated, with Nasser requesting removal of peacekeeping troops from Sinai, and on June 5, 1967, the War had officially started. Hussein would later state that Jordan’s particular engagement in the war was “imposed on our nation”[23]. Within hours from the beginning of the war, Jordan was losing in the West Bank, and the palace was flooded by cables from Nasser supporting Jordanian withdrawal from the West Bank, allegedly stating to Hussein “when history is written, your courage and bravery will be acknowledged […] gave-and-take is part of [history] and so is progress and retreat.”[24]

On June 10, 1967, the Arabs had officially lost the war, and thus Jordan had lost the West Bank, with a second wave of refugees entering the East Bank, some of whom have been displaced for a second time since 1948. Martial law was strictly enforced again. Transjordanian-Palestinian relations were again impacted as a result of the war; with the army composed of a majority of Transjordanians and new figures showing that only 696 lost their lives created feelings of guilt amongst Transjordanians, and feelings of betrayal amongst Palestinians, who thought that the Jordanian army conspired with Israel to defeat Nasser[25], contrary to Nasser’s cables, supporting withdrawal from the West Bank as early as twenty-seven hours from military engagements.

Politically, Jordan was to be subject of new “ethnic” tensions that will last decades. Economically, Jordan was in ruins. Jordan’s immediate post-war agenda was the reclamation of the West Bank, and as such attempted maintaining strong bonds with the West Bank, as well as an open bridge allowing the passage of West Bankers and East Bankers alike, in any direction. Israel did not mind, as long as its end of the bridge was controlled by them. Israel on the other hand, made the “West Bank question” more critical, where the option of an independent non-Jordanian control over the West Bank was raised to the international community. By then, the PLO was still not given the status of “sole representative of the Palestinian people”. The position of the PLO, that advocated a liberated Palestinian state, whose destiny is then decided by its people, was not always parallel to the wishes of West Bankers, many of which demanded restoration of land and Jordanian unity.

Still, for Jordan, retrieval of the West Bank was to happen peacefully, through talks and international pressure, rather than militarily with Israel. Hussein emphasized during the Arab Summit that Arab attitudes towards Palestinian liberation were impotent, and emphasized the Jordanian element of the West Bank, calling its people “our family on the West Bank of Jordan”, and hailing their nationalistic and patriotic steadfastness[26].

Black September and the Jordanian Divide

The 1967 war led to a new era, in which Palestinians “were beginning take matters into their own hands”. Guerilla groups, forming since Nabulsi’s era, were empowered and consolidated, most of which were known as the Fedayeen, meaning freedom fighters. The most important of these groups was Yasser Arafat’s Fatah[27]. Fedayeen groups launched attacks on Israel from within the East Bank, and the Israeli army was to retaliate by sizable military action against the Jordanian town of al-Karameh (meaning “the dignity”) in March, 1968.

For the first time, the Jordanian army and Fedayeen fought side-by-side, with unprecedented cooperation, and while Israel’s military objectives were indeed achieved, they had done so with considerable damage to their own army, and as such as seen as some type of victory. Regardless of cooperation, Massad argues that “depending on whose account one reads, both the Jordanian army and the guerillas minimized the role of the other […] and claimed victory for themselves.”[28] Such contention in crediting one side for the victory marked the beginning of tensions to come. The Fedayeen were receiving more public attention, to the dismay of many Jordanian army officers, who saw that their efforts, their more advanced weaponry, and their greater numbers disregarded[29]. Indeed, while around 15,000 Jordanian soldiers with artillery, tanks, and canons fought, while most estimates state that 300 Palestinian fedayeen fought[30]. Jordan will also however change the rhetoric of al-Karameh to market it as a Jordanian cause, rather than a national Palestinian cause.

As paramilitary entities, the Fedayeen, with their growing popularity became both a military and “existential threat to the Hashemite rule”, as Fruchter-Ronen describes it. He also describes this period as:

[…] characterized by the strengthening of [Fedayeen] organizations and their entrenchment in Jordan by means of the establishment of autonomous military, political, and social institutions. (Fruchter-Ronen, p. 244)

Their presence as “a state-within-a-state” was thus strengthened. While the official Jordanian story accuses the fedayeen of acting as ‘bandits’, Massad says that “serious guerilla misconduct” was, in a number of cases, caused by “Jordanian agents”[31]. Regardless, a significant rift within the Jordanian population was on the rise. While Hussein initially did not respond, some[32] say because of his sympathy with the Palestinian cause, while others, like Fruchter-Ronen attribute it to the initial popularity of the fedayeen, which later decreased as trans-Jordanians and middle-class Palestinians objected to their “violations”. During the beginning of 1970, Hussein arranged meetings with Bedouin tribal leaders to garner their support, but they were not mobilized.[33]

Even before Black September proper, Jordanian retaliation against fedayeen was often directed at refugee camps, which, indeed, harbored some fedayeen, but also shows how, by that time, “the army looked on all Palestinians as an extension of the fedayeen and vice versa.”[34]

Tensions increased further when Prince Zaid Bin Shaker’s wife was murdered in her home. Hotels were supposedly shelled, and courts were “completely out of action”. By then, Amman’s streets were completely controlled by the fedayeen. The Royal Palace was also targeted, as was the broadcasting center and power station. Threats culminated when, On September 1, an attempted assassination of Hussein took place. The three hijacked planes in the Dawson’s Field hijackings were landed in al-Zarqa by a fedayeen group, after which they were eventually blown up with 54 passengers still on board[35], the rest of the hostages remained in possession of the fedayeen. Queen Noor claims that, in a phone call with Fatah leader Yasser Arafat, Hussein was told that he had twenty-four hours to exit the country and surrender the throne[36].

And as the official Jordanian government story goes, Jordan had “no choice” but to act militarily if it was to preserve the Hashemite throne[37]. International pressure to reclaim the hostages also mounted on the government. On September 15, a military government was set up and the army began its violent operations; martial law was reinforced. That day, Arafat became commander-in-chief of the Palestinian Liberation Army. It was a Civil War. The Jordanian army moved to Amman and northern towns. But Black September was not a one-sided operation; the fedayeen continued to attack the palace, but also military and intelligence headquarters. In response to fedayeen attacks on September 17, the army launched a massive, unorganized counterattack on fedayeen, regarded as some as “a cleansing campaign and general slaughter of the Palestinians”[38].

Hussein and his government maintained that the death toll was 1,500-2,000, mostly Palestinians. International journalists, as well as the guerillas reported a toll between 7,000 and 20,000. Guerilla forces were defeated, and remaining fedayeen were assaulted and forced to leave the country. The PLO also reassessed its role in Black September, and “admitted to a number of mistakes that helped to precipitate the clash”[39]. Jordanians, however, as stated, still assert that military action was the “only choice” to preserve the kingdom.

The war itself was fought by trans-Jordanian and Palestinian-Jordanians alike, both, on both sides, with many Palestinian-Jordanians and trans-Jordanians remaining neutral. Still, the divide between Palestinian national movements, supporters of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and Palestinians in general on one hand, and the Jordanian army, Jordanian loyalists, and even Transjordanians in general on the other hand grew further by these events. Black September symbolizes a serious “clash” between Palestinian Identity and Jordanian Identity, as described by ex-Minister of Information Laila Sharaf.

In the periods between 1967 and Black September, “the state of Jordan lost some of the characteristics of its sovereignty” in favor of the PLO, says Fruchter-Ronen, and adds:

[These events] have been imprinted in the collective consciousness of both Jordanians and Palestinians as events bearing symbolic, social and national meaning, and carrying internal implications on Jordanian society and the Palestinian–Jordanian relationships even until these very days. To a large extent, it may be claimed that the Civil War of 1970–71 was a turning point in enhancing the growth of trans-Jordanian national consciousness. [Source[40]]

With the end of Black September, we would see another main shift to Jordan’s agenda, both internally and externally. Jordan changed its stance towards the PLO, accepting it gradually as the “sole representative of the Palestinian people” and as such letting go of its claim for the West Bank. Jordan’s involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict remained, and its involvement with the Palestinian cause continued, albeit shifting from “our family on the West Bank of Jordan is suffering” to “our Palestinian brothers are suffering”. In 1974, in the Arab League Rabat Summit, a resolution was passed proclaiming the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian People, and the 1982 Fez Summit, in which it was agreed, unanimously (i.e. including Hussein) on the establishment of an independent non-Jordanian Palestinian state in the occupied West Bank. And, on 1988, in an address to the Nation, King Hussein formally letting go of the Jordanian claim for the West Bank, and declaring full support of the “Palestinian Cause” and the PLO.[41] This happened after, based on a PLO request, the Arab League unanimously voted in 1988 for a Jordanian disengagement with the West bank.

Islamic Movements in Jordan as Friends of the Throne

When Islamic Movements are mentioned, especially in Jordan, mind goes immediately to the Muslim Brotherhood, and rightfully so. The brotherhood is Jordan’s largest, oldest, and most influential Islamic group, and its political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), is the most influential opposition group today. The Brotherhood’s official presence in Jordan began after the elevation of the status of Transjordan to a kingdom in 1945, and the movement was granted legal status as a charitable organization in January, 1946, and was granted status as an “organized group” in 1953[42]. The relationship between the Brotherhood and Abdullah I flourished as he supported their conservative Islamic agenda, and saw it as a good tool to counteract the effects of communism and socialism post World War II, whereas the Brotherhood supported the union of the two banks and “respected the religious credentials” of the Hashemites[43]. It is important to recognize that while the Muslim Brotherhood itself is not a political party per say, it is highly politicized, whether today through the IAF or before as a grassroots movement with legitimacy and leverage.

As mentioned earlier, the Muslim Brotherhood also continued during the 1957 crisis, in which it was allowed to continue as a charitable organization. However, it was also helpful to Hussein in combatting the wave of Nasserism discussed above[44], and was, in the 1950s and 1960s, a good source of support to the monarchy. The Jordanian branch operated like its Egyptian parent a popular grassroots movement, supporting the idea that Islam is an all-encompassing religion, that shari`a law should be implemented as state law, and opposing general views of pan-Arabism, Arab Nationalism, and other nonreligious schools of thought.

Since 1967, but especially since some years after, the strength of Nasser’s Arab Nationalism, as well as general secular nationalism started to fail in the Arab world, as many saw the disaster of 1967 as a proof of the failure of these ideologies. With these, the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Movements in general began to prosper. Then came the 1979 Iranian Revolution, that later proved to be an Islamic Revolution, that, for many, showed the possible success of an Islamic state. For many, the Islamic revolution, along with socioeconomic woes of the time lead many to favor the Brotherhood’s slogan “Islam is the solution”[45].

Return of Parliament Life and the Islamic Opposition

Post the 1988 disengagement from the West Bank, Hussein believed that Jordan’s stability and institutions were able to sustain political development after decades of martial law and parliamentary elections. The National Assembly convened to vote on Hussein’s decision on West Bank disengagement, and along with it a modified election law where the West Bank is no longer represented. Since “house of representatives” in that assembly was unelected, thus basically just allowed the new laws to go to action for the 1989 elections. The elections themselves were a response to popular riots in April of 1989[46], which themselves criticized economic policies. The elections themselves were considered honest and democratic[47]. While political parties themselves remained outlawed, the ban on political activity was lifted; members of multiple parties were among the parliament, from far left to far right. Chief among these was the Islamists, who claimed 40% of the seats[48].

Now with considerable power, “the Brotherhood became the regime’s main opposition both inside and outside the parliament” says Tal[49]. The Jordanian government, on the other hand, had already by 1985 regarded the Muslim Brotherhood as a “strategic threat” over concerns of increased fundamentalism and concerns over their ‘secretly-planned’ education and preaching programs[50].

In 1992, after Parliament Life had returned, the ban on political parties was lifted. As such, the IAF was founded the political party of the Muslim Brotherhood, and many underground parties were re-established.

The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1994, which will be discussed next, was the final blow in regime-Brotherhood relations, which transformed the Brotherhood’s party, the IAF to a true opposition move. In the 1993 parliament, the IAF occupied 16 of 80 parliament seats, and firmly opposed “any peace deal with Israel” adding “on whatever terms”[51]. Since, the IAF has not been significantly included the cabinet, though its voice in the parliament, as well as demonstrations and rallies are often heard and not silenced. The IAF has especially been a proponent of Jordan’s slow normalization of relations with Israel, and continuously stressed the use of education to promote the ‘Palestinian cause’ and keeping the public aware of the ‘Zionist threat’.

The 1994 Jordan-Israel treaty of Peace in the Context of Parliament, Political Freedom, and Political Development

In August, 1993, the parliament was dissolved three months before its end of term, in preparation of new elections under, in which electoral rules had been modified. Such modification was done supposedly “to reduce fundamentalists’ advantage”[52] according to Boustani, referring mainly to Islamic fundamentalists and the IAF. Islamists indeed lost 14 seats, now with 18 IAF seats, and leftists won only 2 seats, with the rest going to centrists and conservative loyalists[53].

According to Raffaella Wakeman, changes to election law did not alter representation in terms of number of seats per district, but did change the system from Bloc voting to Single Non-Transferable voting (SNTV)[54]. Wakeman also identifies attempting to drive IAF out of the parliament as the main motivation behind the 1993 and 2001 election laws. However, since the original 1986, representation was not proportional, especially in the capital and other cities such as Zarqa, as a residual consequence from Black September, thus high amounts of Palestinians suffering malapportionment.

An interpretation of the 1993 modifications to election law is to facilitate moving forward with the peace treaty with Israel, which the parliament very well may have blocked its ratification. Thus, in facilitating the treaty by election mechanism “reform”, two parties took the hit: Islamic Movements in Jordan, mainly the IAF, which, still, remains the largest centralized party in the parliament, and Palestinian-Jordanians in general.

The 1994 Wadi Araba Jordanian-Israel Treaty of Peace created an additional rift in the country, one that empowered IAF opposition. More seriously perhaps, is the social issue of marginalization of Palestinian-Jordanians, who make up around 50% of the country, depending on which statistics you read, and yet are mis-represented within the Parliament.

Conclusion: Today’s Political System in context of the Past

Jordan’s political system today can definitely be seen as a result of decades’ worth of political repercussions, especially during Hussein’s time. Crises in the first decade of his term put significant strain on Jordanian national identity, highlighted differences between opposition and loyalists, often aligning these along racial lines. Hussein’s response in 1957 preserved Jordan and the regime’s stability, but cemented in the constitution basis for extended dissolution of the government and authoritarianism if the head of state sees it fit.

Black September had many long-standing political effects as well, it being most responsible for current social issues between Palestinians and Transjordanians in Jordan, and the basis for serious malapportionment in the government.

Today’s Political System includes two main issues of public concern, which are also possible hurdles to future democratization: first, the issue of Palestinian-Jordanian marginalization in the parliament and government, and second, the relationship between the government and the Islamic Action Front. The former can be described differently, as an issue of mis-proportional representation, especially in the country’s political and intellectual capital, Amman.

As for political development in the country, it has been very limited today. While press is partly to blame, the bulk of this issue comes from the nature of political parties in the country, with most opposition parties, with the exception of the IAF, weak, with no real political presence. This is a main hurdle to political development. The underlying reasons for this can be linked to Hussein’s policies of 1989 and 1992, which returned parliamentary life and political parties, and were hailed as positive steps in the direction of democracy. The problem is, given the History of Jordan since 1957, most political movements in the country have been of external influence, whether from Egyptian Nasserism, Egyptian Islamism, Syrian and Iraqi Ba’athism, Palestinian Nationalism, or Syrian Socialism and Communism. By the 1980s, these parties lost relevance in Jordan’s internal politics, and were only given legitimacy and popularity due to the political oppression of the regime. By 1989 and 1992, no party had a real agenda relevant to Jordan, other than blind support or criticism for the regime depending on its parent party, whether in Syria, Damascus, Baghdad, or others.

But the current regime can do a lot for harboring political development, from the de-marginalization of Palestinian-Jordanians and Amman, to increased transparency, political party laws, or other programs. And there is one important motivation here:

In support of my main objective in the abstract, the paper should have shown the malleability of the political system. For instance, the return of political party law in 1989 in an effort to please the people after riots regarding economic woes, but also all the way since refusing to sign the Baghdad Pact. Even if one doesn’t pass judgment on current state of “democracy”, the power of public pressure and the malleability of the political system have been integral to political development in Jordan even during periods of martial law and suspended parliament life.

Citations and Endnotes

Works Cited

On the move: Jordan. (peace talks with Israel). (1994, June 11). The Economist (US).

Abu-Odeh, A. (1999). Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East peace process. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Aruri, N. H. (1972). Jordan: a study in political development (1921-1965). The Hague: Nijhoff.

Boustani, N. (1993, November 10). Centrists and Hussein Loyalists Gain Seats in Jordan Election. The Washington Post.

Fruchter-Ronen, I. (2008). Black September: The 1970-71 Events and their Impact on the Formation of Jordanian National Identity. Civil Wars, 10(3), 244-260.

Hussein of Jordan. (1988, July 31). Address to the Nation. Retrieved May 9, 2010, from Official King Hussein Website: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/88_july31.html

Massad, J. A. (2001). Colonial effects : the making of national identity in Jordan. New York: Columbia University Press.

Murphy, C. (1989, November 9). Jordan Holds Parliamentary Election In New Mood of Political Openness . The Washington Post.

Press and Publication Department. (1967). Al-Watha’iq al-Urduniya [Jordanian Documents]. Amman: Press and Publications Department.

Queen Noor. (2003). Leap of Faith: Memoirs of an Unexpected Life. Miramax Books.

Satloff, R. B. (1994). From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in transition. New York: Oxford University Press.

Tal, N. (2005). Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.

Tawfiq Abul Huda, e. a. (1952, January 1). The Constitution of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Retrieved May 5, 2010, from King Hussein Library: Documents: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html

The Hindu. (1951, August 20). The Hindu. Retrieved May 4, 2010, from Abdullah assassination case opens: http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2001/08/20/stories/10201045.htm

The Middle East Journal. (1947, July). The Constitution of Transjordan. Middle East Journal, 1(3), pp. 322-333.

TIME. (1952, August 18). JORDAN: Schizophrenia. Retrieved May 5, 2010, from TIME: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,816694,00.html

TIME. (1957, May 6). Jordan: The Education of a King. Retrieved April 20, 2010, from TIME Archives: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,809412,00.html

Wakeman, R. L. (2009). Containing the opposition : selective representation in Jordan and Turkey. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.

Wiktorowicz, Q. (2001). The management of Islamic activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Share

The status of the Arab Revolt is complex, especially when considered by an Arab. While on the one hand, the Arab Revolt signifies a rebirth of the Arabs, in which attempts for independence re-emerge, and in which the yearning to greatness after years of dormancy is rekindled. In that respect, there is a big chance that Sherif Hussein’s correspondence with the British to secure an independent Arab future lead to the existence of the modern Arab states. One the other hand, however, while the Arab Revolt might signify the birth of Independent Arab entities, it also embodies some sort of death; a more serious Arab decline.

The deep involvement of the British with the Arab Revolt, as well as the Hashemite-British alliance have given leverage to Britain over the Arabs and allowed it to secure an autocratic role in handling the remains of the Ottoman Empire after its dissolution. The Arab Revolt, instead of resulting in the Birth of a unified and independent Arab state in the Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire, lead to the partitioning of the entire empire, the creation of artificial nation states, often with imported regents or rulers, the birth of the Palestine Question and the greater Arab-Israeli Conflict, the continued ‘colonization’ of the fragmented Arab states as a weak periphery ever supporting the west.

This complex two-sidedness of the Arab Revolt makes it particularly hard, especially for an Arab, to determine one’s views towards it. While an Arab might owe it to the revolt to still call oneself ‘an Arab’, its long term political failure means that an Arab also owes it to the revolt that he probably is, with an increased probability, regretful of being ‘an Arab’.

I do not think I am in a position to comment if the Arab Revolt was benign or not, worth it or not, positive or not. My point is not to comment on Sherif Hussein’s efforts in the revolt, nor the efforts of the Arabs as a people, because I think it is largely irrelevant. Regardless of the motivation, goals, and intentions of the revolt, the reason I view it with some sort of melancholy or regret is the end result of fragmentation and instability. And I do not think that Hussein or any of his peers had an impact on that. I look at the revolt with melancholy because of the British involvement, the broken promises, the double-alliances, and the way history unfolded. What a shame.

Share

This one has been on my mind for a while. The current political situation in the Middle East is one of the topics I’m truly interested in, and I’ve been writing numerous posts related to the issue. One thing that caught me attention was that I was addressing a lot of Arab concerns against Israel and its regime (which I firmly believe in), and in so forgot to address my personal concerns about Arabic politics when it comes to the conflict.

I also decided to write this after a long conversation I had with a friend (whose also Arab) who believes that Jordanian politics regarding the issue, especially the 1994 Wadi `Araba Treaty, indicates that Jordan (or the government/king) has – in a sense – betrayed The Cause and other Arab countries.

I think that’s a completely wrong approach, and I believe the truth is that Jordan is a pioneer in seeking peace, and a Just Solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Had other Arab countries followed Jordan’s footsteps in large, then Arabs would’ve done their part in promoting a just peace, and stability in the region would’ve been a much more probable reality.

Since I think such belief that Jordan went against the Palestinian Cause (and Pan-Arab Values, fraternity, and unity) is utterly misconceived on numerous levels, I find it hard to find where to start. This is why I’ll divide the post into separate arguments that will hopefully complement each other.

(The outline is basically as follows: 1: Jordan was not alone in pursuing peace in the 1990′s, 2: Jordan did not go against Palestine, 3: While Jordan has peace, Jordan is not a neutral nation, 4: Other Cases of Jordanian Commitment to the Pan-Arab Cause).

1) Jordan was not alone in pursuing peace in the 1990’s

King Hussein of Jordan had Middle East peace aspirations even before the war of 1967. That did not stop him, or the country, from being properly aligned with the Arabs in the war of 1967, where Jordan, lead by King Hussein, entered a full-force war against Israel, and lost a considerable amount of land from the West Bank, which, at the time, was part of the Kingdom of Jordan. (Many people have doubts about Hussein’s intentions in the 1967 war, these will be discussed in future articles). As a matter of fact, while King Hussein talked to Israelis (as did Egyptian, Lebanese, and Syrian officials), he only allowed such talks to translate into a treaty much later on.

While Anwar El-Sadat was alone in signing a peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, King Hussein’s 1994 treaty happened in a different light that Arabs of today forget:After Egypt’s 1979 treaty, Egypt’s membership in the Arab League was suspended, along with diplomatic relations between Egypt and many other Arab States. In 1989, however, the Arab League restored relations with Egypt, which was readmitted into the league. (Timeline: Arab League, BBC News.  2008)

Even more importantly, is the Madrid Conference of 1991 which involved official representations from Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine, to negotiate peace.

Even in the 1993 Oslo Accords, Syria was invited to participate, and only refused participation due to the PLO’s participation (per “Oslo Accords: Background” on Wikipedia). I.e. Syria refused pursuing further negotiations of peace with Israel not due to its reservations towards Israel, but rather, the PLO (due to tensions in the Gulf War).

In any case, post 1989, there was a new direction across all Arab countries that aimed to put an end to the conflict. The general direction of most Arab states was, indeed, peace negotiations.

Jordan did not go out of its way in signing the treaty, it is only different from other Arab countries in that it was successful in reaching a treaty.

2) Jordan did not go against Palestine

Then, in 1993, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat sign the Oslo Accords, which at the time was seen as the end for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Since the Oslo Accords announced an ‘end of hostility’ between PLO (the “sole representative of the Palestinian Peoples”) and the State of Israel, a ‘framework of solutions’ have been laid out.

King Hussein has said that any peace treaty he would sign with Israel would not go against the Palestinian Cause. Since, in 1993, “the Cause” appeared to have been solved (or begin to be solved), the king had no reason not to pursue his country’s own peace with Israel.

Indeed, Oslo is seen to have given the king the green light to pursue signing a treaty.

How could Jordan have gone against Palestine with its treaty of peace, if the Palestinian Authority itself signed its own treaty of peace first? Whatever grievances and grudges held by Arab States against Israel are there as a result of compassion and fraternity towards the Arab Palestinian population. Once the population’s representation (meaning, the PA) expresses its aspirations for settlement and compromise, it is the duty of sister Arab states to stand by the Palestinians in ending the conflict, just as it were their duty to stand by the Palestinians in defending their land in 1948 and 1967.

Some might comment that I refer to the Oslo Accords as if it were a successful treaty, when, in fact, its outcome indicates immense failure. However, I am describing the Oslo Accords as they were seen at the time, by King Hussein and other Arab leaders. Furthermore, the failure of the Oslo Accords, in my view, is not to be attributed to deception on either side, but rather, the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, and the consequent election of  fundamentalist ^{(disclaimer: personal opinion)}, right-wing Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, running the country in an opposite direction, against the principles agreed upon in Oslo.

3) While Jordan has peace, Jordan is not a neutral nation

I repeat: Jordan is not a neutral nation. Policies of Jordan since 1994 have been consistently pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian.

It is frustrating to see that many thing Jordan has deserted the Palestinian Cause, because as I open my Jordanian newspaper every day, and see developments in Jordanian foreign politics, out efforts regarding Palestine are all I read about.

“Jordan will continue to fight for Palestinian rights — King” says one front-page headline in December, 2009[1]. “Time running out on Mideast” says another, clarifying: “In comments published Monday, His Majesty King Abdullah warned that the window of opportunity for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is very limited”[2].

In checking the front page of The Jordan Times between December 22nd, 2009 and January 1st, 2010, I have not found a single case where the Palestine did not occupy front-page headline news. More often than not, headline news regarding Palestine is not detached, and often covers government initiatives, speeches by the King, diplomatic visits by the king and government, talks with Abbas, the Israeli government, etc., regarding reaching a solution to the conflict.

When did the last time any non-Jordanian, non-Egyptian Arab diplomat take the time to speak of Palestine instead of his own country on official state visits and speeches? The are a few exceptions, but at large, Jordan is one of the very few countries that is genuinely deeply interested in a Just Solution for the Palestinians.

Or how about this one? In King Abdullah’s Speech to the Congress in 2007, the words “Jordan”, “Jordanian”, etc. were uttered a total of 7 times, compared to the 15 times Palestine was mentioned! And I’m not being silly and just counting words, go ahead, click the link above, and read the speech. This is our king’s speech on a state visit to the U.S. You would think it’d be in Jordan’s best interest to talk about foreign aid, economical reform, cooperation (as do the leaders of the rest of the Middle Eastern countries), but he – representing the position of Jordan in the conflict – chose, and continues to choose the issue of Palestine, making it Jordan’s main mission, in terms of foreign policy. Go ahead, give it a read, this is what Jordan stands for, advocating peace in the Middle East, and a Just Solution for Palestine.

In official state visits to Japan, the EU, and the U.S., the general attitude of news items is along the lines of: “the King stressed the importance of a viable Palestinian state… oh, and by the way, they agreed on economical cooperation”, or something.

Also, Jordan openly denounces and condemns Israeli settlement expansion, as well as Israeli military moves against other Arab nations. In the 2006 Lebanon war, a statement from the Jordanian government denounced Israel’s actions (yes, even though we signed a peace treaty with them):

“Jordan stands against whoever exposes the Palestinian people and their cause, Lebanon and its sovereignty to unexpected dangers. Israel’s use of force against unarmed civilians and the outcome in terms of the human loss and destruction of civil institutions.”

BBC NEWS

As for the Gaza War:

SALAH BASHIR, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Jordan, said his country felt deep pain and grave concern at the escalation of violence and deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, […]  The military operations were a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and the Fourth Geneva Convention.

un.org/News/Press/docs//2009/sc9563.doc.htm

I’m not asking anyone to commend Jordan on such quotes, because that’s Jordan’s duty. The point of showing such quotes is to emphasize that Jordan continues to criticize Israel – and harshly – whenever it feels compelled by Arab duty to do so. While Jordan engages in full normalization with Israel, it does not engage in neutralization. Please, do not confuse the two; the feelings, emotions, views, and motivations of the Jordanian people and their leadership remain the same: in full support of the Palestinians, we discovered, however, that our pro-Palestinian message and efforts are best conveyed in an atmosphere of peace and dialogue.

Point is, foreign politics of Jordan is centered around the Palestinian Cause. Saying Jordan deserted Palestine or other Arab States because of its peace with Israel insults the very foundation of Jordanian policy.

4) Other Cases of Jordanian Commitment to the Pan-Arab Cause

Also among Jordanian Efforts, are King Hussein’s interference in the Wye River Memorandum of 1998 (will be discussed in a future article), and his facilitation of the Hebron Agreement that lead to the pulling back of the “IDF”, out of Hebron. Jordan’s aid to the Gaza strip, and continuous donations to Palestine are also among these.

In the Lebanon war in 2006, Jordan’s Queen Alia International Airport was the first and only airport to be used to send aid/relief aircrafts to Lebanon during the war. Countries like the UAE used Jordan as a medium to send its own relief planes soonafter,  taking advantage of the safe air passage opened by Jordan to Lebanon, based on negotiations with Israel. Also, In the Gaza War in 2008-09, relief as usual, and a huge blood donation campaign, in which the king was one of thousands to donate blood.

An important example, that shows Jordan’s commitment to the Arab cause, and its proper prioritization of Arab interests above Jordanian interests is the following story:

On 25/09/97, Khaled Mashal, a prominent Hamas leader, suffered an assassination attempt by Israeli Mossad agents, while presiding in Jordan (where he lived between ‘91-‘99).  King Hussein threatened to cut diplomatic relations with Israel, and nulling the 1994 treaty of peace if an antidote is not given to Mashal, and indeed, an antidote was supplied. Jordanian authorities also captured the Mossad agents, and released them in exchange of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, founder of Hamas.

Over and out.

Share

You can check out an example article on the bottom of page 14 of Issue 46 of this year’s The Tech. The issue in question was published on October 20, 2009.

In response to the false claims and strong language of this article, I collaborated with John Mikhael, an interested friend, to write up an article that responds to all of the false claims in the FLAME article.

You can either download and view the PDF here or view it using the flash object below:

Share

Such expectation has come under test in the final few days with the Goldstone Report. Richard Goldstone, a South African Constitutional Court judge, has been appointed to head the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, to investigate the issue of war crimes in the 2008-2009 Gaza War, in particular the issue of War Crimes by Israel against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. You can see my opinion on the Gaza War here.

The Fact Finding Mission concluded that both Israel and Hamas are guilty of war crimes, but with Israel getting the majority of the criticism. According to Goldstone, the report is completely objective and challenged all critics to point out what exactly about the report makes it biased, and to date, no critic responded with a specific complaint about bias.

For me, criticizing the report, (like what Israel has been doing), is similar to having Neo-Nazis say modern accounts of holocaust history are biased because the majority of the crimes they mention are by Nazis; of course they are – because factually, they were responsible for the most crimes! The same applies to Israel in this case: of course Israel is criticized the most in the report for war crimes; they killed 1,417 Palestinians, including 925 civilians, while Hamas was only responsible for killing 13 Israelis, of which 3 are civilians. Who is the offender? Who should be punished more? Jee, I don’t know.

Anyways, also quick to criticize the Goldstone Report, was the U.S., whom criticized the mission for reasons similar in baselessness and content to Israel’s own. The U.S. says the report is harsh towards Israel but provides no evidence on any instance in which the report was factually biased or omitted.

So here’s the deal, the U.S. veto superpower and its close ally Israel are the only two nations who oppose the report. By induction from observations from throughout the last decade, one might expect that it is inevitable that the U.S. will veto any decision regarding holding Israel accountable to the war crimes it has committed (according the UN mission report). Such expectation is reinforced by Israel’s own claimed, who say Hillary Clinton “promised Israel” to veto any decision against Israel that can occur as a consequence of the mission’s findings.

If that is true, then I’ll be disgusted and disappointed. Vetoing a decision that has been adopted by every single other country in the world because shows that the U.S. has not changed its thinking. In other words, a veto against a decision that holds Israel accountable to crimes it committed means that Obama is not serious in caring about “Palestinian children growing up in peace”. It also means that the little girl in Gaza who died on the hands of Israel’s war crimes isn’t worth a change. Most importantly, a veto by the U.S. would mean Israeli war crimes can repeat themselves; it is an unpunishable offense that is acceptable.

Israeli children will grow up in peace, as they always have. Their largest fear will be some image they saw on TV which they have no personal experience with. Israel will continue to grow, and socioeconomic life will be fine as always. If that’s all that the U.S. cares about, then I understand the sentiment behind possibly vetoing holding Israel accountable.

If however, I am correct in my enthusiasm… If the U.S. is really serious about the change… If Barrack Obama’s words about wishing for Palestinian and Israeli children to grow up in peace alike are truly serious… then, they must acknowledge that passing such decision will put an end to social injustice, and Palestinian children will finally begin to have security.

How wonderful a world would it be if all children growing up, across all continents and countries alike, would realize that if any entity is to offend or oppress them, justice will be served eventually.

If the new Administration agrees with such sentiments, then I needn’t worry; justice will be served, the offender will be held accountable.

Share

Israel cannot rely on a right of self‑defence or on a state of necessity in order to preclude the wrongfulness of the construction of the wall.  The Court accordingly finds that the construction of the wall and its associated régime are contrary to international law.

International Court of Justice ^[1]

Why is it so that a structure proclaimed illegal (or in breach of international treaties) by the General Assembly, the Red Cross, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Israeli human rights groups continue construction for nearly a decade?

The “Israeli West Bank Barrier” (also known as the “security fence” by the Israelis, and the “segregation wall” by Arabs), has been in existence since the Oslo Accords in 1993. However, such barrier only transformed to be a threat to the very existence of Palestinians after the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000.

According to the Israeli story, the logic behind the barrier is obvious: security. The wall is aimed at reducing “Palestinian violence” and protecting citizens of the Israeli states.

That’s all fine and dandy, until we get to one stipulation: the path and structure of the wall is simply irrelevant to security. Instead of having the wall be built on the 1949 Armistice Lines (more commonly known as the Green Line), you will find the wall divergent in multiple areas, continuously annexing land from the Palestinian West Bank, essentially rendering it Israeli de facto.

The wall goes through unbelievable lengths, with its past east of the Israeli settlements (that have also been deemed illegal by the international communities), engulfing them and their surrounding areas as Israeli land and leaving nothing to Palestinians.

To put things into perspective, the wall’s length is 723 km, while the Green Line between the West Bank and Israel is only half the length. ^[2] Furthermore, only 14% will be built on the Green Line, with the remaining 86% built inside the West Bank.^[2]

The existence of the walls means that thousands of schoolchildren can’t get to school, hundred of thousands surrounded by the wall and can’t travel elsewhere in their own territory without elaborate procedures, and many others with no place to work, no land to grow, and no crops to gather.

Here are some interesting tidbits from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ report on the West Barrier route, published in July 2009 (full document will be listed in further readings section):

• The Bethlehem governorate is 660 km². Only 13 percent of Bethlehem’s land is available for Palestinian use, much of this fragmented
• The Barrier cuts off West Bank Palestinians and care providers from specialist and tertiary health care in the six specialist hospitals in East Jerusalem.
• The Barrier cuts off Muslims and Christians from religious sites in Jerusalem.

Israeli peace group Peace Now adds (report will also be added to further readings list):

• The fence has created many Palestinian cities (i.e. Kalkiliya), villages and Jerusalem neighborhoods to completely cut off and caged without any freedom of movement.
• The current route of the fence will annex de-facto around 8-10% of the West Bank land

Peace Now continues to add:

the actual fence continues to be constructed deep within Palestinian territory. The current route of the fence is intended to destroy all chances of a future peace settlement with the Palestinians and to annex as much land as possible from the West Bank. Thus the method of creating facts on the ground by annexing land to existing settlements continues, this time by using the route of the fence.

The wall is simply not a just solution, and cannot be rationalized by waving the good old “security” banner. Not this time. Institutions internationally have stressed the unlawfulness of this structure over and over again. International leaders have acknowledged that the wall is a problem, both for the existence of a viable Palestinian state, and even further: any sustainable peace effort to begin with. In his time, U.S. President George W. Bush affirmed the illegality of the wall, and today, President Barrack Obama explicitly states that settlements (and their by-products) are a problem that hinders the cause of peace.

What I’m trying to say here is: the world knows its wrong, the have for the past 8 years; the reason no one is doing anything about it, and the reason the Security Council has stood mute for the past 5 years (even after an ICJ ruling), is because no one seems to care just enough to do anything about it. So much for humanity.

To the west of these concrete blocks, life is perfectly fine. News of the Palestinian mother whose unborn child’s first sight is a hostile soldier alertly holding a gun towards its mother and young father are nowhere to be heard. As far as the Israelis know (or would like to believe), school children are not denied education, and lives are not being destroyed. But alas, they are.

What happened to accountability? Israel: you do not only have a responsibility towards your own citizens, but a global responsibility towards humanity, just as every other country in the world does. And that responsibility simply involves allowing others in the human race to live in peace. Just because you are the country of the chosen people doesn’t exempt you from your human duty of honoring human rights of your neighbors.

Moving up the ladder of politics, we get to the current minister of Israel, Benyamin Netanyahu. A man who stood defiant to peace efforts, genuinely supportive of completing the wall, and incredibly encouraging to the process of continued settlement expansion. But I (and any other Arab) welcome any genuine efforts towards peace, regardless of their source. Mr. Netanyahu, if you want to be serious about peace, if you want to show the world a gesture, a real gesture, that you are as committed to cherishing the human rights of your neighbors as you do to your people, then Mr. Netanyahu, tear down this wall.

____
1: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, International Court of Justice.

2: Palestine Monitor Factsheet – The Wall, Updated 16 December 2008, Palestine Monitor.

Further Readings

• UN OCHA West Bank Barrier Report, July 2009
• Peace Now – Positions on the Wall
• Palestine Monitor Wall Factsheet
• Map of the Separation Barrier, as of February 2008

Share

The Arab-Israeli conflict is a regional issue that has plagued over sixty years of Middle East history; nearly a hundred thousand on both sides died of direct military clashes, more died as a result of occupation and living conditions, hundreds of thousands have been injured, and millions have been deprived of their most basic rights due to this conflict. Living conditions have been deteriorating so rapidly that light and running water have become luxuries.

As an Arab Middle Easterner, it is very easy to get carried away amidst such conflict, to get carried in the current of hate, bigotry, and intolerance. How can I not take sides? How can I – when the status quo has bred such pain and agony to my people?

To be honest, I must take sides, and I do. But what I must not do is lose perspective.

When millions are suffering on both sides, it is my human compassion that wakes me up to remind me that human anguish and distress on either side is unacceptable; this is the perspective that I strive to maintain: no matter how strong my political dedication to one side is, it should never reward, justify, or even belittle the ugliness of human pain on either side of the conflict.

The problem we are currently faced with is that most people have lost that perspective; most people have lost respect to, or even acknowledgement of, the other side’s humanity. Sadly, the sixty years of conflict shaped a generation unwilling to compromise.

What really needs to happen is a serious reconsideration on both sides, not of the politics of the Middle East, but of the morals and values. We must decide if we should continue cherishing land above lives, inept slogans above active effort, and causes (even good ones) above reconciliation. We must decide to view compromise as strength rather than weakness.

Treaties are signed by governments, but peace is made by the people ^[1], that is why we cannot be content with mere political and governmental reform, but must seek a spread of mass education and awareness. Current dialog and coexistence programs must be strengthened and supported, and other similar efforts must be launched so that youth on both sides learn to understand, appreciate, accept, and humanize others. Within several years of such genuine widespread reconciliation efforts, a new generation will be shaped, a generation where peace “lies in the hearts and minds of all people” ^[2].

While change must come from within, we are also in dire need of external change to arise. When the world’s superpowers also start to look at the conflict objectively, and maintain their own perspectives, it is then – and only then – that they can exert true effective pressure and catalyze a just peace process. We cannot afford a powerful nation that listens too intently to its partial media, and disregards the human suffering afflicted on the other side of the conflict.

---

[1] John Wallach, founder of Seeds of Peace

[2] John F. Kennedy

Hope you enjoyed reading this, make sure you let me know what you think.

Share

10) Arabs live in tents, ride camels, and wear different clothes

Just because Native Americans used to live in teepees doesn’t mean they do now, its as simple as that. Arab tradition – dating from a few hundred years ago – revolves around utilizing camels for transportation and tents as an ideal way of living. That doesn’t mean that this applies now; we have technology as do others and thus have access to all resources that can improve our living conditions. Even outside the capital and main cities, Jordanian villages are far from the form that some people in the west imagine. If you were planning to visit an Arab state in hope of exploring an Aladdin-esque world, think again .

In desolate areas of the desert, we still have native tribal Jordanians who – by choice – decided to remain following their traditional Bedouin lifestyle. Even these people, though they might appear closest to the western image of Arabs, still blend in quite well if/when they need to visit the city for errands, etc.

9) Arabs are rich, own oil wells, and control the world

I WISH! I really do … First of all, I need to reiterate that some countries (like Jordan over here) have absolutely no oil. Second, lets take a look at the figure to the right:

This is a list of countries sorted by their GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per annum, courtesy of Wikipedia. It is quite clear what I’m trying to point out: in the top 25 GDP countries, only one Arab state exists: Saudi Arabia, with a rank of 25. The U.S., Italy, Mexico, Australia, Indonesia, and Norway, among many others, exceed Saudi Arabia. So, considering that the Arab country with the highest GDP is rather “average”, I guess that points out how we measure with other countries. You can check the full list, too.

To further emphasize my point, we may want to see the Gross Domestic Product per person and the rankings of countries accordingly. This list on Wikipedia shows this; when sorting all countries by Rank, we see that the United Arab Emirates is ranked 17-19, Saudi Arabia is ranked39-44, and all Arab countries have even lower ranks.

I’m not doing this to negatively describe the standards of livings in Arab states; a GDP per capita ranking of below 44 is still quite fine, but surely does not reflect that Arabs are – in any way – in financial control of the world.

8 ) Sunnis and Shiites are fighting because their beliefs differ

The Sunni and Shiite sects are more similar to one another than are Catholics and Protestants (fact). Different “varieties” of Islam aren’t causing any conflict in the region directly; all internal conflict we have is purely political.

The reason Westerners hear a lot about Shiites and Sunnis fighting is because many political parties often adopt certain religions (or religious schools of thought) as a marketing technique to encourage more people to join them.

For instance, the main difference between Hezbollah and the Future Current isn’t their religions, but rather their views on regional foreign policies, especially concerning how to treat Israel and how to approach the issue of “resistance of occupation”.

7) A veil is a proof of weakness and ignorance of women

I’m not a big fan of the veil, to be honest. But that’s just my opinion. Still, when seeing veiled women, I refuse to associate that with any type of ignorance. Women do not wear veils because the think they are inferior; it is simply a matter of their own beliefs, feeling that – by wearing a veil – they become more devoted to god.

Why is it that nuns are not viewed as weak, oppressed, and ignorant? We tell ourselves: sure, they chose a certain path of life and committed themselves to it. Why is it so hard to associate the same thought with a Muslim woman wearing the hijab? Its simply a personal choice, that anyone may or may not agree with. Like Queen Rania of Jordan states, don’t judge a woman by what is over her head, but rather what is in her head.

6) The Quran encourages ‘Terror’

Say what?! No it doesn’t! While I’m not Muslim to know everything about Islam, I know enough to know that this is a bunch of nonsense. Sure, we’ll have people quoting individual verses of the Quran and showing how these ‘encourage’ killing or manslaughter, but:

1. The Quran is really as gory as the Old Testament in the Bible. Descriptions of killing or slaughter are really in the same context (if not a more peaceful one).
2. All of these verses are taken out of context. All Islamic scholars agree that such verses are aimed at offenders, and specifically mentioned in the Quran to assure Muslims of ~600 AD that they are allowed to fight back against the offending polytheists at the time, who greatly oppressed Muslims at that time.

Furthermore, the concept of Jihad is also targeted at those who oppress Muslims directly; jihad is really more about defense: self defense, defense of one’s ‘dignity’, religion, and beliefs. It is not targeted at people of other religions or people who disagree with you.

So why does terror exist? Because certain groups decided that the best way to achieve their own goals was to employ religion to do so. They have their own extremist scholars who misinterpret the teachings of the Quran and try to spread such teachings and mislead young Muslims into thinking they are doing the right things. When targeting the right places: poor and uneducated (just like dangerous gangs form in the states), they can garner a lot of support.

5) All Arabs are Terrorists

Again: say what?! Arabs are not terrorists and do not need to be. Terrorist attacks occur in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UK, India, and the U.S. alike. Terrorism doesn’t belong to a particular nation or a particular school of thought, it is a result of random groups, sticking with extremism to their own radical ideologies, and committing such ‘acts of terror’. I further explained the irrelevance between Islam (and on a winder scale, Arab culture) and terrorism.

4) Your leaders suppress your rights and force you into poverty

A couple of weeks ago, I was in a conversation about Jordan’s leaders and how they supposedly suppress the people. The talk was mainly regarding the Queen, but here is what he told my anyways:

When you’re a monarchy, you ARE stealing! You have imposed your rule on a country without a vote and without any reason other than to say “I’m better than you because I’m royalty”. And all the money spent on her clothes alone would benefit the poor in her country, and there are poor in Jordan. I can’t tolerate someone who lives off of the sweat of others preaching about giving.

To which I replied:

As a person who knows enough about his surroundings, I know what is going on. Now we can argue about how the system of leadership actually occurred, but the undeniable facts are: the king (and queen) are popular, they are benefiting the country, the money they make is not from the taxes, it is from their own business ventures, etc. etc. We have an elected parliament like everyone else does. We have a voice like everyone else does. Do we have poverty? sure. But its the same as any other country who has poverty. And no one criticizes Bush, McCain or Obama for selling their suits or giving away their campaign money for the poor (not enough, at least). I don’t criticize them either, because I know one thing: the money they got, they worked for and earned, they didn’t steal it. Just because in Jordan they’re called a King and a Queen doesn’t mean: a) they are the government, and b) they steal.

And it would be great if you check out Queen Rania’s “giving” efforts. She (as an individuals) have been improving schools all over Jordan, making international women’s rights campaigns, and is part of many other organizations all over the world and supports them (Seeds of Peace being an important one of them). What about our king (the man who actually IS the monarch)? Well, he personally donated blood to Gaza [not the biggest thing he did, but shows that they ARE involved in giving], started the “Dignified Housing for Dignified Lives” Initiative to provide FREE or VERY CHEAP housing for the poor, and regularly donates sums of money to those serving in the army, or working people, or other demographics.

I don’t see anything wrong with this. And if you ask me where would Jordan be this time if it wasn’t for the monarchy we have, we would be in conflict like every other neighboring country, we would have internal issues, a segregated population, few investments, and a poor status of living.

So I hope that’d be an answer to the generalized misconception as well. Note that other Arab leaders are also active in similar ways. Are some corrupt? Yes, sure we have some. But these have the same chance of being in the Arab word than in anywhere else around.

3) You do not treat your women well (Or: Your women are not given enough rights)

To make sure my reply is centralized and organized, here are the main areas that people often accuse Arabs of being abusive to their women:

1. Honor crimes are acceptable;
2. Domestic violence is acceptable;
3. Women are socially viewed as a weaker counterpart;
4. Women are not allowed to be viable members of society.

So first, to reply to the first two points regarding honor crimes and domestic violence.

I have to clear up some facts about honor crimes:

• Honor crimes in Jordan exist as offenses against both male and female
• Honor crimes exist everywhere around the world

Regardless of these two points, of course, we must agree that the mere existence of honor crimes is wrong.

The reality of the matter is, honor crimes rarely go unpunished recently. Our courts are very active in convicting anyone known to have committed “honor crime” against someone else. But it is true that in the past (about 19 years ago), honor crimes did go unpunished. Why is that? Contrary to popular belief it has nothing to do with sexism in the Jordanian legislation but something else.

You see, many countries’ judicial systems discuss “temporary insanity”, and those deemed to be ‘temporarily insane’ at the time of a wrongdoing are cleared of any punishment. Similarly, the Jordanian constitution contains something called (نزعة غضب) that can be translated as “a rage surge” or “an anger surge” and is virtually identical to the concept of temporary insanity. In the past, Jordanian judges cleared charges or made them ‘lighter’ based on this, because the murderer uses such plea in court. I said that honor crimes occur for both men and women, but unfortunately men are angrier and more aggressive by nature, and thus more honor crimes exist against women in Jordan.

In recent years (about 15 years ago), Jordanian journalists started to publically talk about and criticize the existence of honor crimes and that they go unpunished (freedom of expression, we have that too!), and since then, many nationwide initiatives were launched to combat that. In recent years, the number of honor killings have dropped dramatically, and those that do occur are punished severely.

As for “3.”, the best way to show that women are socially respected is to also disprove “4.” and se how women are encouraged viable members of society.

We have female judges, cab drivers, construction workers, driving instructors, plumbers, doctors, surgeons, and pilots. We have equality at the workplace too; for instance, Orange Telecom, a cell phone provider in Jordan (now purchased by Orange, previously called MobileCom) has a woman CEO.

We have women ministers too: the minister of Tourism and the minister of social-something are women, from the top of my head. We also have women members of the parliament. And women can vote and campaign.

Unfortunately, not all Arab countries have the same degree of women’s rights. But I know one that all Arab states do have in common: progress in women’s rights issues.

2) Arabs do not value their lives (Or: Arabs value land over life)

It seems to be a recurring fad (especially for Israelis) to view Arabs and Palestinians as individuals with a weird prioritization, where land – among other things – is valued greater than their lives.

Land and other insignificant things are never valued for an Arab more than his or her life. True, many Arabs value causes more than their lives and decide to ‘sacrifice’ for the sake of a certain cause, but that exists in all humanity and can be witnessed again and again in the history of the world.

Palestinians who blow themselves up do not:

1. Do it because they think freeing land is more valuable than their lives
2. Do it because their hate of Israelis overcome their love of their lives

But rather, they do it as a result of continued suppression, deteriorating living conditions, occupation, and psychological suffering. Because of such conditions, Palestinians feel they already lost their lives and do whatever they do as a way of acting out.

Surely none of us can appreciate the amount of mental strain and pressure that one can go through living their entire lifetime under occupation and oppression, but we should try to understand that actions taken by such individuals – as radical as they might seem to us – are the only option they perceive. Instead of labeling these as terrorists and potential terrorists and bombing them all in an airstrike, how about actually alleviating the suffering of these people, perhaps something good might come out of them?

1) Human Rights are Severely Violated in Arab Countries

They are not.  Arab states might not be the perfect place for human rights, but we have no major human rights violations. Freedom of speech, expression, religion, transportation, and having an appropriate status of living – among others – are entitled to Arab citizens as they are entitled to anyone else.

With that in mind, I will agree that some civil rights in some countries still need work.

Share

Israel – as any sovereign entity – has the right to exist, granted. Israel – as any other nation – has the right to defend itself, again: granted. But these two statements cannot justify an entire military operation with the magnitude of what is going on now, because they are irrelevant.

Is Hamas’s decision to fire al-Qassam rockets at southern Israel wrong? Sure it is. Does Israel have the right to defend itself from ‘attacks’? Yes it does. But: how can THIS be seen as a self-defense act?

From the ‘hundreds’ of Qassam rockets fired at Israel, only 3 Israeli civilians died. My deepest condolences to their families, really. But how can the death of 3 prompt a massacre being launched against Gaza? How can the death of 3 citizens justify the death of 915 from Gaza? Why is Palestinian blood being considered that cheap? Its normal for a government to value the lives of its citizens, but when 3 civilian lives are valued more than nine-hundred-something (and still rising) lives on the other side, something is unjust.

Israel isn’t attacking Hamas, its attacking the people of Gaza. Maybe it doesn’t mean to attack them – but the bottom line is: the people of Gaza are the ones suffering, so what is the point really?

Israel is breaking the Fourth Geneva Convention, which it ratified, because its military actions and hostilities are collective measures that fail to distinguish between civilians and militias (the “hostile entities”).

The head of the UNRWA in Gaza made an emotional televised appeal yesterday, I recommend you search for it.

And here’s a nice statistic: for every Israeli that dies (that is, including members of the Army), 71 Palestinians are killed by the Israeli forces in the Gaza conflict. When taking the entire Arab-Israeli conflict into consideration, Ehud Olmert states that – in 2008 – for every Israeli killed by Palestinians, 25 Palestinians were killed by Israel. TAKE THAT, Human Rights!

Share