I was wishing to write on this topic long ago, and I started writing on it since three weeks ago, but never got around to publish. Unfortunately for me, perhaps, the topic was debated (albeit in a limited way) and many did reach the conclusion that I was trying to argue for. Nevertheless, this article should be there for the sake of completeness.

A big taboo in Jordan is the critical discussion of the Hashemite Monarchy and the Institution of the Throne. Unfortunately, this makes for real intellectual debate on the institution of the Throne rare and weak, and result in having criticisms of the monarchy happen in concentrated outlets, with one-sided arguments, without real objective consideration.

The truth is, if anyone wishes to advocate for reform in Jordan, a position on the Hashemite Throne must be established, whether in private or in the argument. The reason for this is that, if whoever advocates for reform establishes that the institution of the throne is no good, then the matter of reform altogether should be dropped altogether and replaced with revolution. To establish the need for reform, one must first establish if the very core of the system is viable, and I think it is.

Again, to emphasize, this article is not a defense but rather a part of a series on reform, and it wishes to investigate the legitimacy of the monarchy as an institution, both historically and in the present context. I will establish that this institution does have legitimacy, or at least some legitimacy, and in the way shed light on the societal requirements from the Throne to secure stability (of the country) and legitimacy (of the establishment).

Part 1: On the Institution of the Throne and the Legitimacy of the Hashemite Monarchy

Before we can discuss the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy, we must establish how the legitimacy of an institution is measured. The legitimacy of an institution, I believe, is established by an answer of “yes” to two questions:

1. Was it (or is it) in the will of the people to have the institution?
2. Does this institution serve the greater good of the nation?

Both questions must hold at any period in time, though I will argue that the second question should hold slightly more weight than the first.

Historically, the two questions can be answered in a straightforward fashion. Challengers of the Hashemite monarchy often  tell a story of an Emir from Hijaz, heading to Syria, stopping along the way in Transjordan and creating a country, or a story of a figure from Hijaz, installed by Western Powers for their own ambitions. Independent of these stories, however, is the establishment of allegiance to Emir Abdullah and the Hashemite Throne in 1920.

Establishment of allegiance, also known in Arabic as mubaya`a (مبايعة), is the traditional Islamic way in which Arab tribes negotiate and establish allegiance to a ruler. In all senses, the establishment of rule in the Arab world through mubaya`a is legitimate: it is a traditional, direct negotiation between monarch-to-be and the constituency, through “legitimate” social hierarchies of tribesmen and tribe-leaders. In 1920s Transjordan, the country was mainly tribalist, and even residents of cities were rooted into the known Jordanian tribes, and were often in close contact. Even minorities, like Christian and Circassian families at that time had already organized themselves into large families that are analogous to such tribes. That is to say: such negotiation of allegiance to Abdullah I did cover the entire constituency. Then and there, in 1920, the tribes decided that their interests are deeply rooted with that of the Hashemites, and they willed the creation of a Hashemite Kingdom in Transjordan.

Therefore, we established how it was the will of the people to have the institution of the throne, specifically, the Hashemite throne.

There is a little subtlety, however, which is the annexation of the West Bank in 1949, and thus the imposition of the establishment on the population of Palestinian origins. Was it the will of those people to have the establishment? The answer is complex, and highly debatable. The Husseini’s were clearly against a Hashemite rule of the West Bank, while the Nashashibi’s were in favor. And Jerusalem at the time (and with it, the West Bank as a whole), was divided in allegiance between the Husseini’s and Nashashibi’s, and through the effort of a Jerusalem Parliament (whose authenticity and legitimacy is to be questioned), it was decided that the West Bank is to go under the establishment. As such, one cannot say much about whether it was the will of some 50% of the today’s population’s ancestry to be under the Establishment—that I admit.

As for the second question: does the institution of the throne serve the greater good of the nation? To that, I would answer yes, and popular discourse in Jordan today seems to agree: unprecedented populist expressions of loyalty to the idea of the throne, and a Hashemite throne specifically, even if people are asking for limitations of the monarch’s powers. Jamal al-Sha`ir, a Ba`athist, had said in 1998:

I started understanding how much Jordan is attached—Jordan as a country and a people, especially Transjordanians—how much the future of these people and the whole country is connected with the Hashemite throne. If the Hashemite throne goes, Jordan goes. I started believing this only in the last ten years. But many people believed it before us. But we rejected it when we were young.

Source: Anderson, Betty S.. Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State. 2005. Austin, TX.

Thus, there is a consensus, it seems, that the Hashemite throne is somehow linked to the goodwill of Jordan, but again, with a few subtleties:

1. The sentence “especially Transjordanians” appears, through al-Sha`ir assures that Jordanians of Palestinian origins are also covered when he adds “and the whole country”. Still, the distinction is of interest later on, and introduces some very interesting paradoxes.
2. We don’t understand why the prosperity of the Hashemite throne is in the best interest of the country and vice versa.

A good answer to the second question is that the platform of the Hashemites (starting the Sons of Hussein of Mecca to an extent, but much more so since King Hussein I) consistently included a mix of Arab nationalism, secular governance, and foreign policies of moderation¹ that is congruent with the needs and aspiration of the people. Another answer (or an additional benefit) may also be that the idea of a monarch is also necessary when certain social division, especially in religion, race, but more so in origin, exist, and a power is needed to “moderate” democracy and make sure that no minority will be abused by the tyranny of a majority. Does Jordan need something like the latter? This will be discussed later, but in short, current Transjordanian nationalist movements are alarming and show us that such might be necessary.

In Short: The Palestinian Paradox and the Transjordanian Establishment

The interesting story of the status of Jordanians of Palestinian origins today and the social complexities that surround it will be tackled in another upcoming post. However, the Palestinian Paradox is a more contemporary issue that (while completely rooted in the former) can be discussed independently. The Palestinian Paradox, basically, is this:

Given the two criteria, as well as the rhetoric of those like al-Sha`ir, the legitimacy of the Hashemite Throne from the perspective of the Palestinian-Jordanians is debatable, which also pauses a serious threat to the legitimacy of the throne in the country, considering those of Palestinian origins are a large part of the population. Also given the criteria, the Establishment is a Transjordanian Establishment, initially aimed at a Transjordanian constituency. The Paradox basically states that, if we are to assume these two facts, then there is a contradiction, and the only way to avoid the contradiction is to assert that the Establishment is also legitimate for Palestinians and extended to a pan-Jordanian (or, Jordanian) establishment. Namely:

If we attempt to make the assumption that that the Hashemite Throne is illegitimate from a Palestinian-Jordanian standpoint, then the end game will result in damage for those of Palestinian origins, making such an impossible option. Or, to paraphrase: trends of racist transjordanian nationalism show that the Establishment is actually making more ‘controversial’ decisions in the protection of those of Palestinian origins from the Tyranny of Transjordanian nationalism, than it is making controversial decisions in the marginalization of those citizens.

That is not to say that the marginalization of Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origins is to be permissible at any level, or that it is ethically or practically justifiable. And I will go at lengths in discussing this in future parts. What I am saying, however, is that while there is some marginalization of Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origins, recent events show that this does not translate into bias against Jordanians of Palestinian origins, as far as the Establishment is concerned.

Conclusion

In general, one can see both historical and contemporary justification of the Hashemite Throne as a legitimate entity, whose well-being is in the best interest of the nation, and vice-versa. With many ethnic tensions existing in Jordan, especially those between Transjordanian-Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origins, the buffer of an entity to moderate democracy and control the political system is necessary. The structure of the system, the limitations of powers on the king, and the institutions entailed by the establishment, however, are not free from flaw and need to be reformed.

Coming next in the series on the Jordanian Establishment: The Ethnic Affairs.

Notes:

1. As an aside, Marwan Muasher criticizes the use of “moderate” to describe states that practice foreign policy moderation with Israel, not because he disagrees, but because he believes that such states don’t extend such moderation to their internal policies and thus cannot be called truly moderate in every sense — only so in foreign policy. I agree, actually.

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But as a Jordanian, this time is both a threat and an opportunity to a country like Jordan. Recent events both showed the potential for hope and prosperity, and great regression.

One uncontested fact, however, is that the Jordanian Establishment is in dire need of reform. I have had my own long list of criticisms to the Jordanian Establishment, but I have never really addressed it on this blog because I was too busy countering the criticisms of the Establishment that I feel are false, and even dangerous. I still see such criticisms, but I decided the best way to advocate for real reform is to articulate my own view on what is wrong with the Establishment. This cannot be done without establishing also what is right, and what should remain the same.

Starting today, I will be introducing a multi-part series of articles on my blog. The series is titled “The Jordanian Establishment: Perks, Flaws, and the Call for Reform“, and will look at multiple aspects of the Jordanian establishment, from the monarchy, to the constitution, and from society to institutions. Questions of legitimacy will be raised and answered, questions on nationalism will be discussed, the plague of societal racism that we witness will be discussed, and throughout the articles I will try voice my opinion on how to improve.

The purpose for the series is neither to criticize, nor to defend. The purpose of the series is to advocate for my view on reform, why it is necessary, and why is it good. However, in the process, I will be engaging in both criticism and defense to satisfy the real purpose.

Not all parts advocate for reform independently, some will shed background and establish facts, while others voice opinion.

In this post, I will be maintaining links to the published articles in the series:

1. The Jordanian Establishment: Part 1 — The Hashemite Throne
2. The Jordanian Establishment: Part 2 — The Ethnic Affairs
3. The Jordanian Establishment: Part 3 — TBA

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Abstract

This paper discusses the development of a political system in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in an effort to understand the state of the current political system in the country. Different phases and defining moments in the history of Jordan will be studied, and will often directly correspond to phases of Jordanian national identity. Starting from the assassination of King Abdullah I and the short-lived reign of Talal, through the numerous coup d’état attempts in early reign of Hussein I, up to the 1994 Wadi Araba Treaty of Peace, the effect of ongoing events in shaping a political system in Jordan will be explored.

The development of a political system in Jordan will be discussed hand-in-hand along with contemporary regional politics and political movements, coupled with internal views regarding national identity. As such, the rise of Nasser and Nasserism is examined, illustrating the impact of the increasingly popular Nasserist movements in the 1950’s on the government, its policy, and the political system. Similarly, the Arab-Israeli Conflict as a whole, including the Six-Day war, the influence of the PLO, the rise of Fedayeen, and Black September will be reviewed, showing how these also shaped state policy. In addition, the rise of Islamic movements, particularly the Islamic Action Force (IAF), the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and its relation to and impact on the political system will be discussed throughout the course of history.

It will be argued that the period of the late 1950s in King Hussein’s reign, the Six-day war of 1967, the battle of Karameh of 1968, and most importantly, Black September of 1970, have been defining moments in the history of a Jordanian national identity and the formation of its current-day political system. The paper will reason that Black September represents the climax of an internal political crisis that lasted throughout the ‘70s and ‘80s.

The development of a Jordanian political system will be studied, beginning with King Talal and Prime Minister Tawfiq abul-Huda’s rewriting of the constitution and the establishment of some sort of a semi-democracy that is put to the test in the 1952 abdication of King Talal. The effect of Nasserist-inspired coup d’état attempts, as well as Black September on the Jordanian political system will be investigated, as well as the 23-year-long era of martial law, and the still-developing political system that emerged afterwards.

The essay aims to argue that the current political system – as well as its lack-thereof – in Jordan, is a result of a combination of organic development and non-development due to a century’s internal, as well as regional, political repercussions. It is my hope that this paper would illustrate the malleability of the political system and the possibility of continuous improvement. More so, it is my hope to illustrate that the existing political system (whether its current state is fortunate or unfortunate) is a result of internal, regional, and – seldom – external political repercussions, rather than a set static agenda by the ruling elite.

Background

Since Abdullah I’s reign, the newly-created kingdom of Jordan was particularly unstable; the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan (East Bank) has just merged with the West Bank, absorbing highly politicized Palestinian West Bankers, as well as refugees, giving them all Jordanian citizenship, and tripling the population of the country[1]. The entering population of Palestinians was more sophisticated, urbanized, and educated than the average Transjordanian population, which was predominantly Bedouin. Palestinians loyal to the Mufti also saw Jordan as an occupying power, and held a “high moral ground”, believing that Jordan’s Arab Legion, along with other Arab armies, have failed them, while others looked at King Abdullah as a “protector against Israeli aggression”. It is important to note that, until 1967, these Palestinians never demanded separation from the East Bank.[2]

Thus, with a tripled population, a Transjordanian-Palestinian divide, strong Palestinian nationalism, and a growing refugee problem, the newly-created Hashemite kingdom was in highly critical times…

Beginning of Change

With three fatal gunshots[3] the life of newly-created kingdom of Jordan’s first monarch ended, marking the beginning of decades of uncertainty and instability that continue to leave a distinctive mark on the country’s political system today. Abdullah’s successor, his son Talal, shaped by his father’s mistreatment during his upbringing, was resolved on becoming his father’s polar opposite, and as such initiated far-reaching reforms to the Jordanian political system.[4]

While initiatives such as acknowledging the opposition, integrating it into the political system and cabinet, selecting more representative Senators in the upper house of the parliament, and liberalizing the state as a whole were important and highly welcomed by the people, Talal and Prime Minister Tawfiq abul-Huda’s biggest and most far reaching achievement is Jordan’s re-written constitution.[5]

Talal’s 1952 constitution translated Jordan’s monarchy from an absolutist authoritarian regime into a constitutional one, with a basic framework of checks and balances. Indeed, the 1952 constitution proclaims “the Nation is the source of all powers”[6], replacing previous proclamation that, in the King is vested executive[7] and legislative[8] power. The constitution also attempts to safeguard some basic human rights, as Satloff puts it, “banning discrimination on race, language, or religion (Article 6i); ensuring work, education, and equal opportunity (Article 6ii); guaranteeing freedom of opinion in speech, writing, ‘photographic representation,’ and the press (Article 15i/ii)”.[9]

The constitution also created a bicameral parliamentary system; the upper house, the Senate, constitutes of notables appointed by the king and makes no more than one-third of the parliament, while the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, constitutes elected representatives.

Looking from the outside, the system of government created by Talal and Abul Huda was a basic democratic constitutional monarchy, with the king as the Head of State, a Prime Minister, appointed by the head of state, acting as the head of government, both heading the executive branch, where the king rules by royal decree (analogous to U.S. President’s Executive Order). These two entities can propose legislation, but ultimate authority is vested in the separate legislative branch, the Parliament, which is bicameral and includes an elected body, and can also interfere with the executive branch (checks and balances), especially with votes of no-confidence, in which two-thirds of the elected chamber of deputies could revoke government actions or call for its dissolution. The head of state can still veto parliament decisions, as is typical in many political systems.

However, the political system was still flawed by giving the King and Prime Minister the absolute advantage; almost all articles in the constitution secure rights to the people and parliament conditional upon the “limits of the law”, giving the ruling elite – specifically the king and prime minister – unprecedented leverage, tipping over the balance of the system in their favor. Such “loopholes”, indeed, were ‘exploited’ several times through the course of history, both positively and negatively, in shaping future election law, enabling absolutist martial law with a dissolved parliament, and even enabling the 1994 Wadi Araba Israel-Jordan treaty of peace.

On August 11, 1952, the new constitution was put through the ultimate test, when King Talal’s worsening schizophrenia prompted Abul Huda to appeal to the parliament to depose the king. By Article 28v, the king was required to be mentally sound; accordingly, the parliament deposed him.[10]

The Young King and the Nasserist Wave

Nineteen days before Talal’s deposition, on July 23, 1952, was the beginning of Egypt’s 1952 revolution, led by the Free Officer Movement, which ended with the abdication of King Farouk of Egypt. The revolution also marked the beginning of Gamal Abdul Nasser’s rise to power and influence, and the spread of a distinct pan-Arab, Arab Nationalistic school of thought: Nasserism.

Meanwhile, Hussein was proclaimed king on August 11, 1952, but was under the legal age of 18 years of the lunar Islamic (Hijri) calendar, and as such, Tawfiq abul-Huda continued to rule as Prime Minister, until 2 May, 1953. Dissatisfaction of abul-Huda’s “reign” culminated opposition, with growing “conservative opposition” in Amman, and “semi-liberal opposition” in the West Bank[11]. Thus, by the time King Hussein was to be enthroned and assume full power, there was already a well-established opposition force within the public sphere, the royal palace, and the government. These opposition groups included Arab Nationalists, mainly constituting of Nasserists, national socialists, mainly constitution of communists and Ba’athists, Islamists, mainly constituting of the Muslim Brotherhood[12], as well as Palestinian nationalists. This section focuses on the Nasserist wave, but the influence of political movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the PLO (or more formally the Fedayeen) will be studied in future sections.

The first culmination of tension occurred in 1955, when Britain tried, eventually in vain, to get Jordan to sign the Baghdad Pact. While initial Prime Minister Said al-Mufti of the Old Guard harshly opposed joining the pact, other forces disagreed, and he finally resigned his government. The new Prime Minister, Hazza’ al-Majali, announced Jordan’s readiness to enter negotiations with the British on the pact. Meanwhile, radios from Cairo (such as “Sawt al Arab” meaning The Arab Voice) prompted Jordanians to refuse. As popular opposition turned to protest, the government complied and rejected the pact[13]. With that, another major step had to be taken, to further align Jordan for the ever-more-powerful pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism trends, and it occurred on March 1, 1956. On March 1, the king dismissed General Glubb, also known as “Glubb Pasha”, from his post as the commander-in-chief of the Arab Legion, Jordan’s army. The people, and the Arab world, reacted very positively, considering it a (re)declaration of independence[14], to the point that the king and the monarchy were hailed even by the most liberal and anti-monarchy opposition[15].

But as Hussein was moving closer and closer towards Nasserist Arab Nationalism, Nasser’s pressure began to be felt. Especially because, by then, the July 26, 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal already took place, transforming Nasser and Nasserism into idolized figures and ideologies, respectively. Free elections occurred in October 1956 that resulted in a parliament dominated by the opposition, mainly West Banker Nasserists and Communists, unsurprisingly, given recent events. Thus, with parliament pressure, King Hussein asked Suleiman Nabulsi, a pro-Nasserist and founder and leader of the National Socialist Party, to head the government. A mere two days after entering office, the tripartite alliance of Britain, France, and Israel, entered Egypt in what is now known as the Suez Crisis of 1956, after which Nasser was defeated, yet nevertheless managed to emerge as a hero in the Arab world.

The parliament, and the newly appointed government, as well as sizable portions of the public sphere, especially amongst liberals, began advocating a union with Egypt. As an article in TIME states, in the West Bank “there were more pictures of Nasser to be seen on the shop walls than of Hussein. […] The country’s new [Prime Minister], Suleiman Nabulsi […] proclaimed flatly: “Jordan’s destiny is to disappear.” ”[16]. Nabulsi’s government also reduced diplomatic relations with the West, targeted pro-Western officials in civil service, and entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union (as a response to Hussein’s request to dismiss a number of communist elements from the cabinet), thus strengthening the position of leftists, specifically socialists and communists within the country. The position of Hussein seemed weakening with time.

Worse yet for the 21-year old Hussein, was that the dismissal of Glubb from the army resulted in “senior vacancies […] occupied by nationalist and Ba’athist officers, who were to challenge the monarchy […]”[17], among these was Ali Abu Nuwwar. Indeed, the Arab Legion continuously became more and more politicized, with Ba’athist, Nationalist, and Socialist political parties attempting to recruit members of the army; after all, the Free Officers Movement has shown that the shortest and most effective path to power was through the army.

As the relationship between the Palace and the Cabinet sunk to an all-time low, with Hussein acting ‘behind the cabinet’s back’, and the cabinet calling for a federation with Egypt and Syria, Nabulsi’s government retaliated, threatening resignation if a list of demands is not met. Hussein ultimately responded, on April 10, 1957, by requesting the resignation of the cabinet.

Opposition rallies expressing support for al-Nabulsi’s outgoing government broke loose, putting more pressure on Jordan and the monarchy. Hussein tried to appease the public by appointing Hussein Fakhri al-Khaldi, a Palestinian, as PM, who resigned 24 hours after appointment. Opposition became stronger[18]. The king tried to commission others to form a government, but they also failed. The country seemed “on a verge of chaos” and on April 13, 1957, units of the army loyal to nationalist Abu Nuwwar clashed with those loyal to the king. It was, to say the least, a coup attempt[19]. The king himself, in a surprising turn of events, went to the said army camp in Zarqa on that same day, after having secretly gained the Bedouins allegiance against Abu Nuwwar (and “his Palestinians”). Then, as described in an article in TIME:

[…] taking the untrustworthy Abu [Nuwwar] with him, he rushed out to confront the rampaging Bedouins, narrowly saved his quaking general from being shot, and won wild cheers from the tribesmen by leaping atop an armored car and shouting: “If you do not want me as your King, I will go!” […] As his Bedouins swarmed over Amman, with faces blackened by charcoal as a sign they meant business, Hussein began warily to consolidate his opening triumph. There were, after all, other armies in Jordan. (TIME, 1957)

Two days later, on April 15, a government by al-Khaldi was successfully formed, with al-Nabulsi still in the cabinet as minister of Foreign Affairs, despite disapproval from the king. On April 16, it was announced that Jordan would receive financial assistance under the Eisenhower Doctrine, had it become victim of aggression[20]. Cairo’s radio, “The Arab Voice” talked about a plot in the palace against the Jordanian people. The street roared; people shouted “long live Nasser” and “down with the Eisenhower Plan”[21], and another unsuccessful coup against Hussein took place, this time linked indirectly to al-Nabulsi. Hussein shifted again to a conservative government from the Old Guard, by appointing Ibrahim Hashem, banning all political parties, and declaring a state of emergency and along with it martial law.

Political parties were dismantled, dissolved, and banned officially, but in reality ‘went underground’, and remained illegal until 1992. The Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to continue as a “charitable organization”. The “democratization” of Jordan that had occurred since 1953 was reversed in two weeks in April[22]. The post-1957 political setup of Jordan was changed:

[…] the Jordanian polity was divided into two parts: the majority that supported the king […], and the minority, comprising the political opposition. Unlike the latter, the majority were inactive, counting on the government to be their spokesperson; this created the “silent majority” in Jordan. (Abu-Odeh, p. 82)

It was then, as a result these events that some form of political “Trans-Jordanization” of the then-two-Banked Jordan started to unfold, with the East Bank generally more favored. The 1957 riots and coup attempts had proven that the huge Nasserist influence on the West Bankers was a threat to the kingdom and monarchy.

Such events could very well be understood through the concept of National Identity. First, the concept of an independent Jordanian state, especially at that time, where no cultural or national distinctiveness has yet developed, was thus mostly intertwined with ‘loyalty’ or support of the Hashemite throne. Transjordanians were generally loyal to the monarchy, but for Palestinian-Jordanians, it was more complicated; a more powerful Palestinian national identity had already developed as a result of political events since the beginning of the century. Nasser’s Arab Nationalist rhetoric was more effective on Palestinian-Jordanians than Transjordanians, since was often coupled with commitment to “liberate Palestine” and solve the Palestine Question, but also since they had less commitment to a separate, independent “Jordan”, compared to Transjordanians.

The Six-Day War

Since 1964, while Jordan remained pro-Western, it also aligned itself more with Arab Nationalism as well, signing a mutual defense treaty with Egypt, agreeing to the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, becoming a founding member of the United Arab Command, etc. The state of emergency had almost seized, and martial law had been relaxed. However, the post-1957 opposition shifted to “external opposition” as numerous opposition leaders fled to other countries, and as such radios of Damascus and Cairo, now joined by Baghdad, intermittently campaigned against the Hashemite Kingdom nevertheless. Regardless, the monarchy’s political relationship with Nasser was in good shape.

Following activities by Fedayeen elements against Israel prompted it to launch military operations against the West Bank, these quickly escalated, with Nasser requesting removal of peacekeeping troops from Sinai, and on June 5, 1967, the War had officially started. Hussein would later state that Jordan’s particular engagement in the war was “imposed on our nation”[23]. Within hours from the beginning of the war, Jordan was losing in the West Bank, and the palace was flooded by cables from Nasser supporting Jordanian withdrawal from the West Bank, allegedly stating to Hussein “when history is written, your courage and bravery will be acknowledged […] gave-and-take is part of [history] and so is progress and retreat.”[24]

On June 10, 1967, the Arabs had officially lost the war, and thus Jordan had lost the West Bank, with a second wave of refugees entering the East Bank, some of whom have been displaced for a second time since 1948. Martial law was strictly enforced again. Transjordanian-Palestinian relations were again impacted as a result of the war; with the army composed of a majority of Transjordanians and new figures showing that only 696 lost their lives created feelings of guilt amongst Transjordanians, and feelings of betrayal amongst Palestinians, who thought that the Jordanian army conspired with Israel to defeat Nasser[25], contrary to Nasser’s cables, supporting withdrawal from the West Bank as early as twenty-seven hours from military engagements.

Politically, Jordan was to be subject of new “ethnic” tensions that will last decades. Economically, Jordan was in ruins. Jordan’s immediate post-war agenda was the reclamation of the West Bank, and as such attempted maintaining strong bonds with the West Bank, as well as an open bridge allowing the passage of West Bankers and East Bankers alike, in any direction. Israel did not mind, as long as its end of the bridge was controlled by them. Israel on the other hand, made the “West Bank question” more critical, where the option of an independent non-Jordanian control over the West Bank was raised to the international community. By then, the PLO was still not given the status of “sole representative of the Palestinian people”. The position of the PLO, that advocated a liberated Palestinian state, whose destiny is then decided by its people, was not always parallel to the wishes of West Bankers, many of which demanded restoration of land and Jordanian unity.

Still, for Jordan, retrieval of the West Bank was to happen peacefully, through talks and international pressure, rather than militarily with Israel. Hussein emphasized during the Arab Summit that Arab attitudes towards Palestinian liberation were impotent, and emphasized the Jordanian element of the West Bank, calling its people “our family on the West Bank of Jordan”, and hailing their nationalistic and patriotic steadfastness[26].

Black September and the Jordanian Divide

The 1967 war led to a new era, in which Palestinians “were beginning take matters into their own hands”. Guerilla groups, forming since Nabulsi’s era, were empowered and consolidated, most of which were known as the Fedayeen, meaning freedom fighters. The most important of these groups was Yasser Arafat’s Fatah[27]. Fedayeen groups launched attacks on Israel from within the East Bank, and the Israeli army was to retaliate by sizable military action against the Jordanian town of al-Karameh (meaning “the dignity”) in March, 1968.

For the first time, the Jordanian army and Fedayeen fought side-by-side, with unprecedented cooperation, and while Israel’s military objectives were indeed achieved, they had done so with considerable damage to their own army, and as such as seen as some type of victory. Regardless of cooperation, Massad argues that “depending on whose account one reads, both the Jordanian army and the guerillas minimized the role of the other […] and claimed victory for themselves.”[28] Such contention in crediting one side for the victory marked the beginning of tensions to come. The Fedayeen were receiving more public attention, to the dismay of many Jordanian army officers, who saw that their efforts, their more advanced weaponry, and their greater numbers disregarded[29]. Indeed, while around 15,000 Jordanian soldiers with artillery, tanks, and canons fought, while most estimates state that 300 Palestinian fedayeen fought[30]. Jordan will also however change the rhetoric of al-Karameh to market it as a Jordanian cause, rather than a national Palestinian cause.

As paramilitary entities, the Fedayeen, with their growing popularity became both a military and “existential threat to the Hashemite rule”, as Fruchter-Ronen describes it. He also describes this period as:

[…] characterized by the strengthening of [Fedayeen] organizations and their entrenchment in Jordan by means of the establishment of autonomous military, political, and social institutions. (Fruchter-Ronen, p. 244)

Their presence as “a state-within-a-state” was thus strengthened. While the official Jordanian story accuses the fedayeen of acting as ‘bandits’, Massad says that “serious guerilla misconduct” was, in a number of cases, caused by “Jordanian agents”[31]. Regardless, a significant rift within the Jordanian population was on the rise. While Hussein initially did not respond, some[32] say because of his sympathy with the Palestinian cause, while others, like Fruchter-Ronen attribute it to the initial popularity of the fedayeen, which later decreased as trans-Jordanians and middle-class Palestinians objected to their “violations”. During the beginning of 1970, Hussein arranged meetings with Bedouin tribal leaders to garner their support, but they were not mobilized.[33]

Even before Black September proper, Jordanian retaliation against fedayeen was often directed at refugee camps, which, indeed, harbored some fedayeen, but also shows how, by that time, “the army looked on all Palestinians as an extension of the fedayeen and vice versa.”[34]

Tensions increased further when Prince Zaid Bin Shaker’s wife was murdered in her home. Hotels were supposedly shelled, and courts were “completely out of action”. By then, Amman’s streets were completely controlled by the fedayeen. The Royal Palace was also targeted, as was the broadcasting center and power station. Threats culminated when, On September 1, an attempted assassination of Hussein took place. The three hijacked planes in the Dawson’s Field hijackings were landed in al-Zarqa by a fedayeen group, after which they were eventually blown up with 54 passengers still on board[35], the rest of the hostages remained in possession of the fedayeen. Queen Noor claims that, in a phone call with Fatah leader Yasser Arafat, Hussein was told that he had twenty-four hours to exit the country and surrender the throne[36].

And as the official Jordanian government story goes, Jordan had “no choice” but to act militarily if it was to preserve the Hashemite throne[37]. International pressure to reclaim the hostages also mounted on the government. On September 15, a military government was set up and the army began its violent operations; martial law was reinforced. That day, Arafat became commander-in-chief of the Palestinian Liberation Army. It was a Civil War. The Jordanian army moved to Amman and northern towns. But Black September was not a one-sided operation; the fedayeen continued to attack the palace, but also military and intelligence headquarters. In response to fedayeen attacks on September 17, the army launched a massive, unorganized counterattack on fedayeen, regarded as some as “a cleansing campaign and general slaughter of the Palestinians”[38].

Hussein and his government maintained that the death toll was 1,500-2,000, mostly Palestinians. International journalists, as well as the guerillas reported a toll between 7,000 and 20,000. Guerilla forces were defeated, and remaining fedayeen were assaulted and forced to leave the country. The PLO also reassessed its role in Black September, and “admitted to a number of mistakes that helped to precipitate the clash”[39]. Jordanians, however, as stated, still assert that military action was the “only choice” to preserve the kingdom.

The war itself was fought by trans-Jordanian and Palestinian-Jordanians alike, both, on both sides, with many Palestinian-Jordanians and trans-Jordanians remaining neutral. Still, the divide between Palestinian national movements, supporters of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and Palestinians in general on one hand, and the Jordanian army, Jordanian loyalists, and even Transjordanians in general on the other hand grew further by these events. Black September symbolizes a serious “clash” between Palestinian Identity and Jordanian Identity, as described by ex-Minister of Information Laila Sharaf.

In the periods between 1967 and Black September, “the state of Jordan lost some of the characteristics of its sovereignty” in favor of the PLO, says Fruchter-Ronen, and adds:

[These events] have been imprinted in the collective consciousness of both Jordanians and Palestinians as events bearing symbolic, social and national meaning, and carrying internal implications on Jordanian society and the Palestinian–Jordanian relationships even until these very days. To a large extent, it may be claimed that the Civil War of 1970–71 was a turning point in enhancing the growth of trans-Jordanian national consciousness. [Source[40]]

With the end of Black September, we would see another main shift to Jordan’s agenda, both internally and externally. Jordan changed its stance towards the PLO, accepting it gradually as the “sole representative of the Palestinian people” and as such letting go of its claim for the West Bank. Jordan’s involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict remained, and its involvement with the Palestinian cause continued, albeit shifting from “our family on the West Bank of Jordan is suffering” to “our Palestinian brothers are suffering”. In 1974, in the Arab League Rabat Summit, a resolution was passed proclaiming the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian People, and the 1982 Fez Summit, in which it was agreed, unanimously (i.e. including Hussein) on the establishment of an independent non-Jordanian Palestinian state in the occupied West Bank. And, on 1988, in an address to the Nation, King Hussein formally letting go of the Jordanian claim for the West Bank, and declaring full support of the “Palestinian Cause” and the PLO.[41] This happened after, based on a PLO request, the Arab League unanimously voted in 1988 for a Jordanian disengagement with the West bank.

Islamic Movements in Jordan as Friends of the Throne

When Islamic Movements are mentioned, especially in Jordan, mind goes immediately to the Muslim Brotherhood, and rightfully so. The brotherhood is Jordan’s largest, oldest, and most influential Islamic group, and its political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), is the most influential opposition group today. The Brotherhood’s official presence in Jordan began after the elevation of the status of Transjordan to a kingdom in 1945, and the movement was granted legal status as a charitable organization in January, 1946, and was granted status as an “organized group” in 1953[42]. The relationship between the Brotherhood and Abdullah I flourished as he supported their conservative Islamic agenda, and saw it as a good tool to counteract the effects of communism and socialism post World War II, whereas the Brotherhood supported the union of the two banks and “respected the religious credentials” of the Hashemites[43]. It is important to recognize that while the Muslim Brotherhood itself is not a political party per say, it is highly politicized, whether today through the IAF or before as a grassroots movement with legitimacy and leverage.

As mentioned earlier, the Muslim Brotherhood also continued during the 1957 crisis, in which it was allowed to continue as a charitable organization. However, it was also helpful to Hussein in combatting the wave of Nasserism discussed above[44], and was, in the 1950s and 1960s, a good source of support to the monarchy. The Jordanian branch operated like its Egyptian parent a popular grassroots movement, supporting the idea that Islam is an all-encompassing religion, that shari`a law should be implemented as state law, and opposing general views of pan-Arabism, Arab Nationalism, and other nonreligious schools of thought.

Since 1967, but especially since some years after, the strength of Nasser’s Arab Nationalism, as well as general secular nationalism started to fail in the Arab world, as many saw the disaster of 1967 as a proof of the failure of these ideologies. With these, the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Movements in general began to prosper. Then came the 1979 Iranian Revolution, that later proved to be an Islamic Revolution, that, for many, showed the possible success of an Islamic state. For many, the Islamic revolution, along with socioeconomic woes of the time lead many to favor the Brotherhood’s slogan “Islam is the solution”[45].

Return of Parliament Life and the Islamic Opposition

Post the 1988 disengagement from the West Bank, Hussein believed that Jordan’s stability and institutions were able to sustain political development after decades of martial law and parliamentary elections. The National Assembly convened to vote on Hussein’s decision on West Bank disengagement, and along with it a modified election law where the West Bank is no longer represented. Since “house of representatives” in that assembly was unelected, thus basically just allowed the new laws to go to action for the 1989 elections. The elections themselves were a response to popular riots in April of 1989[46], which themselves criticized economic policies. The elections themselves were considered honest and democratic[47]. While political parties themselves remained outlawed, the ban on political activity was lifted; members of multiple parties were among the parliament, from far left to far right. Chief among these was the Islamists, who claimed 40% of the seats[48].

Now with considerable power, “the Brotherhood became the regime’s main opposition both inside and outside the parliament” says Tal[49]. The Jordanian government, on the other hand, had already by 1985 regarded the Muslim Brotherhood as a “strategic threat” over concerns of increased fundamentalism and concerns over their ‘secretly-planned’ education and preaching programs[50].

In 1992, after Parliament Life had returned, the ban on political parties was lifted. As such, the IAF was founded the political party of the Muslim Brotherhood, and many underground parties were re-established.

The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1994, which will be discussed next, was the final blow in regime-Brotherhood relations, which transformed the Brotherhood’s party, the IAF to a true opposition move. In the 1993 parliament, the IAF occupied 16 of 80 parliament seats, and firmly opposed “any peace deal with Israel” adding “on whatever terms”[51]. Since, the IAF has not been significantly included the cabinet, though its voice in the parliament, as well as demonstrations and rallies are often heard and not silenced. The IAF has especially been a proponent of Jordan’s slow normalization of relations with Israel, and continuously stressed the use of education to promote the ‘Palestinian cause’ and keeping the public aware of the ‘Zionist threat’.

The 1994 Jordan-Israel treaty of Peace in the Context of Parliament, Political Freedom, and Political Development

In August, 1993, the parliament was dissolved three months before its end of term, in preparation of new elections under, in which electoral rules had been modified. Such modification was done supposedly “to reduce fundamentalists’ advantage”[52] according to Boustani, referring mainly to Islamic fundamentalists and the IAF. Islamists indeed lost 14 seats, now with 18 IAF seats, and leftists won only 2 seats, with the rest going to centrists and conservative loyalists[53].

According to Raffaella Wakeman, changes to election law did not alter representation in terms of number of seats per district, but did change the system from Bloc voting to Single Non-Transferable voting (SNTV)[54]. Wakeman also identifies attempting to drive IAF out of the parliament as the main motivation behind the 1993 and 2001 election laws. However, since the original 1986, representation was not proportional, especially in the capital and other cities such as Zarqa, as a residual consequence from Black September, thus high amounts of Palestinians suffering malapportionment.

An interpretation of the 1993 modifications to election law is to facilitate moving forward with the peace treaty with Israel, which the parliament very well may have blocked its ratification. Thus, in facilitating the treaty by election mechanism “reform”, two parties took the hit: Islamic Movements in Jordan, mainly the IAF, which, still, remains the largest centralized party in the parliament, and Palestinian-Jordanians in general.

The 1994 Wadi Araba Jordanian-Israel Treaty of Peace created an additional rift in the country, one that empowered IAF opposition. More seriously perhaps, is the social issue of marginalization of Palestinian-Jordanians, who make up around 50% of the country, depending on which statistics you read, and yet are mis-represented within the Parliament.

Conclusion: Today’s Political System in context of the Past

Jordan’s political system today can definitely be seen as a result of decades’ worth of political repercussions, especially during Hussein’s time. Crises in the first decade of his term put significant strain on Jordanian national identity, highlighted differences between opposition and loyalists, often aligning these along racial lines. Hussein’s response in 1957 preserved Jordan and the regime’s stability, but cemented in the constitution basis for extended dissolution of the government and authoritarianism if the head of state sees it fit.

Black September had many long-standing political effects as well, it being most responsible for current social issues between Palestinians and Transjordanians in Jordan, and the basis for serious malapportionment in the government.

Today’s Political System includes two main issues of public concern, which are also possible hurdles to future democratization: first, the issue of Palestinian-Jordanian marginalization in the parliament and government, and second, the relationship between the government and the Islamic Action Front. The former can be described differently, as an issue of mis-proportional representation, especially in the country’s political and intellectual capital, Amman.

As for political development in the country, it has been very limited today. While press is partly to blame, the bulk of this issue comes from the nature of political parties in the country, with most opposition parties, with the exception of the IAF, weak, with no real political presence. This is a main hurdle to political development. The underlying reasons for this can be linked to Hussein’s policies of 1989 and 1992, which returned parliamentary life and political parties, and were hailed as positive steps in the direction of democracy. The problem is, given the History of Jordan since 1957, most political movements in the country have been of external influence, whether from Egyptian Nasserism, Egyptian Islamism, Syrian and Iraqi Ba’athism, Palestinian Nationalism, or Syrian Socialism and Communism. By the 1980s, these parties lost relevance in Jordan’s internal politics, and were only given legitimacy and popularity due to the political oppression of the regime. By 1989 and 1992, no party had a real agenda relevant to Jordan, other than blind support or criticism for the regime depending on its parent party, whether in Syria, Damascus, Baghdad, or others.

But the current regime can do a lot for harboring political development, from the de-marginalization of Palestinian-Jordanians and Amman, to increased transparency, political party laws, or other programs. And there is one important motivation here:

In support of my main objective in the abstract, the paper should have shown the malleability of the political system. For instance, the return of political party law in 1989 in an effort to please the people after riots regarding economic woes, but also all the way since refusing to sign the Baghdad Pact. Even if one doesn’t pass judgment on current state of “democracy”, the power of public pressure and the malleability of the political system have been integral to political development in Jordan even during periods of martial law and suspended parliament life.

Citations and Endnotes

Works Cited

On the move: Jordan. (peace talks with Israel). (1994, June 11). The Economist (US).

Abu-Odeh, A. (1999). Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East peace process. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Aruri, N. H. (1972). Jordan: a study in political development (1921-1965). The Hague: Nijhoff.

Boustani, N. (1993, November 10). Centrists and Hussein Loyalists Gain Seats in Jordan Election. The Washington Post.

Fruchter-Ronen, I. (2008). Black September: The 1970-71 Events and their Impact on the Formation of Jordanian National Identity. Civil Wars, 10(3), 244-260.

Hussein of Jordan. (1988, July 31). Address to the Nation. Retrieved May 9, 2010, from Official King Hussein Website: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/88_july31.html

Massad, J. A. (2001). Colonial effects : the making of national identity in Jordan. New York: Columbia University Press.

Murphy, C. (1989, November 9). Jordan Holds Parliamentary Election In New Mood of Political Openness . The Washington Post.

Press and Publication Department. (1967). Al-Watha’iq al-Urduniya [Jordanian Documents]. Amman: Press and Publications Department.

Queen Noor. (2003). Leap of Faith: Memoirs of an Unexpected Life. Miramax Books.

Satloff, R. B. (1994). From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in transition. New York: Oxford University Press.

Tal, N. (2005). Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.

Tawfiq Abul Huda, e. a. (1952, January 1). The Constitution of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Retrieved May 5, 2010, from King Hussein Library: Documents: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html

The Hindu. (1951, August 20). The Hindu. Retrieved May 4, 2010, from Abdullah assassination case opens: http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2001/08/20/stories/10201045.htm

The Middle East Journal. (1947, July). The Constitution of Transjordan. Middle East Journal, 1(3), pp. 322-333.

TIME. (1952, August 18). JORDAN: Schizophrenia. Retrieved May 5, 2010, from TIME: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,816694,00.html

TIME. (1957, May 6). Jordan: The Education of a King. Retrieved April 20, 2010, from TIME Archives: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,809412,00.html

Wakeman, R. L. (2009). Containing the opposition : selective representation in Jordan and Turkey. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.

Wiktorowicz, Q. (2001). The management of Islamic activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

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This one has been on my mind for a while. The current political situation in the Middle East is one of the topics I’m truly interested in, and I’ve been writing numerous posts related to the issue. One thing that caught me attention was that I was addressing a lot of Arab concerns against Israel and its regime (which I firmly believe in), and in so forgot to address my personal concerns about Arabic politics when it comes to the conflict.

I also decided to write this after a long conversation I had with a friend (whose also Arab) who believes that Jordanian politics regarding the issue, especially the 1994 Wadi `Araba Treaty, indicates that Jordan (or the government/king) has – in a sense – betrayed The Cause and other Arab countries.

I think that’s a completely wrong approach, and I believe the truth is that Jordan is a pioneer in seeking peace, and a Just Solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Had other Arab countries followed Jordan’s footsteps in large, then Arabs would’ve done their part in promoting a just peace, and stability in the region would’ve been a much more probable reality.

Since I think such belief that Jordan went against the Palestinian Cause (and Pan-Arab Values, fraternity, and unity) is utterly misconceived on numerous levels, I find it hard to find where to start. This is why I’ll divide the post into separate arguments that will hopefully complement each other.

(The outline is basically as follows: 1: Jordan was not alone in pursuing peace in the 1990′s, 2: Jordan did not go against Palestine, 3: While Jordan has peace, Jordan is not a neutral nation, 4: Other Cases of Jordanian Commitment to the Pan-Arab Cause).

1) Jordan was not alone in pursuing peace in the 1990’s

King Hussein of Jordan had Middle East peace aspirations even before the war of 1967. That did not stop him, or the country, from being properly aligned with the Arabs in the war of 1967, where Jordan, lead by King Hussein, entered a full-force war against Israel, and lost a considerable amount of land from the West Bank, which, at the time, was part of the Kingdom of Jordan. (Many people have doubts about Hussein’s intentions in the 1967 war, these will be discussed in future articles). As a matter of fact, while King Hussein talked to Israelis (as did Egyptian, Lebanese, and Syrian officials), he only allowed such talks to translate into a treaty much later on.

While Anwar El-Sadat was alone in signing a peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, King Hussein’s 1994 treaty happened in a different light that Arabs of today forget:After Egypt’s 1979 treaty, Egypt’s membership in the Arab League was suspended, along with diplomatic relations between Egypt and many other Arab States. In 1989, however, the Arab League restored relations with Egypt, which was readmitted into the league. (Timeline: Arab League, BBC News.  2008)

Even more importantly, is the Madrid Conference of 1991 which involved official representations from Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine, to negotiate peace.

Even in the 1993 Oslo Accords, Syria was invited to participate, and only refused participation due to the PLO’s participation (per “Oslo Accords: Background” on Wikipedia). I.e. Syria refused pursuing further negotiations of peace with Israel not due to its reservations towards Israel, but rather, the PLO (due to tensions in the Gulf War).

In any case, post 1989, there was a new direction across all Arab countries that aimed to put an end to the conflict. The general direction of most Arab states was, indeed, peace negotiations.

Jordan did not go out of its way in signing the treaty, it is only different from other Arab countries in that it was successful in reaching a treaty.

2) Jordan did not go against Palestine

Then, in 1993, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat sign the Oslo Accords, which at the time was seen as the end for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Since the Oslo Accords announced an ‘end of hostility’ between PLO (the “sole representative of the Palestinian Peoples”) and the State of Israel, a ‘framework of solutions’ have been laid out.

King Hussein has said that any peace treaty he would sign with Israel would not go against the Palestinian Cause. Since, in 1993, “the Cause” appeared to have been solved (or begin to be solved), the king had no reason not to pursue his country’s own peace with Israel.

Indeed, Oslo is seen to have given the king the green light to pursue signing a treaty.

How could Jordan have gone against Palestine with its treaty of peace, if the Palestinian Authority itself signed its own treaty of peace first? Whatever grievances and grudges held by Arab States against Israel are there as a result of compassion and fraternity towards the Arab Palestinian population. Once the population’s representation (meaning, the PA) expresses its aspirations for settlement and compromise, it is the duty of sister Arab states to stand by the Palestinians in ending the conflict, just as it were their duty to stand by the Palestinians in defending their land in 1948 and 1967.

Some might comment that I refer to the Oslo Accords as if it were a successful treaty, when, in fact, its outcome indicates immense failure. However, I am describing the Oslo Accords as they were seen at the time, by King Hussein and other Arab leaders. Furthermore, the failure of the Oslo Accords, in my view, is not to be attributed to deception on either side, but rather, the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, and the consequent election of  fundamentalist ^{(disclaimer: personal opinion)}, right-wing Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, running the country in an opposite direction, against the principles agreed upon in Oslo.

3) While Jordan has peace, Jordan is not a neutral nation

I repeat: Jordan is not a neutral nation. Policies of Jordan since 1994 have been consistently pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian.

It is frustrating to see that many thing Jordan has deserted the Palestinian Cause, because as I open my Jordanian newspaper every day, and see developments in Jordanian foreign politics, out efforts regarding Palestine are all I read about.

“Jordan will continue to fight for Palestinian rights — King” says one front-page headline in December, 2009[1]. “Time running out on Mideast” says another, clarifying: “In comments published Monday, His Majesty King Abdullah warned that the window of opportunity for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is very limited”[2].

In checking the front page of The Jordan Times between December 22nd, 2009 and January 1st, 2010, I have not found a single case where the Palestine did not occupy front-page headline news. More often than not, headline news regarding Palestine is not detached, and often covers government initiatives, speeches by the King, diplomatic visits by the king and government, talks with Abbas, the Israeli government, etc., regarding reaching a solution to the conflict.

When did the last time any non-Jordanian, non-Egyptian Arab diplomat take the time to speak of Palestine instead of his own country on official state visits and speeches? The are a few exceptions, but at large, Jordan is one of the very few countries that is genuinely deeply interested in a Just Solution for the Palestinians.

Or how about this one? In King Abdullah’s Speech to the Congress in 2007, the words “Jordan”, “Jordanian”, etc. were uttered a total of 7 times, compared to the 15 times Palestine was mentioned! And I’m not being silly and just counting words, go ahead, click the link above, and read the speech. This is our king’s speech on a state visit to the U.S. You would think it’d be in Jordan’s best interest to talk about foreign aid, economical reform, cooperation (as do the leaders of the rest of the Middle Eastern countries), but he – representing the position of Jordan in the conflict – chose, and continues to choose the issue of Palestine, making it Jordan’s main mission, in terms of foreign policy. Go ahead, give it a read, this is what Jordan stands for, advocating peace in the Middle East, and a Just Solution for Palestine.

In official state visits to Japan, the EU, and the U.S., the general attitude of news items is along the lines of: “the King stressed the importance of a viable Palestinian state… oh, and by the way, they agreed on economical cooperation”, or something.

Also, Jordan openly denounces and condemns Israeli settlement expansion, as well as Israeli military moves against other Arab nations. In the 2006 Lebanon war, a statement from the Jordanian government denounced Israel’s actions (yes, even though we signed a peace treaty with them):

“Jordan stands against whoever exposes the Palestinian people and their cause, Lebanon and its sovereignty to unexpected dangers. Israel’s use of force against unarmed civilians and the outcome in terms of the human loss and destruction of civil institutions.”

BBC NEWS

As for the Gaza War:

SALAH BASHIR, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Jordan, said his country felt deep pain and grave concern at the escalation of violence and deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, […]  The military operations were a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and the Fourth Geneva Convention.

un.org/News/Press/docs//2009/sc9563.doc.htm

I’m not asking anyone to commend Jordan on such quotes, because that’s Jordan’s duty. The point of showing such quotes is to emphasize that Jordan continues to criticize Israel – and harshly – whenever it feels compelled by Arab duty to do so. While Jordan engages in full normalization with Israel, it does not engage in neutralization. Please, do not confuse the two; the feelings, emotions, views, and motivations of the Jordanian people and their leadership remain the same: in full support of the Palestinians, we discovered, however, that our pro-Palestinian message and efforts are best conveyed in an atmosphere of peace and dialogue.

Point is, foreign politics of Jordan is centered around the Palestinian Cause. Saying Jordan deserted Palestine or other Arab States because of its peace with Israel insults the very foundation of Jordanian policy.

4) Other Cases of Jordanian Commitment to the Pan-Arab Cause

Also among Jordanian Efforts, are King Hussein’s interference in the Wye River Memorandum of 1998 (will be discussed in a future article), and his facilitation of the Hebron Agreement that lead to the pulling back of the “IDF”, out of Hebron. Jordan’s aid to the Gaza strip, and continuous donations to Palestine are also among these.

In the Lebanon war in 2006, Jordan’s Queen Alia International Airport was the first and only airport to be used to send aid/relief aircrafts to Lebanon during the war. Countries like the UAE used Jordan as a medium to send its own relief planes soonafter,  taking advantage of the safe air passage opened by Jordan to Lebanon, based on negotiations with Israel. Also, In the Gaza War in 2008-09, relief as usual, and a huge blood donation campaign, in which the king was one of thousands to donate blood.

An important example, that shows Jordan’s commitment to the Arab cause, and its proper prioritization of Arab interests above Jordanian interests is the following story:

On 25/09/97, Khaled Mashal, a prominent Hamas leader, suffered an assassination attempt by Israeli Mossad agents, while presiding in Jordan (where he lived between ‘91-‘99).  King Hussein threatened to cut diplomatic relations with Israel, and nulling the 1994 treaty of peace if an antidote is not given to Mashal, and indeed, an antidote was supplied. Jordanian authorities also captured the Mossad agents, and released them in exchange of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, founder of Hamas.

Over and out.

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As such, I’ll be writing a series of articles under the category of “Jordan – Know More!“, of which this is the first part.

Jordan and Democracy: Know More

Recently, on November 23rd, King Abdullah issued a Royal Decree calling for the dissolution of the 15th Jordanian Parliament, and carrying out early elections, previously slated for 2011. Following news of the Royal Decree, 85% of Jordanians rejoiced from across the political spectrum,while almost every non-Jordanian I have encountered used this as ‘tangible evidence’ of oppression of democracy and exploitation of power. Why? Why the discrepancy? Alas, they just don’t know any better.

Throughout this post, I’ll go through several misconceptions about this recent event, perhaps such discussion will make a difference.

Who wilt it?

Granted, the direct translation of Royal Decree (إرادة ملكية) gives ‘Royal Will’ or ‘Royal Wish’, a rather straightforward indication that it is the King’s wish that is being executed here. But ‘Why’ is a much more interesting and qualitative question; why is it that the king would wish for a parliament to be dissolved? I’ll quote a couple of sources.

Jordanian newspaper Alghad writes (translated):

“Furthermore, politicians confirm that the poor performance of the Council of Representatives, both legislative and regulatory framework, was the most important reason for issuing the Royal Decree to dissolve it, expecting carrying out the coming elections under a new law.”

Jordanian blogger Naseem Tarawnah quotes the same poll I linked to above, saying:

“The poll [...] revealed that 78% of respondents believe the reason for the decision to be due to incompetency of the MPs. Interestingly enough, 90% strongly support early elections, 69% strongly support a new election law, and 88% strongly support establishing an independent body to administer the elections.”

Poor performance. Incompetence.

Sure, the king is dissolving a parliament elected by the people, but here’s an undeniable fact: the people are very keen on seeing the parliament they elected dissolved. Very.

For those of you wondering about the reliability of the poll, it was conducted by Ammonnews, an independent, non-governmental, alternative media website and seld-described news agency based in Jordan. The poll addressed 200 individuals, amongst them (translated) “leaders, polititians, party members, media activists, academics, tribal leaders, and members of civil institutions in an effort to reflect public opinion trends”. Check out the details yourself if you can read Arabic.

An ‘Incompetent Parliament’ Says a lot about Your Democracy

No, it doesn’t. An incompetent parliament only says a lot about the social and socio-political structure and atomsphere within Jordan. It just so happens that we have a fragmented majority supporting the government (with countless political parties), and a unified, centralized, minority forming the opposition (with a single dominant political party: the Islamic Action Front, IAF). Such societal structure, combined with our flawed electoral law, leads to poor and biased representation within the government, and promotes tribal leaders and non-intellectuals, giving them the upper hand in voting. Indeed, the Jordanian Parliament often stood in the face of progress, barring numerous proposed bills, including Women’s Rights bills.

Aha! So your flawed electoral law has been forged by your autocratic leaders to hijack your liberties!

Again, not really. Assuming people who make such arguments refer to the King as the ultimate autocratic figure (who, indeed, is the single most powerful  individual in Jordan), such argument fails for one basic reason: the overrepresented groups in the parliament are those who are the most responsible for hindering the King’s effort in this country.

Indeed, the previous partliament (also elected under the same Electoral Law), were responsible for failing a bill suggested by the Queen herself, pertaining to the status of women in Jordan.

So how was the 15th Parliament ‘incompetent’ to the people?

Those unfamiliar with internal Jordanian politics would be quick to assert that words such “incompetent”, “dysfunctional”, and “poor performance” are in reference to the King’s Agenda. In other words, many might assume that anything that opposes the King’s agenda, whatever it may be, is deemed incompetent by our biased media.

In fact, that cannot be further from the truth. Incompetence of the 15th Parliament is a result of the outcry of the people, not a biased decision by the king.

Indeed, for the 15th Parliament,  Jordan Times writes:

“[...] in the last extraordinary session, lawmakers approved only 13 laws out of 29 listed on their agenda, which included laws of interest to the public.

The extraordinary session was adjourned while deputies were still discussing the income tax draft law, having only finished 11 articles of the 70-article law.

The government also withdrew the energy draft law and the income tax draft law to amend them in accordance with developments in these two sectors.”

Doesn’t this prove that the King has the ultimate power in this country?

Yes and no. On the one hand, yes, there is great power that can be abused into a so-called ‘ultimate power’, but on the other: no, there is no intention of having it abused, and any possibility of such event ever occurring is too remote such that, for all practical purposes, is considered nonexistent.

For instance, while the parliament can be dissolved, the constitution makes sure such dissolution is never abused Musa Alshuqairi quotes a Jordan Times article:

“According to Article 73 of the Constitution, if the Lower House is dissolved, a general election will be held, and the new chamber has to convene in an extraordinary session no later than four months from the date of dissolution. The same article stipulates that if no elections have taken place by the end of the four months, the dissolved House will assume its full constitutional powers and assemble as if its dissolution had not taken place.”

So yes, temporary laws can be enacted during these 4 months, but some parliament will need to pass them as soon as a parliament is decided on. And if the parliament is not elected, the consitution commands that the old parliament be re-summoned and restored, thus giving it a say in passing or failing all temporary laws that have been enacted for the previous four months.

Kapish?

So what powers does the Jordanian-elected Parliament have?

The parliament is responsible of passing laws, so that any law – whether pushed by the government or the king – needs to go through the Parliament, in both its chambers, before being passed. The parliament is also responsible for the provision of the government, and can, after the formation of every government, voice their opinion and express their blessing or ‘distrust’ in the government. In the case that the Parliament expresses contempt towards the newly appointed government, the government itself is dissolved and a new one is appointed. The King himself appoints the Prime Minister, who, in turn, appoints the rest of the government. This nascent government will have a short period before it is evaluated by the parliament. So, while the King has the power of appointing and pushing the Prime Minister to create a certain government, the King does so in a way as to go hand-in-hand with the wishes of the people and the government.

We’re a constitutional monarchy, not an absolute monarchy. Jordan is governed by a solid constitution that gives power to the people to voice their concerns and direct the political process of the country. Are full powers given to the people? Not yet. The parliament did, for instance, attempt to revoke the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1994 as a reaction to the Gaza War. Luckily, while our parliament can be insane, our monarchy is not; such wishes within the government were given no legitimacy. (I’ll be working on an upcoming post about Jordan and the 1994 treaty with Israel).

So yes, I understand the importance of Democracy, but any “limitations” existing in Jordan in these times are doing us good. The king expressed, multiple times, his wishes of increased democracy (which contextually implies increased power restrictions on his part), but such top-down modification in the system must be handled with the utmost caution.

So, what are your King’s intentions?

Glad you asked. In reference to the dissolution for the parliament, the Jordan times says:

In a letter to Prime Minister Nader Dahabi, the King stressed that these elections “should be a model of transparency, fairness and integrity, and a promising step in our process of reform and modernisation, the aims of which are to achieve the best for our nation and to expand the horizon of progress and prosperity for Jordanians”. [...] He also directed the government to develop the electoral process “in such a manner that the next legislative elections will be qualitatively improved and all Jordanians will practise their right to campaign and to elect their representatives in Parliament”.

While referencing a 2005 article by  The Washington Institute of Near East Policy, a Wikipedia article states:

King Abdullah also decreed that journalists would no longer be imprisoned in Jordan and he called for the liberalization of Jordan’s press. He has given his support to the human rights organizations operating in Jordan to conduct investigations on any human rights misdemeanors and called on the government to correct these problems. King Abdullah was commended on his political reform strategies.

Above are the relevant examples on the intentions of the Jordanian leadership in the scope of political and democratic reform. Other efforts in foreign policy, education, economy, poverty elimination, refugee admission, energy, Arab nationalism, and cooperation are equally, if not more, commendable. Such efforts cannot be discussed in this article, however, because they do not correspond to today’s core topic. They will, however, be discussed in relatively more detail, in future posts.

Conclusion

As I said, I find it disturbing that Jordan is oftened misunderstood, even by fellow Arab states, who underestimate our liberties, marginalize the efforts of our leadership, and wrongly view the entire Jordanian political process. While 60 years ago things may or may not have been different, fellow Arab countries today need to recognize that the Jordanian leadership, ranging from the monarchy to the active youth, is not only working together internally, but is also a magnificent and legitimate force of great intentions and visions. The Jordanian leadership already works closely with several Arab governments, but vocal groups within society in the Arab states must realize the viabilityo f the Jordanian leadership as well.

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