Prelude

I was wishing to write on this topic long ago, and I started writing on it since three weeks ago, but never got around to publish. Unfortunately for me, perhaps, the topic was debated (albeit in a limited way) and many did reach the conclusion that I was trying to argue for. Nevertheless, this article should be there for the sake of completeness.

A big taboo in Jordan is the critical discussion of the Hashemite Monarchy and the Institution of the Throne. Unfortunately, this makes for real intellectual debate on the institution of the Throne rare and weak, and result in having criticisms of the monarchy happen in concentrated outlets, with one-sided arguments, without real objective consideration.

The truth is, if anyone wishes to advocate for reform in Jordan, a position on the Hashemite Throne must be established, whether in private or in the argument. The reason for this is that, if whoever advocates for reform establishes that the institution of the throne is no good, then the matter of reform altogether should be dropped altogether and replaced with revolution. To establish the need for reform, one must first establish if the very core of the system is viable, and I think it is.

Again, to emphasize, this article is not a defense but rather a part of a series on reform, and it wishes to investigate the legitimacy of the monarchy as an institution, both historically and in the present context. I will establish that this institution does have legitimacy, or at least some legitimacy, and in the way shed light on the societal requirements from the Throne to secure stability (of the country) and legitimacy (of the establishment).

Part 1: On the Institution of the Throne and the Legitimacy of the Hashemite Monarchy

Before we can discuss the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy, we must establish how the legitimacy of an institution is measured. The legitimacy of an institution, I believe, is established by an answer of “yes” to two questions:

1. Was it (or is it) in the will of the people to have the institution?
2. Does this institution serve the greater good of the nation?

Both questions must hold at any period in time, though I will argue that the second question should hold slightly more weight than the first.

Historically, the two questions can be answered in a straightforward fashion. Challengers of the Hashemite monarchy often  tell a story of an Emir from Hijaz, heading to Syria, stopping along the way in Transjordan and creating a country, or a story of a figure from Hijaz, installed by Western Powers for their own ambitions. Independent of these stories, however, is the establishment of allegiance to Emir Abdullah and the Hashemite Throne in 1920.

Establishment of allegiance, also known in Arabic as mubaya`a (مبايعة), is the traditional Islamic way in which Arab tribes negotiate and establish allegiance to a ruler. In all senses, the establishment of rule in the Arab world through mubaya`a is legitimate: it is a traditional, direct negotiation between monarch-to-be and the constituency, through “legitimate” social hierarchies of tribesmen and tribe-leaders. In 1920s Transjordan, the country was mainly tribalist, and even residents of cities were rooted into the known Jordanian tribes, and were often in close contact. Even minorities, like Christian and Circassian families at that time had already organized themselves into large families that are analogous to such tribes. That is to say: such negotiation of allegiance to Abdullah I did cover the entire constituency. Then and there, in 1920, the tribes decided that their interests are deeply rooted with that of the Hashemites, and they willed the creation of a Hashemite Kingdom in Transjordan.

Therefore, we established how it was the will of the people to have the institution of the throne, specifically, the Hashemite throne.

There is a little subtlety, however, which is the annexation of the West Bank in 1949, and thus the imposition of the establishment on the population of Palestinian origins. Was it the will of those people to have the establishment? The answer is complex, and highly debatable. The Husseini’s were clearly against a Hashemite rule of the West Bank, while the Nashashibi’s were in favor. And Jerusalem at the time (and with it, the West Bank as a whole), was divided in allegiance between the Husseini’s and Nashashibi’s, and through the effort of a Jerusalem Parliament (whose authenticity and legitimacy is to be questioned), it was decided that the West Bank is to go under the establishment. As such, one cannot say much about whether it was the will of some 50% of the today’s population’s ancestry to be under the Establishment—that I admit.

As for the second question: does the institution of the throne serve the greater good of the nation? To that, I would answer yes, and popular discourse in Jordan today seems to agree: unprecedented populist expressions of loyalty to the idea of the throne, and a Hashemite throne specifically, even if people are asking for limitations of the monarch’s powers. Jamal al-Sha`ir, a Ba`athist, had said in 1998:

I started understanding how much Jordan is attached—Jordan as a country and a people, especially Transjordanians—how much the future of these people and the whole country is connected with the Hashemite throne. If the Hashemite throne goes, Jordan goes. I started believing this only in the last ten years. But many people believed it before us. But we rejected it when we were young.

Source: Anderson, Betty S.. Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State. 2005. Austin, TX.

Thus, there is a consensus, it seems, that the Hashemite throne is somehow linked to the goodwill of Jordan, but again, with a few subtleties:

1. The sentence “especially Transjordanians” appears, through al-Sha`ir assures that Jordanians of Palestinian origins are also covered when he adds “and the whole country”. Still, the distinction is of interest later on, and introduces some very interesting paradoxes.
2. We don’t understand why the prosperity of the Hashemite throne is in the best interest of the country and vice versa.

A good answer to the second question is that the platform of the Hashemites (starting the Sons of Hussein of Mecca to an extent, but much more so since King Hussein I) consistently included a mix of Arab nationalism, secular governance, and foreign policies of moderation¹ that is congruent with the needs and aspiration of the people. Another answer (or an additional benefit) may also be that the idea of a monarch is also necessary when certain social division, especially in religion, race, but more so in origin, exist, and a power is needed to “moderate” democracy and make sure that no minority will be abused by the tyranny of a majority. Does Jordan need something like the latter? This will be discussed later, but in short, current Transjordanian nationalist movements are alarming and show us that such might be necessary.

In Short: The Palestinian Paradox and the Transjordanian Establishment

The interesting story of the status of Jordanians of Palestinian origins today and the social complexities that surround it will be tackled in another upcoming post. However, the Palestinian Paradox is a more contemporary issue that (while completely rooted in the former) can be discussed independently. The Palestinian Paradox, basically, is this:

Given the two criteria, as well as the rhetoric of those like al-Sha`ir, the legitimacy of the Hashemite Throne from the perspective of the Palestinian-Jordanians is debatable, which also pauses a serious threat to the legitimacy of the throne in the country, considering those of Palestinian origins are a large part of the population. Also given the criteria, the Establishment is a Transjordanian Establishment, initially aimed at a Transjordanian constituency. The Paradox basically states that, if we are to assume these two facts, then there is a contradiction, and the only way to avoid the contradiction is to assert that the Establishment is also legitimate for Palestinians and extended to a pan-Jordanian (or, Jordanian) establishment. Namely:

If we attempt to make the assumption that that the Hashemite Throne is illegitimate from a Palestinian-Jordanian standpoint, then the end game will result in damage for those of Palestinian origins, making such an impossible option. Or, to paraphrase: trends of racist transjordanian nationalism show that the Establishment is actually making more ‘controversial’ decisions in the protection of those of Palestinian origins from the Tyranny of Transjordanian nationalism, than it is making controversial decisions in the marginalization of those citizens.

That is not to say that the marginalization of Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origins is to be permissible at any level, or that it is ethically or practically justifiable. And I will go at lengths in discussing this in future parts. What I am saying, however, is that while there is some marginalization of Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origins, recent events show that this does not translate into bias against Jordanians of Palestinian origins, as far as the Establishment is concerned.

Conclusion

In general, one can see both historical and contemporary justification of the Hashemite Throne as a legitimate entity, whose well-being is in the best interest of the nation, and vice-versa. With many ethnic tensions existing in Jordan, especially those between Transjordanian-Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origins, the buffer of an entity to moderate democracy and control the political system is necessary. The structure of the system, the limitations of powers on the king, and the institutions entailed by the establishment, however, are not free from flaw and need to be reformed.

Coming next in the series on the Jordanian Establishment: The Ethnic Affairs.

Notes:

1. As an aside, Marwan Muasher criticizes the use of “moderate” to describe states that practice foreign policy moderation with Israel, not because he disagrees, but because he believes that such states don’t extend such moderation to their internal policies and thus cannot be called truly moderate in every sense — only so in foreign policy. I agree, actually.

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This took a good portion of my energy for the past month, and discusses the history of political development, and its lack thereof, in Jordan. It is rather long, but nevertheless, if you have a comment or something to say, then at least more than the abstract. You can either view it here, or, for more comfortable viewing, check the PDF at Scribd.

Abstract

This paper discusses the development of a political system in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in an effort to understand the state of the current political system in the country. Different phases and defining moments in the history of Jordan will be studied, and will often directly correspond to phases of Jordanian national identity. Starting from the assassination of King Abdullah I and the short-lived reign of Talal, through the numerous coup d’état attempts in early reign of Hussein I, up to the 1994 Wadi Araba Treaty of Peace, the effect of ongoing events in shaping a political system in Jordan will be explored.

The development of a political system in Jordan will be discussed hand-in-hand along with contemporary regional politics and political movements, coupled with internal views regarding national identity. As such, the rise of Nasser and Nasserism is examined, illustrating the impact of the increasingly popular Nasserist movements in the 1950’s on the government, its policy, and the political system. Similarly, the Arab-Israeli Conflict as a whole, including the Six-Day war, the influence of the PLO, the rise of Fedayeen, and Black September will be reviewed, showing how these also shaped state policy. In addition, the rise of Islamic movements, particularly the Islamic Action Force (IAF), the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and its relation to and impact on the political system will be discussed throughout the course of history.

It will be argued that the period of the late 1950s in King Hussein’s reign, the Six-day war of 1967, the battle of Karameh of 1968, and most importantly, Black September of 1970, have been defining moments in the history of a Jordanian national identity and the formation of its current-day political system. The paper will reason that Black September represents the climax of an internal political crisis that lasted throughout the ‘70s and ‘80s.

The development of a Jordanian political system will be studied, beginning with King Talal and Prime Minister Tawfiq abul-Huda’s rewriting of the constitution and the establishment of some sort of a semi-democracy that is put to the test in the 1952 abdication of King Talal. The effect of Nasserist-inspired coup d’état attempts, as well as Black September on the Jordanian political system will be investigated, as well as the 23-year-long era of martial law, and the still-developing political system that emerged afterwards.

The essay aims to argue that the current political system – as well as its lack-thereof – in Jordan, is a result of a combination of organic development and non-development due to a century’s internal, as well as regional, political repercussions. It is my hope that this paper would illustrate the malleability of the political system and the possibility of continuous improvement. More so, it is my hope to illustrate that the existing political system (whether its current state is fortunate or unfortunate) is a result of internal, regional, and – seldom – external political repercussions, rather than a set static agenda by the ruling elite.

Background

Since Abdullah I’s reign, the newly-created kingdom of Jordan was particularly unstable; the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan (East Bank) has just merged with the West Bank, absorbing highly politicized Palestinian West Bankers, as well as refugees, giving them all Jordanian citizenship, and tripling the population of the country[1]. The entering population of Palestinians was more sophisticated, urbanized, and educated than the average Transjordanian population, which was predominantly Bedouin. Palestinians loyal to the Mufti also saw Jordan as an occupying power, and held a “high moral ground”, believing that Jordan’s Arab Legion, along with other Arab armies, have failed them, while others looked at King Abdullah as a “protector against Israeli aggression”. It is important to note that, until 1967, these Palestinians never demanded separation from the East Bank.[2]

Thus, with a tripled population, a Transjordanian-Palestinian divide, strong Palestinian nationalism, and a growing refugee problem, the newly-created Hashemite kingdom was in highly critical times…

Beginning of Change

With three fatal gunshots[3] the life of newly-created kingdom of Jordan’s first monarch ended, marking the beginning of decades of uncertainty and instability that continue to leave a distinctive mark on the country’s political system today. Abdullah’s successor, his son Talal, shaped by his father’s mistreatment during his upbringing, was resolved on becoming his father’s polar opposite, and as such initiated far-reaching reforms to the Jordanian political system.[4]

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Jordan is one of the most misunderstood nations in the region; an observation that is bothering me. While it is true that that the Middle East as a whole, Arab States, Islamic States, and Islam are all misunderstood entities, the problem with the outside-looking-in view on Jordan is that it is sheerly misunderstood even by fellow Middle Eastern and Arab states. It seems like topics such as Jordanian Foreign Policy, our approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and democracy and society in this country are all misunderstood, or sometimes marginalized, subjects.

As such, I’ll be writing a series of articles under the category of “Jordan – Know More!“, of which this is the first part.

Jordan and Democracy: Know More

Recently, on November 23rd, King Abdullah issued a Royal Decree calling for the dissolution of the 15th Jordanian Parliament, and carrying out early elections, previously slated for 2011. Following news of the Royal Decree, 85% of Jordanians rejoiced from across the political spectrum,while almost every non-Jordanian I have encountered used this as ‘tangible evidence’ of oppression of democracy and exploitation of power. Why? Why the discrepancy? Alas, they just don’t know any better.

Throughout this post, I’ll go through several misconceptions about this recent event, perhaps such discussion will make a difference.

Who wilt it?

Granted, the direct translation of Royal Decree (إرادة ملكية) gives ‘Royal Will’ or ‘Royal Wish’, a rather straightforward indication that it is the King’s wish that is being executed here. But ‘Why’ is a much more interesting and qualitative question; why is it that the king would wish for a parliament to be dissolved? I’ll quote a couple of sources.

Jordanian newspaper Alghad writes (translated):

“Furthermore, politicians confirm that the poor performance of the Council of Representatives, both legislative and regulatory framework, was the most important reason for issuing the Royal Decree to dissolve it, expecting carrying out the coming elections under a new law.”

Jordanian blogger Naseem Tarawnah quotes the same poll I linked to above, saying:

“The poll [...] revealed that 78% of respondents believe the reason for the decision to be due to incompetency of the MPs. Interestingly enough, 90% strongly support early elections, 69% strongly support a new election law, and 88% strongly support establishing an independent body to administer the elections.”

Poor performance. Incompetence.

Sure, the king is dissolving a parliament elected by the people, but here’s an undeniable fact: the people are very keen on seeing the parliament they elected dissolved. Very.

For those of you wondering about the reliability of the poll, it was conducted by Ammonnews, an independent, non-governmental, alternative media website and seld-described news agency based in Jordan. The poll addressed 200 individuals, amongst them (translated) “leaders, polititians, party members, media activists, academics, tribal leaders, and members of civil institutions in an effort to reflect public opinion trends”. Check out the details yourself if you can read Arabic.

An ‘Incompetent Parliament’ Says a lot about Your Democracy

No, it doesn’t. An incompetent parliament only says a lot about the social and socio-political structure and atomsphere within Jordan. It just so happens that we have a fragmented majority supporting the government (with countless political parties), and a unified, centralized, minority forming the opposition (with a single dominant political party: the Islamic Action Front, IAF). Such societal structure, combined with our flawed electoral law, leads to poor and biased representation within the government, and promotes tribal leaders and non-intellectuals, giving them the upper hand in voting. Indeed, the Jordanian Parliament often stood in the face of progress, barring numerous proposed bills, including Women’s Rights bills.

Aha! So your flawed electoral law has been forged by your autocratic leaders to hijack your liberties!

Again, not really. Assuming people who make such arguments refer to the King as the ultimate autocratic figure (who, indeed, is the single most powerful  individual in Jordan), such argument fails for one basic reason: the overrepresented groups in the parliament are those who are the most responsible for hindering the King’s effort in this country.

Indeed, the previous partliament (also elected under the same Electoral Law), were responsible for failing a bill suggested by the Queen herself, pertaining to the status of women in Jordan.

So how was the 15th Parliament ‘incompetent’ to the people?

Those unfamiliar with internal Jordanian politics would be quick to assert that words such “incompetent”, “dysfunctional”, and “poor performance” are in reference to the King’s Agenda. In other words, many might assume that anything that opposes the King’s agenda, whatever it may be, is deemed incompetent by our biased media.

In fact, that cannot be further from the truth. Incompetence of the 15th Parliament is a result of the outcry of the people, not a biased decision by the king.

Indeed, for the 15th Parliament,  Jordan Times writes:

“[...] in the last extraordinary session, lawmakers approved only 13 laws out of 29 listed on their agenda, which included laws of interest to the public.

The extraordinary session was adjourned while deputies were still discussing the income tax draft law, having only finished 11 articles of the 70-article law.

The government also withdrew the energy draft law and the income tax draft law to amend them in accordance with developments in these two sectors.”

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